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Abstract 
Since January 1991, Somalia has been a war-torn society without law and order machinery. 
After a decade of chaos, in January 2001, an interim government formed in Djibouti was brought 
to Mogadishu, albeit it failed to function. Two similar others followed; one in 2004 and the other 
in 2007. In 2012, a federal government was elected by 275 members of parliament, but it is yet to 
govern most of the country’s regions. Consequently, over 25 years, there has been sociopolitical 
and economic instability which jeopardised Somalia’s environment and security (land and marine). 
Now, who are the actors of socio-political and economic instability, and can marine sustainability 
be achieved in the absence of stability?  
This doctoral study identifies, defines, examines and analyzes each of the state and non-
state actors/networks operating in Somalia, at the international, regional, national, provincial, and 
local levels. I investigated who are they and what are their backgrounds/origins? What are their 
objectives and strategies? What are their capacities and economic status? What are their motives 
and manoeuvres? and what are their internal and external relationships? I categorised each one of 
them based on these scales: instability, potential stability or stability. I adopted a multi-dimensional 
approach which aims at tackling both marine environmental degradation and insecurity in the 
Somali basin, while establishing a community-based policy as a milestone for the formulation of 
a national/provincial policy.  
The study finds out that the competing multifaceted and multipurpose (economic, political 
or social gains) networks deliberately or inadvertently destroy the country’s environment and 
contribute to instability. Yet, in the country’s post-conflict situation, environmental traditional-
based policy and socio-legal systems can be practiced at the grassroots level. I then proposed the 
roles to be played by individuals, local communities, provincials, and national, as well as regional, 
and international communities in the implementation of this bottom-up approach policy. While 
showing the relationship between environmental sustainability and sociopolitical stability, I argue 
that marine problems are borderless and as such, need global attention. I shed light on how war-
torn states and post-conflict countries can establish vital means of environmental sustainability by 
applying community-based policy, implemented through self-help programs.  
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Chapter One 
General Introduction to Somalia  
Introduction 
Somali Democratic Republic (commonly known as Somalia) is an African sub-Saharan 
country that borders to the North the Gulf of Aden, the East and South on the Indian Ocean, to the 
Southwest Kenya, to the West Ethiopia, and to the Northwest Djibouti. Genealogically, the Somali 
people trace their lineage back to one fore-father called “Samal.” Even though they are divided 
into clans and sub-clans, they are still as one entity when it comes to culture, customs, behaviour, 
language, and religion.  
In this chapter, I introduce my audiences to the social, political, economic and 
environmental dynamics of Somalia. I describe the impacts of the civil war, from 1990-2014, on 
these four areas. I highlight the Somalia’s clan system and the connection, between coastal 
communities’ lifestyles and marine geography. Furthermore, I describe Somalia’s foreign 
relations’ networks and their domestic influence networks and the roles of various foreign forces 
in destabilizing the country. In this study, I highlight, (but will investigate and analyse in chapter 
3, 4 & 5) the link between Somali government policies and an array of its socio-political and 
economic stakeholders at the international/regional, national, and provincial/local levels. 
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1.1: Somalia: from Central Authoritative System to Unstable Fiefdoms 
Pre-independence, the European imperial forces divided Somalia at the Berlin Partition 
Conference in 1897 into: 1) British-Somaliland, 2) Italy-Somaliland, 3) Ogaden and Liban (under 
Ethiopian rule), 4) Northern Frontier District - NFD (under Kenyan authority), 5) Socotra Islands 
(under South Yemen administration), and 6) Djibouti under the French colonial administration 
(Gregoire, 2010). British-Somaliland and Italy-Somaliland were declared as an independent state 
on June 26, 1960 and July 1, 1960 respectively. The two were united as one state called Somalia 
inaugurated on July 1, 1960. A civilian system of governance was formed that lasted a 9-year term. 
The first head of state, President Aden Abdulle, came to power through Parliamentary election, 
and ruled until July 1967. During that time, the country's economic and financial capacity was 
limited to the level of "from hand to mouth" (Mubarak, 1996). The civilian government was 
condemned for being weak and haphazard (CIA World Fact Book, 2004). Although this would be 
expected in the case of any newly established state, Somalia’s first administration was accused of 
letting a few individuals manipulate the country’s resources and power (Mubarak, 1996). 
Corruption and graft began. Besides the corruption in the public properties, there has been constant 
clan-based warfare, droughts and a lack of national progress. During these critical circumstances 
of economic deficiency, natural disasters, insecurity, maladministration, and political turmoil a 
few individuals who had access to the public property have lived high lifestyles.  
In the first administration, the majority of the Somalis, irrespective of their clans, felt that 
they neither had their rightful shares to the national resources nor any political power (Mubarak, 
1996). Consequently, in 1967, a new President, Adbirshid Ali Sharmake, was elected by the same 
parliament, but he also failed to achieve any significant positive change. Sharmake was shot dead 
3 
 
on 15 October 1969 by one of his body-guards (Mahmood, 2001). In the next two weeks, the 
Parliament argued over who would replace him. The dispute showed no hope of resolution. As a 
result, the national military, under the leadership of their Chief Commander Major General 
Mohamed Siad Barre, took power, by force, on 21 October 1969. The coup d’état was bloodless, 
no one was injured and not a single bullet fired.  
       The Military Junta called its mission the “Holy Revolution,” naming M. S. Barre as the 
President of the country with an unlimited mandate. During its first 15 years, the revolution 
transformed the economy of the country. The economy boomed and was recognized as the 
“miracle economy” in Africa. The country was one of the strongest African countries in military 
forces, diplomatic relations, development projects, and domestic policies. In military terms, 
despite its small population, Somalia was the second super-power – after Egypt - in Africa (Luis, 
1993). Within in a decade, the regime announced self-sufficiency (Kibreab, 1994). Most of the 
nomads were given lands for farming or boats for fishing (Metz, 1992; Luis, 2001). Consequently, 
the unemployment rate had drastically fallen to its lowest level (Abdi, 1998). In the main cities, 
household energy and drinking water were made free, albeit, later on, low charges were applied 
for electricity. The Majority of the government employees were settled in government houses for 
free (Metz, 1992). Pre-university education was compulsory and the university students were 
remunerated for attending post-secondary education (Abdi, 1998). Entertainment was made 
abundant. However, songs and dramas were censured. In the country, political discussion was 
made illegal and there was only one media “SONA1” as a source of information (Metz, 1992) 
                                                          
1 There were only one Radio “Radio Mogadishu”, one TV station “The National TV”, one journal “The October Star”, and post 
office “The National Post” in the country. The ideas of private medias and competitive medias were not there.  
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The Holy Revolution attempted to enforce the political decision made by the first 
recognized Somali administration inaugurated on July 1, 1960, which was to bring back the 
missing regions of the Somali inhabitants in the name of Pan-Somalism2. In 1977, the 
revolutionary administration waged a massive war against Ethiopia and advanced nearly to its 
capital city, Addis Ababa. After a year of conquest, the most powerful socialist states, including 
the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea, South Yemen, Libya, and others directly attacked the Somali 
military inside Ethiopia driving them back home (Lalieu, 2010). After this defeat, some of the 
Somali clans and sub-clans rebelled against their government.  
From late 1985, the regime became weaker and steadily lost its capability to govern. The 
people were divided into several clans and sub-clans (Luis, 2011). Deep hatred and animosity 
against one another was instigated and planted by clannish oppositions. The widespread animosity 
and clan warfare hindered all economic sectors that existed in the country, and consequently, led 
to the collapse of not only the economy, but also the livelihood of the people. At this stage, the 
ambition of Pan-Somalism in the Horn of Africa died, due to a lack of military and financial 
power3. 
Somalia has been a war torn society since January 1991 (Little, 2003). From 1991-2000, 
there was no governmental authority to provide governance and services for the population, but 
since then, there has been a series of attempts to form a practical public administration. Between 
the years of 2000 and 2012, three transitional governments were formed, but all to no avail as they 
made insignificant progress towards stability. Similarly, there were not less than 23 reconciliation 
                                                          
2 Upon the independence of the two liberated regions, British-Somaliland and Italian-Somaliland, Somali political leaders 
unanimously agreed on seeking other non-liberated regions through both diplomatic and military means, but to, strategically, forgo 
and forget one of these regions, which is Socotra Islands under Yemen’s control. 
3 Even the only two united regions became separated by conflict, albeit not recognized as two separate states, and the most 
destructive civil war in modern history has ruined the nation for over two decades. 
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conferences held outside the country, but all ended as failures, except the three, which produced 
the three transitional governments respectively (Farah, 2011). Unfortunately, each of these 
transitional governments failed to function as expected. In August 2012, the transitional system 
ended. A national reconciliation conference was held inside the country, a presidential election 
took place inside the country, a new national constitution was drafted, and an officially recognized 
non-transitional government was formed (Great Britain, 2012). This government has been 
officially recognized by most of the Western countries, including the United States of America 
(USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) as legitimate. With this new government in place, Somalia 
has adopted a “federal governmental system” and has abolished the former centralist system by 
changing the name of the country from the Somali Democratic Republic to the Somalia Federal 
Republic. This fundamental progress opens a new window of opportunity for Somalia to become 
a stable state socially, politically, economically, environmentally, jurisdictionally, and more 
importantly policy-wise.  
This doctoral study seeks a means of establishing marine environmental sustainability and 
security in the post-conflict situation in Somalia. It consists of six chapters of which each is an 
explanatory and complementary to both its foregoing and after-going. Chapter one provides 
general introduction to social, political, economic, and marine environmental instabilities in 
Somalia as a general problem definition. Chapter two is about the dissertation’s theoretical 
approach and literature review. It concludes that the traditional literature on resource management 
and policy analysis are neither appropriate nor applicable in Somalia, due to Somalia’s present 
situation of instability and post-conflict situation. The most appropriate materials for analysing 
Somalia’s critical situation are those on post-conflict situations, which facilitate community-based 
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policy in the context of instability at provincial/local level (Pellegrini, 2011; Dingo, 2012, John, 
11).   
 Chapter three is an analytical study of the roles and the responses of the international/regional 
stakeholders, both individual state and non-state actors and networks of actors, towards maritime 
environmental policy in Somalia. It identifies the foreign actors and networks of instability, 
potential stability and stability at the international/regional scale. Chapter four evaluates and 
analyses the role of the federal governmental institutions including the roles of the Judiciary, 
Executive and Legislative branches in the country’s marine environmental policy and law. Then, 
it discusses the role of the key domestic actors of instability, investigating who they are, what their 
objectives and strategies are and their capacities. Chapter five considers relationships in the marine 
zone in Somalia’s three provinces: Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central as well as other related 
actors of instability. Finally, chapter six seeks how to transform networks of instability to potential 
stability or stability for the purpose of pollution prevention and ecosystem management. It analyses 
some proposed approaches on maritime policy under a “multi-dimensional” approach. On the basis 
of this analysis, I make recommendations to build networks of socio-political, economic and 
maritime environmental stability, sustainability and security in post-conflict Somalia at the 
provincial/ local, national, and international/regional scales. 
 
1. 2: Clan System in Somalia 
Theoretically, Somalia can be defined as a country of one tribe. In anthropology, a tribe is 
defined as a “notional form of human social organization based on a set of smaller groups (known 
as bands), having temporary or permanent political integration, and defined by traditions of 
common descent, language, culture, and ideology” (Encyclopedia Britannica, nd). Somalia is a 
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unique nation with one language, one religion, one culture, one lifestyle, and one descendent 
tracing their lineage to a father known as “Samale” (UNESCO, 2014). Internally, Somalia is 
divided into 5 clans: Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Rahanweyn, and a range of Minorities also known as 
0.5 (Luis, 2011; UNESCO, 2014). 
There are sub-clans and sub-sub-clans in each of these five clans. The former two have 
historically been combatants over territories for residing, grazing, watering, and protecting 
prestige. Yet, within the Darod clan, there are, at least, two rival sub-clans: Marehan and Majerten. 
Similarly, within the Hawiye, there are two major rival sub-clans: Habar-gidir and Abgal (Lowe, 
2000). The hierarchies of the main Somali clan actors in the current conflicts and competitions4 
are represented in the following diagrams5: 
 
 
1) Hawiye  
   Abgal   Others 
Habar-gidir   Harti 
   Wa’budan 
Sa’ad, Saleban, Air, Duduble 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4Their lineage tree is neither authentic nor essential to this study, and would require an extended discussion and illustrations 
(Farah, 2008). 
5 As special note, where stated “others” could be either minority under the major clan or passive and peasant.  
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2) Darod 
     Harti  
Marehan  Ogaden     Warsangeli 
      Others Majerten Dhulbahante 
Dini Siad Husen Wagardha Others 
      
Mohamud Saleban           Others 
 
 
Omar Mohamud Isa Mohamud Osman Mohamud 
 
 
3) Dir 
    Guda-birsay 
Isaq  Isa Gadsan Biyomal  
Awal Garhajis 
 
4) Rahanweyn 
Digil   Mirif 
 
5) 0.5 (minorities) 
 
Midgans Yibru  African Bantu Indians Yemenis 
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In 1979, the first clan-based rebellion named as “SSDF6” rose against the government. It 
was defeated within a few years. From 1988 - 1989, two more clan-based war parties: SNM7 and 
USC8 emerged as open rebels. Each of the three parties largely served the interests of one particular 
clan or sub-clan of Somalia, while using the letter “S” standing for “Somalia” in their logos. 
Furthermore, each of these clannish war parties had its own agenda to dominate the other Somalis 
politically, economically and militarily.  
 One sub-clan of Dir called Isaq considers itself as the most civilized and most deserving one to 
lead the country, by making one of their members the President of Somalia. Throughout the 1980s, 
the leaders of the Isaq sub-clan argued that since they are the former British colonial region 
(Somaliland) that joined the former Italian-colonial region, they should be the ones to lead the 
union (Kaplan, 2010). Their major justification is that they were trained in administrative skills by 
the British (Lowe, 2000). They condemned Barre’s regime as a government representing Italian-
Somaliland and not British Somaliland. In essence, they rebelled and formed SNM as their armed 
political party. After giving up leadership of Somalia, Isaq decided to secede and declare their 
region “Somaliland” as an independent state in May 1991.  
 Subsequently the Hawiye clan considered Barre’s regime as a government for the Darod only, 
and formed USC, an armed political party (Luling, nd; Luis, 1993; Kaplan, 2008). Later on, 
Hawiye split into Abgal and Habar-gidir and divided their political party into USC-SLA and USC-
SNA (Kubiak, 2014; Luling, nd; Luis, 1993). Within the Darod, the Majerten sub-clan argued that 
Barre’s regime was a government for the Marehan only (Little, 2003). Accordingly, every clan or 
sub-clan began to fight for power, refusing the leadership of any of its former contestants. On 26th 
                                                          
6 Somali Salvation Democratic Front; a rebellious political and armed party which is exclusive for Majerten, sub-clan of Darod.  
7 Somali National Movement; a rebellious political and armed party which is exclusive for the Isaq, sub-clan of Dir.  
8 United Somali Congress; a rebellious political and armed party is exclusive for the Habar-gidir, sub-clan of Hawiye.  
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of January 1991, President Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted from power by the Hawiye-led rebels 
– USC, and the state quickly transformed to a war-torn society (Little, 2003). Unlike the Hawiye, 
Darod and Isaq (sub-clan of Dir), the rest of the population - Rahanweyn, Dir’s non-Isaq sub-clans, 
and 0.5 (minorities) are peasants who are neither warriors nor politically-oriented. However, they 
have been dominated by the warrior clans.  
 Divisions and fragmentation of Somalia after the collapse of the state threatened national unity, 
as clan loyalty seemed to overtake loyalty to the nation. People sought protection, representation 
and legitimacy through the clan. Clan animosities continued to feed the culture of violence by 
causing unlimited chaos and long-lasting insecurity. Since the collapse of the Somali central 
government and through the civil war period devastating human rights abuses and environmental 
degradation have resulted from various factions and militias in engaging in atrocities against 
women, children, the minorities and unarmed groups. 
Following the civil war, all forms of governance structures in the country collapsed at the 
local, provincial and national levels. After the regime's collapse, Somalia descended into clan-
based communities, turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. Each of the clans and sub-clans 
named their own Warlord as their local political leader in order to defend their existence. Weak 
territorial groups and autonomies such as Somaliland, Puntland and several other names with the 
suffix of “Land” were established haphazardly. 
 At present, since these clans have been fighting for over 20 years, it is difficult for a clan to 
trust any of its former and current rival clans. The mistrust is not limited to the clan level, but 
extends to both the family and individual levels. For instance, the Darod clan does not trust the 
Hawiye clan, and vice versa. Within the Darod, however, no sub-clan trusts the other, and the same 
applies to the Hawiye. This atmosphere of mistrust is not confined to the clan or group level alone. 
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Mistrust also trickles down to the individual and family levels as well. It is rare to find a member 
of a political, social, religious, or economic assemblage who trusts their colleagues, and it is also 
rare to find a family member who puts trust in their family members or siblings. 
 Thus a clannish culture has covered all parts of social lives -politically, socially, emotionally, 
and economically (Cleghorn, 2005). As a result, most of the citizens postulate that administration 
and leadership roles are similar to those of private businesses owned by individuals and kinships. 
They may perceive that each of the public institutions belongs to its leader and his kinsmen. As 
such, if a minister is ousted or transferred the majority of the ministry’s employees may quit their 
jobs, and follow the minister who initially employed them through nepotism. 
 In short, the most practical policy for current government in Somalia is that clans participate in 
governing themselves in regions while also having full representation in a national government. 
The fact is there are multiple clans, some big and some small in numbers, in any given region and 
district. While diversity can create a constructive culture and social strength, that is unlikely in the 
case of Somalia. Somalis are in the process of either creating clan-based diversities or uniformity 
in one tribe which is one nation. It is hard to tell which of the two the polity will form, until warring 
behaviour ends.  
 
1. 3: Maritime Geography and Climate in Somalia 
Somalia’s coastline is the longest shoreline in Africa (Ham, 2010) and the longest in the 
Western Indian Ocean [WIO] (Encyclopaedia Islamica, 1978) stretching up to 3,330 km in length 
of 183,500 miles (Lalieu, 2010; Schofield, 2008; Tylor, 2015). Its strategic location on the Horn 
of Africa extends to the Bab-al Mandab route and through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal (Horn, 
2012). In linguistic and traditional terms, Somalia is an Afro-Asiatic country situated in the Horn 
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of Eastern Africa (Diamond, 2003). Somalia’s coastal shoreline borders both that of the Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden in the Red-Sea. Thus, it has been one of the busiest arcs for 
marine traffic in the world (Hassan, 2009) connecting the world from East to West and from Africa 
to Asia (Megalommatis, 2008). In terms of global trade and economic development, the Somali 
coast connects the South to the North – poor to rich. In 2004, over 3 million barrels of oil passed 
every day the Red Sea’s Bab-al-Mandab route (Schofield, 2008). However, it is currently the most 
dangerous spot in the world9 and its local problems have turn into global ones. 
The country’s recognized territory stretches over 638,000 km2, (246,201 sq mi), 
comprising a population of 8.5 million according to the latest official census conducted from 1986 
to 1988 (Ministry of National Planning, 1988).  This was based on the estimate of a population 
increase in 1975, which suggested the population grow around 3.3% per year. However, the World 
Bank estimates the average population growth to be 3% per year.  In detail, the Somali population 
consists of 50% nomads, 34% urban and 16% rural dwellers (Lewis, 1993). The mainland of 
Somalia is characterized by three main topographical features; a mountainous highland called 
“Oogo”, a rainforest and pastureland called “Hawd”, and moderately barren land called “Guban” 
(Lewis, 1993). Each of these topographical features discharges the waters of seasonal rains (Gu’ 
season particularly) into lakes, valleys, streams, and rivers that drain to the sea.     
Traditionally, Somalis move from location to location within the Horn and Eastern Africa 
and the Middle-East Asia as well. In terms of culture and lifestyle, they are closer to the middle-
eastern than African countries.   
 They have a strong seafaring tradition, and for many years provided large numbers of crew 
for international ocean-going vessels. Perhaps this, together with their strategically 
situated coastline, which is the longest in Africa, helps explain why they are so well 
placed to have become the world’s most active twenty-first-century pirates, who, by the 
                                                          
9 In terms of land, Somalia is the 4th of the most dangerous place in the word (Dentshop, 2008). 
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late 2000s, were seizing dozens of ships and hundreds of hostages every year. It is not 
only Somalia’s geography which points it away from Africa. There is of course great 
diversity within the continent, but the difference between Somalis and most other 
Africans are especially acute. This makes it difficult, even impossible, to apply to Somalia 
most models, theories or “ways of thinking” about sub-Saharan Africa. (Harper, 2012, p. 
14).   
 
The entire land inhabited by Somalis is unique by nature and resembles its seawaters. It is endowed 
with special plantations, vegetation, climates, water, and air, which are completely different from 
those of its immediate neighbours. If one travels from Kenya – either via Mombasa or from Nairobi 
to Somalia, one would recognize the land inhabited by Somalis as one reaches Garasyani in 
Southern Garissa characterized by its hot climate, short trees with thorns, and its people’s features 
and lifestyle. The same thing applies if one travels from Ethiopia to Somalia anywhere along the 
border between the two countries. 
  The land of Somalia, be it coastal or interior, the trees are short and full of thorns, shrubs 
decorate the land, herds of mixed goats and sheep are abundant, lakes flowing to the sea are 
copious, flocks of she-camels are grazing nearby shifting huts and wigwams made of shrubs 
namely “Aqal Soomaali” (Somali styled house). In the world, there is no community other than 
the Somali one that constructs their houses in such a style. These huts are usually installed 
separately at a distance from each other. A mother piggybacking a child and young boys with he-
camel caravans are also among the outstanding signs. There are two dry seasons and two rainy 
seasons which are moderate and allow the possibility of agricultural and marine activities being 
undertaken year-round. Thus, it is an ideal place to make money because manpower, climate, and 
market are available at all times. 
The climate of Somalia ranges from tropical to sub-tropical and from arid to semiarid. The 
average temperature usually is 27.8 °c (82 °f), but sometimes decreases to as low as °c (32 °f) in 
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the mountain areas and as high as 46.7 °c (116 °f) along the coast. From September to December, 
the monsoon winds bring a dry season. Due to its powerful upwelling of nutrient-rich cold waters 
(UNEP, 2005) associated with constant current marine ecosystem, the coast is productive and 
attractive. Since the country is less developed and less industrialized, air quality is comparatively 
good. There is minimal air pollution, but marine and land pollution are at astonishing levels. The 
average rainfall has been terribly reduced to 200 mm (Hadden, 2007; UNEP, 2005). Thus, a large 
area is facing deforestation and if this is not stopped, dust pollution cannot be controlled.  
 
1. 4: Somalia’s Economy in the Context of Socio-political Instability 
The discussion under this heading encompasses dynamics of social, political and economic 
instability and their consequences in coastal communities’ lifestyle alongside with the impacts of 
the civil war (Africa Renewal, 2013). The country is rich in both land and marine natural resources, 
including a variety of livestock, wildlife, agricultural products, minerals, salt, and forestry 
resources. Natural gas, oil, uranium, iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, and copper are also available 
but not yet exploited (Deen, 2012).  
Currently, the basis of Somalia’s national economy is petty trade and casual labour. 
Citizens are normally buyers and sellers in market interactions with little conflict and dispute.10 
Somali businesspersons have adopted one particular source of moneymaking, which is importing 
foreign products. Though some of them may have the title of “import and export,” less is exported 
hitherto. Although Somalia is full of natural resources, to a large extent business people do not 
                                                          
10 Yet, it seems that their trade system lacks a means of comparing the profit against the loss on one hand, and their activities’ 
negative impacts on environment and security on the other. For instance, decisions related to free trade and oil production may 
have some side effects on both the country’s environment and security, which should be contrasted against their benefits. 
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exploit them. However, since 1991, they started exporting a most valuable asset which is charcoal 
(Africa Renewal, 2013). 
The maritime environmental degradation caused by charcoal exportation is changing the 
color of the coast and seashore from its natural colours to black ink. This seawater and coastal 
degradation is not limited to the country’s main seaports, but has been spread all over the country’s 
coast. Many temporary ports have been constructed to serve for charcoal export and weapons 
import (Hirsch, 2001). Among the most active ones are: Brava, Elma’an, Eil-Adde, Elayo, Eyl, 
Marka, Mareeg, Maydh, Harardhere, Hafun, and Hiis (Haji-Abdi, 2014; Little, 2003; Hadde, 
2007). Several others are temporarily and occasionally used. These forms of informal harbors have 
a real impact on the ground (Kibert, nd) and may “result in weakening social and environmental 
capital” (Wilson, 2012, p. 196). These play a significant role in destroying and poisoning marine 
biodiversity.   
When it comes to food security, there is sufficient food in the country, but its sustainable 
production and consumption are challenging. For instance, in the agricultural sector, pre-war, in 
Somalia, there were various forms of agricultural products such as fodders, human foods, herbal 
and chemical medicines, cottons, rubbers, gums, perfumes, and many other products. Since the 
land of Somalia is mainly arable and fertile, albeit with infrequent rain, cultivation systems and 
fruit production may differ from region to region. Yet, people used to harvest several types of 
foods and fruits from each of the respective regions and districts. For example, maize, sorghum, 
rice, sugar, cassava, beans, sesame, bananas, mangoes, fig, onions, varieties of vegetables, and 
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wild-sweat fruits can be harvested from various zones of Somalia (Haji-Abdi, 2014). Today, 
almost all these agricultural products are scarce due to the political instability11.  
An uncountable number of former pastoralists have changed their lifestyle from 
pastoralism to farming by residing near the rivers, while others have joined in fishing communities. 
Indeed, many former farmers and fresh-water fishers have also become sea-fishers, alongside 
former pastoralists. Due to a lack of appropriate land tenure to prevent and resolve land disputes, 
there are recurrent community disputes, which lead to physical conflicts. Indigenous people of the 
riversides would claim ownership of the land, even in those areas that they never developed. On 
the other side, newcomers will develop some uninhabited, undeveloped or even unmarked areas. 
Here there can be contentious issues, which ultimately impair the communities’ social, political, 
environmental, and economic stability, both on the land and in the marine environment. A frequent 
scenario will have one side arguing that a particular piece of land is located in or near his region 
or hometown, while the other argues that they found a no man's land and have the right to be the 
first developer of the area. (Farah, 2012) 
Barre’s regime remapped the entire land of the country and changed the former 8 regions 
to 18 regions. The purpose of the new topography is based on the country’s four basic economic 
sectors; agriculture, aquaculture, livestock, and trade (Lewis, 1996). Each was mapped as one 
economic block that had access to all the four sectors. Thus, each of the regions of the country 
were endowed with at least one town forming a commercial gateway12, one town next to a sea-
                                                          
11 In this global world that attracts rapid urbanization and economic pressure, most of the world's communities are economically 
competing in residing riversides and seashores. In Somalia, as a part of that competition, local farmers predict how people will 
compete in habitation near rivers for economic purposes in the future. Some traditional anecdotes and proverbs regarding this 
prediction have already become true. As an example, one of the popular proverbs in the Somali Bantu community states "La joogoo 
jiin webi lee waaye", which means "In the end, everybody will be found at the edge of the river". The same applies to the coastal 
communities and conflicts over marine resources. 
12 Located at the centre, the main intersection or one of the borders of Ethiopian, Kenya or Djibouti with Somalia.  
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port or sea-shore, one town by a river bank or major lake, and open areas of fertile arable and 
grassing land. Therefore, every region of the country could be an agricultural hub, commercial 
hub, fishing hub, and pastureland (PERSGA, 2002). For instance, in terms of the agricultural 
sector, the entire country is a breadbasket that can produce maize, sorghum, beans, sesame, onion, 
potatoes, cassava, and varieties of fruits such as papayas, mangoes, watermelons, bananas, 
varieties of wild fruits, and many others (PERSGA, 2002).   
Somalia is uniquely endowed with numerous economically valuable natural resources, 
such as Arabic gum, franksine gum, habag, malmal, yicib, myrrah, beeyo (especially with types of 
mohur and maydi used in perfuming), and many more (Samatar, 2011). In terms of marine natural 
resources, the sea-grasses growing in the Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are the most 
valuable and quantitative sorts of sea-floras in the world (Lori, 2012). In terms of biodiversity, 
there are over 5,000 million of various species with 10,000 per acre, which grow in most of the 
seasons year around (Lori, 2012). Most of these land-based commodities of gum and gum-led 
items as well as sea-grasses are used for pharmaceutical purposes and are in high demand. 
However, without a proper orientation on the resources Somalis remain the richest, but also the 
poorest nation on the face of the earth, whose citizens are thirsty while sitting on top of wells of 
fresh water (Africa Renewal, 2013).      
In Somalia, there are several species of animals being raised in a traditional manner. 
Among them are chickens, ducks, sheep, goats, cattle, and camels. Depending on the given animal, 
these are used for food, milking, medicine, furniture, cloth, hides, feathers, horns, utilities, and 
shelters. Besides the tremendous livestock available in Somalia, there are many types of wildlife 
such as deer, oryx, ostrich, gazelle, dikdik, rhinoceros, giraffe, and many others. In the sea, even 
though most of the Somali coastal communities are familiar with fish per se, there are hundreds if 
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not thousands of marine animals, which are all of the most important species in the world. Most 
popular of these species include shrimp, shark, crab, lobster, oyster, octopus, aragosta, whales, 
turtles, zebra muscles, sea snakes, sea birds, and sea fox (Deen, 2012; Fielding, 1999). There are 
also numerous types of vertebral and non-vertebral species, most of which are not fish, but are 
crustacean, reptiles, omnivores, shellfish and other kinds of scallops (Ministry of Environment, 
2005). 
 
1. 5: Measuring the Economic and Moral Impacts on the Civil War in 
the Context of Instability 
Over two decades, Somali territory has been under the control of warlords, religious 
extremists, illegal resource exploiters, highway robbers, and warring clan factions. This has 
virtually endangered both flora and fauna in the country. The prolonged civil war, drought and 
starvation have dragged the citizens into a miserable situation. Both rural and urban areas have 
been brought to an anarchic condition. In response, citizens resorted to a business that they may 
not have been familiar with: the harvest, consumption and trade of marine resources. 
Harper argues that one of the successes of the Somali traders is that they created an 
environment of an economic boom regardless of the country’s statelessness and chaos. The general 
economy has “shown an extraordinary resilience, adapting to and sometimes taking advantage of 
the lack of strong central government” (Harper, 2012, p. 111). But these traders radically increase 
their wealth while drastically decreasing others’ wealth. They manipulate the country’s marine and 
land natural resources by using their private armed forces. This manipulation has created a new 
form of bourgeois-economic class which had never existed in the country before the civil war. 
Approximately, less than one percent of the citizens became wealthy via this type of illicit 
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business. Local people call these individuals “xaaraan ku naax”, which means “unlawfully self-
nourished”, and their money is called the “blood-money”. Some commentators on Somalia such 
as Lindley (2009; 2010) call this type of money “dirty money” because it was made quickly, 
illicitly, illegally, and with a lack of self-consciousness. Obviously, almost all these new wealthy 
individuals were neither known as a wealthy nor as business people before the civil war. They are 
the product of the civil war. Local business networks usually have close networks with foreign 
corporation. Harper states:  
“On a flight I took to Mogadishu during the civil war in the early 1990s, the only other 
people on the plane were two Philippine businessmen from multinational Dole Fruit 
Company. They were coming to discuss possible trade deals with faction leaders who 
controlled the banana plantations and other fruit-growing areas (Harper, 2012, p. 117).        
 
In this context, it is noteworthy that some commentators have taken a short-sighted 
impression of Somalia’s economy when analysing the less than one percent enjoying the economic 
boom in Somalia. They argue that Somalia has seen economic boom even in war time by quoting 
individuals or groups who are either member of the one percent or were rebels against Barre’s 
regime. Harper (2012) and Lindley (2010) are among these authors. The former highlights these 
contradictions in analysis by discussing the effects of the prolonged hunger and starvation suffered 
from by Somalis, while also stating that urban business, animal husbandry and international 
corporations have shown progress in stateless Somalia so that Somalia is equal or superior to many 
other African nations. 
Lindey has written, “one positive side of ‘statelessness’ is that Somalia has benefited from 
the absence of restrictive and over-bureaucratic business laws and other regulations that are so 
prevalent in other parts of Africa, setting the spirit of entrepreneurship and inhabiting growth” 
(Lindley, 2010, p. 258). Nevertheless, Lindley’s statement is a direct contradiction to the titles of 
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her two works: (1) Between Dirty Money and Development Capital and (2) The Early Morning 
Phone Call: Somali Refugees’ Remittances. The fact on the ground is that throughout the last two 
and half decades, the vast majority of the Somali people living in Somalia survived with 
allowances sent to them by family members or friends who live in abroad, and the main national 
remittance in the country (Harper, 2012; Samatar, 2011). However, prior to the civil war, there 
was not even a money wiring system in the country, and nobody knew what money wiring was 
about. During the civil war and starvation, people died from hunger daily if not hourly. 
Humanitarian aid in the form of food was the main source of living, yet extant marine resources 
became income for many Western and Eastern countries and non-state economic motivated mafias 
(hereafter Economic-Mafias). Harper states: 
I remember arriving at the airport in Mogadishu during the height of the civil war; people 
were starving, but box after box of seafood was being loaded onto planes bound for 
Saudi Arabia, where it was sold for high prices as a delicacy. Although increasing 
numbers of Somalis are eating fish, the maritime industry faces another problem 
(Harper, 2012, 54).  
 
In Somalia, marine sector has always been facing negligence and underestimation. This 
situation has not only seriously affected the people’s survival, but also the Somali ecology and the 
environment. The country’s marine natural resource became the property of foreign trawlers and 
this created harsh conflicts between Somali local communities and foreign seafarers. The issues of 
ecological and environmental concern have hitherto been unpopular in Somalia. Pre-war, the issue 
was not given full attention; although the environment had blatantly deteriorated, the major 
disturbances faced by Somali fishing systems are a product of the civil war (Africa Renewal, 2013; 
Deen, 2012). Not only did the security situation impede healthy fishing activities, but also the 
maintenance of equipment and supply of spare parts. Tackle, equipment and fuel became virtually 
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non-existent. Those ice and freezer plants that had previously been in operation have mostly 
become obsolete, providing another major impediment to finding healthy and clean fish. Various 
types of disease-causing bacteria affect most of the fishes caught for local consumption. The 
capacity to control foreign incursions into the EEZ of the Somali region does not exist, hence other 
nations are likely to, and indeed are reported to, exploit Somali marine natural resources. 
Government officials are not in a position to control the country’s sovereignty and 
economy. Not only do they lack financial and technological capacity, they also lack moral 
responsibility. They have been enticed by corruption and self-interest. These officials even 
compete over recovering the national assets left before 1991 by the Barre’s regime. For instance, 
in 2014, non-state individuals who claimed to be representatives of Shulman Rogers claimed to be 
working to recover more than $1.5 billion assets on behalf of the Somali government from 
European banks (Bahdur, 2014). The matter has caused serious disputes, not only among the 
various politicians and allied companies, but also among economic stakeholders, where each is 
trying to collect the highest share13. Besides the production of natural resources and trade, a new 
service economy and diasporas’ remittances are also important economic factors. Some Somali 
citizens, for instance, have become experts in building and repairing ships and other important 
machines to the extent that other countries manufacture and repair their ships in Somalia14. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 This indicates that the corruption has been transforming to daylight looting over time. Foreign companies and Somali origin 
individuals create networking groups and engage in corruption, public looting, dumping, and political boycott. 
14 The New Service Economy is to make the citizens well-skilled to the extent that other countries send their technologies to 
Somalia for mechanically related repair and other possible services. 
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1. 6:  The Marine Ecological Situation in Somalia 
During the early 1990s, some surveys conducted by UNEP indicated, despite uncontrolled 
plundering of Somalia’s rich sea resources, no serious negative environmental effects on marine 
life have been recorded due to the abundance of Mesopelagic fish in the country’s coast (UNEP, 
1995; 97). However, the reports indicated that should excessive poaching continue at this rate 
without enforcing effective environmental policy and law, Somalia’s marine environment and its 
ecosystem would, definitely, be at great risk (UNEP, 1995).  
The arid to semi-arid nature of the Somali climate results in limited and highly variable 
flows of nutrients from land-based sources to the marine environment. This contributes to the 
generally low level of primary productivity of the continental shelf on the North coast and 
Southern-East Coast of Somali seashores. The monsoonal regime also has a direct bearing on 
primary production. The Southern monsoon generates up-welling of cold, nutrients rich waters, 
which spread into the water along the Northeast coast, primarily between Rasmabber and Rashafun 
from May to August (UNEP, 1982). This up-swelling can be highly variable and can create 
extreme variations in the marine environment and its ability to support living marine resources.  
The mangroves provide critical habitat as nursery grounds for the shrimp, which form an 
important economic resource for the country with extensive mangroves (Sommer, et al., 1996). 
Nevertheless, the mangroves in the country are threatened by various activities. They are 
excessively harvested for poles and firewood without any restriction. Any plantation of mangrove 
that may produce wood that is more valuable than wood in inland is in high demand by illegal 
loggers, because they only have to cover the costs of harvest, processing of charcoal, a short trip, 
and marketing. Almost all the energy consumed in the country is from trees constituted to charcoal 
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and firewood. From 1991-1996, an estimate of 14 Trucks of different sizes of which each was 
carrying nearly 80 tons of charcoal came daily into the big cities (Herzog, 1996). 
Somalia is known for its tropical coral reefs (Schofiel, 2008; Scuba, 2014). Generally, coral 
reefs provide shelter, food-webs and oxygen for marine animals. They are also known for 
providing medicine, food, beauty, income, and construction materials for humans. They support a 
huge community of life such as varieties of fishes, mammals, algae, corals and many other 
organisms. Coral reefs begin the process of providing marine habitats from sheltering tube 
sponges, and then transforming them to marine habitats for fish (AllSopp, 2009). Coral reefs and 
mangrove swamps also create calcium carbonate, oxygen, food, habitat, and shelter for living 
ecosystems (Allsopp, 2009; Valentine et al., 2005). Coral reefs, sea grasses, mangroves, lagoons, 
swamps, and other plantations are dependent on one another.  
Corals are categorized into hard coral and soft coral. Hard corals have hard limestone 
skeletons, which form the basis of coral reefs (Skinner, 2005), while soft corals do not build reefs. 
Coral reefs grow in shallow, warm water, mostly in the tropics where the temperatures may be 
between 70 and 85 ° F (21 - 30 °C) (Okemwa, 1995). They are quite common off the eastern coast 
of Africa, off the southern coast of India, and in the Red Sea, exactly the location of Somalia 
(Skinner, 2005; Reveron, 2009). Nearly a quarter of corals in the Red Sea starting from the Somali 
border all the way to the Mediterranean coasts of Jordan and Israel cannot be found anywhere else 
in the world (Scuba, 2014).  
Besides illegal logging and coastal construction coral reefs are threatened by siltation of 
near-shore marine areas due to terrestrial erosion. They are also exposed to chronic oil pollution 
in some areas, especially in the vicinity of harbors. Coral reefs are sometimes subject to turbidity, 
due to dredging in connection with port improvement and maintenance, or land development. 
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Coral and its associated marine life are collected as souvenirs, especially near tourist areas. Reefs 
can be affected by over-fishing of certain species. Changes in reef ecosystems can lead to the 
depletion of fisheries and the loss of aesthetic and recreational values. The vitality of mangrove 
swamps may be threatened by fluctuations in the amount of fresh water and sediment reaching 
them due to upstream hydraulic works. Mangrove areas are sometimes reclaimed and converted 
for salt ponds and occasionally to make way for other economic activities such as port expansion 
(UNEP, 2009). Mangroves can also be threatened if the siltation from rivers degrades protective 
reefs and exposes the shore to increased erosion (Valentine, et al., 2005). Loss of the extent and 
vitality of mangrove forests can reduce marine biological productivity of dependent species 
especially shrimp. 
Severe loss of habitats could seriously affect associated populations of coastal and marine 
animal species and related aesthetic values (Valentine, et al., 2005). No doubt, in the decade of 
1990s, there have been several types of harmful effects to the marine living ecosystems. To date, 
studies of the condition of such species and their habitats in the coast of the country have been 
inadequate or untouched. Second, national regulations and protective programs have not been 
effective. Third, concerted action has not been taken. Fourthly, Somalia has no formal central 
government connection with the rest of the contemporary world that would it allow it benefit from 
the relevant international conservation conventions.  
There are hundreds of species of fish in the seawaters, but a very small number of them 
attract the majority of the fisheries. These species include herring, cod, anchovy, tuna, salmon, 
flounder, mullet and squid. Others such as shrimp, shark, crab, lobster, oyster, zebra muscles, sea 
snakes, sea birds, sea fox, and scallops are not fish (they are crustacean, reptiles, omnivores, or 
shellfish respectively). Nevertheless, when dealing with the fisheries harvesting some of these 
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species in the name of fish, these fishes may be considered as a part of the fish community. Because 
those who seek marine natural resources are mainly attracted by a very few parts of its rich natural 
resources and biodiversity, people mainly know about the fishery part of marine ecosystems. They 
may concentrate on a particular type of fish, areas of coral reefs, sea-grasses, and mangroves 
around the coasts, which provide rich feeding and breeding grounds for fishes. This limited 
knowledge leads people to neglect the vast majority of marine lives and ecosystems, while 
targeting only a few of them. For instance, commercial fishery operations target fish species while 
destroying coral reefs and sea grasses out of ignorance of their values.  
In Somalia, numerous species of fauna and flora, of which some are not particularly 
targeted in many parts of the world, are subject to extinction, including aragosta, sharks, whales, 
turtles, molluscs, dugong, and several others (Ministry of Environment, 2005). Flood plains, 
coastal marshes and lakes, and animals like rhino, crocodiles, hippopotamus, antelopes, sea-birds, 
shells, and, other kinds of marine mammals are rapidly endangering species (Valentine, et al., 
2005; Sommer, et al, 1996). Although none of these species appear to be directly hunted, turtles 
are caught as a by-product of fishing activity. Collection of shells, turtles for stuffing, search of 
meat and medicine, and exploration for oils are among the top sources exacerbating the threat 
(Somali National Fishing Enterprise, 1989; 2009). Likewise, coral heads and benthic fauna are 
collected for sale to tourists and export to the Middle East.  
 Notwithstanding, there is a remarkable catch of game. There is also intentional harassment and 
killing of the female species, by some careless swimmers and fishermen, before they have a chance 
to reproduce. Due to the large numbers caught, there is ground to suggest that several types of 
marine life such as turtles may be overexploited. Prior to the new millennium, reports released by 
UNEP (1987; 1993) indicate that the demersal fish stocks, turtles, lobsters or sharks, in general 
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were not facing extinction. However, the situation of these species has quickly changed since 2000, 
where almost all of these were reported by traditional local fisheries as species facing extinction 
(UNEP, 2004). There are other problems associated with the marine environment and sustained 
production of marine resources. These include excessive external pollution sources such as toxic 
dumping, debris, oil spillage, and domestic sewage. This pollution coincided with a full scale 
Illegal, Illicit, Unreported, Underreported, Unregistered, Undocumented, and Overfishing 
(IIUUUUOF) that led to marine insecurity (Valentine, et al., 2005). All these problems are 
concurrently taking place where there is a lack of proper fishing methods and management, due to 
a lack of a functional governance system. 
 Marine environmental degradation and insecurity could have been reduced if sufficient funds 
were allocated for such a purpose. Funding is the key instrument to effectively protect the coast 
and sea of the country which provide habitat for several rare or endangered species. To date, even 
the locations, behaviours and the kind of food-chains for these species cannot be known, due to 
lack of effective technology. With sufficient funding, critical habitats could have been identified 
and preserved, and human activities adversely affecting them would have been controlled to the 
extent possible. It could also have been facilitated to provide actions for the national administration 
on coastal management to be able to evaluate the extent of environmental damages caused by 
either domestic traditional activities or foreign forces. Before indicating anything else, it should 
be noted that information concerning living marine resources other than fish is relatively limited. 
However, to begin with, the definition of marine ecosystem, after all, is a self-contained system in 
which the biotic and abiotic components interact within and between each other to produce a 
unique, dynamic, but stable unit (Udvardy, 1975). Generally speaking, it is common that the 
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coastal environments of Somalia contain complex marine habitats but some of them are at risk of 
being endangered (UNEP, 1987). 
Indeed, even if the federal system has become a failure, Somalia seems to be exercising a 
sort of a traditional federalism, where every community will be self-administered. This 
fundamental progress opens a new window of opportunity for Somalia to become a stable state 
socially, politically, economically, environmentally, jurisdictionally, and in policy terms. As a 
result, it is conceivable that Somalia will be able to establish and implement a community-based 
environmental policy that is workable in each of its sociopolitical stages such as during instability, 
during a transition to stability (post-conflict), and during full stability.  
 
 Conclusion 
 Pre-colonialism, Somalia was comprised of clan-based small territories of largely nomadic 
communities competing over resources and brides. Their main tensions were limited to controlling 
the land’s resources. Each of the Italian, French and British colonies controlled a region of these 
territories. In the transitional period to independence, the British annexed the biggest region to 
Ethiopia15, next to Kenya, while granting independence to the other two. The British handed the 
mainly Somali Populated Islands called Socotra to Yemen. French territory, Djibouti, got its 
independence in 1977.  
 After 30 years of independence, it seems that the rebels against Somalia’s revolutionary 
government preferred to resume the old clan system via a corresponding formal governmental 
system. The traditional tensions based on bride and resource competitions which existed pre-
independence were politicized. Many Somali intellectuals and clan chiefs tried to disentangle the 
                                                          
15 Which is divided into three regions; Ogaden, Liban and Harar.  
28 
 
newly mounted clan conflicts by resorting to the pre-governmental traditional procedures for 
conflict resolution, but to no avail. In the past, Somali clans fought over pasture and water-wells, 
but presently they are shaped by political control over extractive economic exploitation which 
requires a different approach to the peace process.  
 From 1993 to 2012, there were tremendous efforts to reinstate Somalia’s governmental system 
which were largely unsuccessful. The federal government which is currently active was established 
in 2012. Throughout the last 25 years, there have been numerous complex networks of instability 
that have impaired the country’s security, sustainability, and environmental protection. These 
networks include warlords, money-lords, clergymen, religious extremists, illegal resource 
exploiters, highway robbers, and the warring clan factions (Gebrewold, 2009). These internal 
networks of instability cooperate with external networks who create excessive pollution sources 
(i.e. toxic dumping, debris, oil spillage, and domestic sewage) as well as IIUUUUOF that caused 
marine insecurity and unsustainability. Thus, even though the country is rich in agriculture, 
livestock, trade, and marine resources, the vast majority of the citizens survive with remittances 
sent to them from abroad.  
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Approach 
Introduction 
 Marine environmental degradation (pollution, ecological instability and insecurity), is the most 
pressing maritime problem in the Somali basin. In this dissertation, I use a “Policy Actor and 
Network Analysis” approach to understand the relationship between socio-political and economic 
instability and marine environmental degradation in the Somali basin. I identify, describe and 
examine both the existing and emerging “networks of instability, stability and potential stability” 
at work at the global/regional, national and provincial /local scales in marine environmental 
management in Somalia.  
 Any local information about government institutions, NGOs, civil societies, pirates, terrorists, 
and clan militias will be analyzed in the light of my working experience in the field as well as my 
personal observations during my presence therein and after. In this effort, I will be utilizing my 
knowledge of the area obtained from previous work as a former Permanent Secretary for the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Disasters, Secretary of a local NGO, academic researcher, 
and as an observant Somali citizen who has been an insider of the most of the incidents under 
discussion. With this experience, I seek strategies of altering instability and unsustainability and 
rather to foster stability and sustainability. The analysis is informed by reviews of the literature on 
environmental management and recovery in post-conflict situations. 
 This chapter begins by identifying a research question, followed by a description of the 
literature reviewed for analysing a means of formulating networks of potential socio-political and 
economic stability, contributing to environmental sustainability. Thereafter, I provide a general 
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introduction to networks and how they work in Somalia. Finally, I explain my research 
methodology and conceptual framework.  
 
2.1: Research Question 
 The question guiding my research is: “Who are the socio-political and economic networks of 
instability and environmental unsustainability in Somalia? Can stability be achieved in the absence 
of sustainability or can sustainability be advanced without stability? What strategies could advance 
both stability and sustainability in marine environmental management in mutually reinforcing 
ways? I explore these three questions through the case study of marine environmental management 
in Somalia. 
 
2. 3: Contemporary Literature on Resource Management and the Case of 
Somalia 
 My literature review consists of books, peer-review journals, governmental and non-
governmental reports, newspapers, and magazines. Reports on International and Regional 
Maritime Conventions and Treaties in the archives of both state and non-state institutions are also 
relevant. I also examine archived public documents such as press releases, meeting communiqués, 
and newspaper reports by both the local community and foreign stakeholders to trace the political 
and security discourses around maritime resource usage and environmental protection. Specific 
policy procedures related to the resolution of disputes over marine borders, security, shared natural 
resources, fishing, and other marine activities are considered. I also reference certain academic 
lectures and official hearing presentations in order to understand some networks’ motives and 
visions. 
31 
 
 There are numerous works on environmental policy, social policy, environmental 
conservation, maritime resources, policy network analysis, community engagement, and other 
relevant topics, but many of them may not be helpful to my research, due to their inapplicability 
to the case of Somalia. The mainstream literature on marine environment and/or policy network 
analysis focuses on situations where there is political stability and governmental systems are in 
place. Many researchers believe that the capacity to address policy and management is only present 
where there is security and stability. It is generally assumed that policy network studies and policy-
formulation processes are undertaken in stable contexts. Even among the researchers focused on 
analyzing ‘policy networks’ rather than policy formulation and decision-making, a stable 
governance system is assumed (e.g. Kraft, et al., 2013).  
 A considerable volume of material (Kraft, 2007; Desai; 1998; Payoyo, 1994), argues that 
effective environmental policy is impossible without active, effective and stable governmental 
institutions. Following that view, much of the policy network literature written prior to the new 
millennium (e.g. Stone, 1988; Daughbjerg, 1998; Kakonen, 1992; Wondolleck, 1990) pays little 
or no attention to networks of instability.  
 Furthermore, most of the literatures on maritime ecosystems, ecology, biology, oceanography, 
environment, specific types of pollution, and so on, focus on science rather than examining the 
connection between human activities and marine environmental degradation. On the other hand, 
the literature on non-scientific fields such as marine transnational resource exploitation, 
navigation, policy, and ports pays little attention to war-torn and post-conflict situations (United 
Nations, 2011). However, recently, some scholars have begun to examine networks of instability 
(e.g. John, 2011; Kahler, 2009; Dunion, 2003; Pellegrini, 2011; Dingo, 2012) for the purpose of 
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stabilizing them. Some of these materials (e.g. Pippard, 2005; Whelan, 2012) explore the potential 
for transitions from instability to stability in an environmental and resource management context.  
 Most of the traditional environmental policy literature describes environmental problems rather 
than the underlying social problems that caused them (Coglianese, at al., 2001). In contrast, my 
study focuses on the social and environmental problems as intertwined problems so as to 
encourage voluntary change. For instance, UNEP (2007) highlights the institutional framework in 
post-conflict Lebanon. There are certain similarities between Somalia and Lebanon in terms of 
policy networks of instability/stability. The factions in Lebanon are as various as those in Somalia. 
The most common motives of the various stakeholders in Lebanon are: economic interest, power, 
prestige, and religious competitions. These are more or less similar to the motives of the 
stakeholders in Somalia. On the other hand, when it comes to state responsibility in policy-
formulation, the two countries differ in many ways. Lebanon has a constitutional central 
government with long governmental experience. In contrast to Lebanon, Somalia’s governmental 
system is a preliminarily federal, but decentralized, fragmented, and familiar with dictatorship. 
Therefore, the institutional aspect of this framework cannot be adopted in Somalia.  
 Hoeffler, et al. (2004), who examined over 73 war torn societies between the 1960s and 1970s, 
states that that it takes a long time to restore peace and security in a war-torn nation, especially 
where there has been a prolonged civil war. Jordan (2010) argues that since its independence Africa 
has experienced regimes of continental instability and insecurity that lead to non-sustainability. In 
Somalia, networks of instability take advantage of socio-political instability, leading to rapid 
administration changes and collapses, to expand their illicit activities, while also adopting new 
tactics to challenge any new administration.  
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 A few pieces of older literature (e.g. Adede, 1993; Kwiatkowska and Sons, 1993; Desai, 1998) 
provide historical context. When dealing with Somalia’s national policy and socio-legal systems, 
most of the references are drawn on the two-decade period of military rule in Somalia, i.e. 1970-
1990. Since 1991, there has been neither governmentally nor traditionally established marine 
environmental management systems in place, except a few decrees issued by the Somaliland or 
Puntland provinces. Somalia has been a war torn society since January 1991 (Little, 2003). From 
1991-2000, there was no central authority to provide services for the population. Over the last 23 
years, there were no less than 23 reconciliation conferences held outside the country, but most of 
them ended as failures.  
 Between the years of 2000 and 2012, three transitional governments were formed, but all to no 
avail as they made insignificant progress towards stability (Farah, 2012). In August 2012, the 
transitional system ended, and an officially recognized non-transitional government was formed 
(Great Britain, 2012). With this new government in place, Somalia has adopted a “federal 
governmental system” and has moved away from its former centralised system of government. 
This change opens a new window of opportunity for Somalia to become a stable state socially, 
politically, economically, environmentally and jurisdictionally.  
 Most of the literature written in the decade before the new millennium, which endeavours to 
find appropriate means of environmental conflict resolution, encourages top-down approaches 
starting from the United Nations’ international conventions downward to the national level 
(Wondolleck, 1990; Marine and Renate, 1991; Kakonen, 1992; Blowers and Glasbergen, 1996; 
Daugbjerg, 1998; Stone 1988; Sabatier, 1999; Suliman, 1999). Literature written by other authors 
in this century (e.g. March 2011; Pellegrini, 2011; Margerum, 2011) encourages solving 
environmental problems from a global perspective. Others (Brown, et al., 2005; Meijer, 2010; 
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Coglianese, et al’, 2001), strongly recommend that the solution should be approached from the 
inside, at a local level.  
 Davis, 1990; Balton, 2004; and John, 2011, argue for the establishment of a new international 
environmental law based on a bottom-up approach. John (2011), states that “the very attractiveness 
of the top-down approach may lead to its downfall, since by specifying in advance the objectives, 
it can create resistance on the part of the general population” (John, 2011, p. 12). In order to reach 
a proper conclusion on all these discourses, I compare the works of (Lefferty, 2000 and Nijkamp, 
1989) which encourage community participation, under governmental auspices with those of 
(Kraft, 2007; Rowland, 2000 and Nagel, 2002) which encourage unrestricted locally-based 
environmental policy. 
 To address the subject matter, having considered the current situation of the country, I scrutinize 
the activities and responses of networks of stability and instability at three scales:  
Global/Regional, National, and Provincial/Local (hereafter the three scales). One of the basic 
differences between creating a process for environmental rehabilitation in Somalia and similar 
contexts rests in the gap between financial power, infrastructure, capacity building, and the status 
of sponsorship. About the latter, when it comes to foreign aid and project sponsorship, the Somali 
case is unusual in that it has not received the levels of international support seen in many other 
post-conflict countries.  
 The Oogo land of Somalia and the Darfur region of Sudan have similar climates and ecology 
(UNEP, 2007; Ham, 2010), and both have experienced nearly a decade of war activities. However, 
the Oogo has never received any international aid to recover its environment and economy, while 
more than $120 million has been provided for the rehabilitation of Darfur region (UNEP, 2007). 
Sudan’s environmental recovery projects were funded and implemented by various NGOs, of 
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which each was specialized in one sector, but all of them operate under the auspices of UNEP 
(2000, 2003).  
 Similarly, US marine navy units frequently carried out missions to clean up wastes in the sea 
zones of Pakistan (UNEP, 2010). The US navy inhabiting the Somali basin has never carried out 
any activity of marine environmental interest in the territory they occupy, which is heavily 
polluted. Oil spills in Lebanon attracted the attention of dozens of state and non-sate donors to halt 
the contamination and clean it up (UNEP, 2007). Somalia has never been a recipient or ever 
expected similar attention, even though there are recurrent oil spills in and around its coastal 
regions. It is also obvious that for each of the post-conflict countries, there were one or more 
countries which took the responsibility of financing their environmental sectors. For instance, 
Afghanistan and Iraq were funded by the US (UNEP, 2012).  
 Another challenge is that implementing projects around foreign humanitarian aid, governmental 
financial aid, investment, environmental sustainability, and sustainable economic growth, depends 
on sustainable security. The challenges of insecurity increase when insecurity also affects 
neighbouring countries through which aid could be channelled. Kabia (2010) notes that Sierra 
Leone and Liberia are not the only countries that suffer from the problems caused by recurrent 
wars. Their neighbours Guinea and Ivory-Coast are under the same threat, due to the instability in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia (Kabia, 2010). During their post-conflict situations, both Sierra Leone 
and Liberia have substantially benefited from the support of the deployment of large UN 
peacekeeping missions and donor support for peace-building programs. Yet, both countries have 
struggled in the areas of security reform, economic recovery, corruption reduction, employment, 
social reintegration and community remobilization (Kabia, 2010). This is similar to the effects that 
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socio-political instability in Somalia has had on Kenya and Ethiopia (UNEP, 2001a; 2008b; Casey-
Maslen, 2013). 
 While circumventing environmental degradation in the Asian and Pacific region, the United 
Nations (2001) identifies the major challenges facing the region as overpopulation, poverty and 
excessive consumption by foreigners. These challenges are similar to the issues facing Somalia, 
but only a small portion of large detrimental factors. In terms of population, for instance, the 
Somali case is different from the descriptions in the report because in certain areas the Somali 
coasts are overcrowded, while other areas are deserted. 
  
2. 4: Stability/Instability Dynamics in Marine Environmental 
Degradation in Somalia 
 Measuring the significance of environmental sustainability and that of social stability, 
Trémolières (2010) argues that even though the two should be simultaneously accomplished, each 
must be emphasized separately. She believes that environmental security, which is needed for 
sustainability, is necessary, but should not be a part of social security. The other components of 
national security (political, social, economic, military, and environmental) may play a role in 
environmental security and sustainability, but should not overshadow the challenges. Westra, et 
al. (2001) reaches a conclusion that neither of the two can be successfully implemented without 
the other. Based on my knowledge of the culture and lifestyle of the Somali local communities, I 
support the latter argument for establishing environmental and resource sustainability alongside 
socio-political stability, which can lead to ecological stability, without prioritizing one over the 
other. 
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 “In the old era of ‘normal’ science, which was based heavily on mechanistic views of the 
universe, science functioned to improve production and was the servant of economic growth” 
(Prugh, et al., 2000, p. 91). Since the beginning of the new millennium, new initiatives of politics, 
economics and the sciences were based on ecological services developed (Prugh, et al., 2000; 
Mitchell, 2009; Miran, 2009; UNEP, 2001; 2006; 2009). These literatures point out the roles of 
socio-political and economic instabilities in marine environmental damage, and the linkages 
between economic exploitation and marine pollution threatening human health, livelihood, 
security, and safety. 
 Although some of these discourses emphasise economic recovery and regrowth (e.g. Tyagi, 
2007; Sesabo, 2007; McPhee, 2008; Scott, 2008), the implications for environmental policy can 
be read between the lines. They inadvertently indicate how domestic and foreign illicit networks 
emerge from political and economic pressures and greed-based interests. This confirms that most, 
if not all, of the networks of instability in Somalia are the results of both internal and external 
conflicts. For instance, piracy became an issue only after the fisheries suffered from direct 
aggressions of foreign trawlers. Similarly, almost all the political networks of instability including 
the branches of Al-Qaida (Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam) were born as a result of recurring 
Ethiopian invasions and assaults, which included a range of illicit activities such as kidnapping, 
arresting, torturing, indiscriminately bombarding, and shooting on sight (Caasimada, 2012; Wall 
Street Journal, 2016). All these unlawful and illicit activities plus long-rooted malfeasances created 
and contributed to ecological instability and marine security crises.  
 At a regional level, the writings of Suliman (1999; Ahmed, 2013; Ahmed, 1995; Vanderzwang, 
2002; Torres, 2005; Seckinelgin, 2006) explore themes which contain analysis of ecological crises, 
causes, triggers, and the impact of politically violent conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
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In the Somali basin, the impact of toxic dumping is evident to both lay-persons and learned 
persons, where it harms both human health and ecological health. Consequently, local reactions 
towards disaster became more serious than degrading the environment and raiding resources as 
described in both locally (e.g. Mohamoud, 2006; Samatar, 2011; Farah, 2011), and internationally 
written works (e.g. Okemwa, 1995; Sherman, 2006; Jasper, 2012; Reddish, 1996). The subject 
matter of this problem is illuminated in the discussion of the relationship between various sources 
of marine pollution (debris, dumping, oil spills, and domestic sewage) and marine insecurity in 
chapter five.  
 Engel et al., (2005) as well as Warner, et al. (1998) stress resource management and 
development by clarifying the role of conflict management assessment in community-based 
natural resource projects. Their studies suggest assessing the degree of the conflict before engaging 
in resource-based projects for the sake of an integrative approach, while simultaneously managing 
conflicts and resources as complimentary to each other. It also highlights how to facilitate rival 
groups engaging in face-to-face negotiations beginning with indirect discussion, which can lead 
into the process of direct bargaining. This is an indirect method for engaging various stakeholders 
for institutional restructuring purposes. In order to improve that system, the authors used strategic 
options of do-nothing, do-something, force, withdrawal, accommodation, compromise, and 
consensus. Where appropriate in my study, I evaluate each or some of these options and 
analytically use them in my discussion.  
 Where peacekeeping missions are present in post-conflict environments, post-conflict 
environmental managers and policy analysts need to contribute to the peacekeeping missions by 
directly or indirectly cooperating with other managers as they are a part of these missions. 
“Peacekeeping agents can have imaginative empathy for conflicting agents who do not believe 
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there are alternatives to violence” (Muhlnickel, 2008, p. 21) through social reengineering and 
reintegration. Krause, et al., argue that “contemporary post-conflict operations rest upon the 
assumption that a sophisticated social engineering approach could replace, or accelerate, a process 
of state formation that otherwise occurs rather more organically” (Krause, et al., 2005, p.1). This 
argument is applicable where there are different opinions and aims in the minds of policymakers 
and practitioners, as is the case in Somalia, with regards to social reintegration and alternative 
development concerns in the practice of post-conflict peace-building (PCPB). 
 By applying the ‘systems thinking’ approach embodied in a “multi-dimensional’ approach, I 
focus on analyzing the problems, which can lead to the creation of a new framework of policy 
formulation. Indeed, when dealing with a poor nation which is recovering from the after-effects of 
civil war, environmental dispute resolution, policy mechanisms and management need to advance 
alongside reducing ongoing conflicts and facilitating peace processes. In this situation, Sidaway 
(2005) argues for the use of consensus building to control, resolve and prevent environmental 
disputes before proceeding to affirm environmental policy mechanisms.  
 
2. 5: The Importance of Locally based approaches 
  Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) examine the role of local communities in a number of African 
countries, who assist in the prevention of environmental degradation caused by natural disasters. 
However, they conclude in their findings that little can be done by either local communities or 
NGOs unless they are being financed by national authorities or foreign donors. In my study, I 
challenge this idea, by proving that local communities can protect their environment without 
receiving funds from foreign donors.  
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 Breton (2012) provides a lesson learned from Guatemala, which was able to restructure its 
coastal environment in the repercussion of climate change by setting forth strategies of prevention, 
intervention and rehabilitation to deal with unforeseen or unexpected occurrences. For instance, 
the local communities remobilized themselves and formed INGOs with volunteers to restore the 
damage to coastal zones and to replant mangroves (Breton, 2012). This lesson can be applied to 
Somalia in order to develop components and strategies to help prepare preventive measures both 
in the situations of war and natural disaster.  
 Mehta, et al. (1999) examine how resource management can be carried out in the context of 
uncertainty and instability. The first finding of their paper is the acknowledgement of the role of 
rural people in dealing with ecological and seasonal variations as well as complex forms of risk 
and disaster management. It also finds that the major challenges facing rural people are the 
maintenance of their livelihood and their resource management, which are often controlled by 
politically and economically-dominant regimes. However, the paper fails to distinguish between 
uncertainty and instability, which I do in my study. Identifying the uncertainties in local 
communities, they argue that rapid technological changes, especially the increase of modern 
information technologies, are a fundamental uncertainty in determining and perceiving risks. I 
argue the opposite is true; modern information technology is the most effective tool to forecast, 
prevent, control, manage, or cope with disasters, networks of instability, and many other harmful 
activities.  
 Finally, as a part of post-conflict community restructuring in resource management, the role of 
local customs/cultures regarding the use of marine natural resources must also be considered. One 
area of concern is women’s position in the areas of the community-based policy formulation 
process, fisheries and piracy activities. The efforts of women’s NGOs in responding to war and 
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post-conflict resolutions were recognized in many parts of the world such as Afghanistan, El-
Salvador, Cambodia, and others (Pankhurst, 2008; Muhlnickel, 2008; Dawn et al., 2010). 
Women’s participation has also been recognized as key to policy network stabilization (Dingo, 
2012; Ault, et al., 2006; Beijing Declaration, 2005). 
 Therefore, the UNs complementary literature (e.g. Cahn, et al., 2011; UNEP, 2006; Castillo, 
2008; Sorensen, et al., 1998) on regaining women’s rights through environmental conservation 
and resource management is pertinent. This literature is among my main references for the 
identification of the role of gender and its relationship with environmental sustainability in post-
conflict situations. Currently, in Somalia, women’s position in maritime issues or involvement is 
often described as negative and not positive, and it is more or less similar to the Kenyan attitude 
known as ‘sex for fish’ (Binks, 2010; Lungu, et al., 2010). 
 In short, in my study, I will refer at some points to some of the traditional literature for 
information, rather than for policy guidance. Most of my guidance comes from post-conflict 
literature. However, even much of the post-conflict literature is inappropriate for this dissertation’s 
case, either due to cultural differences or environmental differences. 
 
2. 6: Policy Actor and Network Analysis: A Brief Introduction 
 Whelan (2012) argues that even though the concept of ‘network’ has been recently widely and 
frequently used across the social and political sciences, its usage varies. It is used for relationships 
between actors in societies including people, organizations and groups. It has also been used for 
methods of analysing how stakeholders are networked via inter and intra-connections, as both a 
unit of analysis describing a specific organization and as general concept. In my dissertation, I 
often use the term actor and network analysis, but I may only use network analysis where necessary 
42 
 
and actor/s where appropriate. This does not mean that my focus is network analysis per se or vice 
versa, but the discussion is on the intersection between the two terms for finding facts.  
The term ‘actor’ is reflective to individuals, clans, public institutions, NGOs, government 
branches, and sociopolitical and economic groups. Actors are used as an expression of building 
blocks contained of complex networks in order to identify “the key actors whose activities should 
be analysed and assessed within each component of the policy cycle” (Hessing, et al., 2005, p. 
113). Identifying “who the key actors are, what brings them together, how they interact, and what 
effect their interaction has on policy” (Hessing, et al., 2005, p. 114) is the fundamental of policy 
formulation. This concern facilitates researchers to understand the landscape of the problem in the 
field of study.   
To understand how diverse and conventional actors fit together as networks, I describe 
‘network’ as a ‘set of relationships, behaviours, characteristics, and activities of complex groups.  
These groups of actors can be described according to the connections between them which are 
based on shared motives, interests, goals, and natural similarities. I research these connections 
which could be legal, illegal, obvious, obscure, secret, sensitive, and or not mandated. For instance, 
when discussing AMISOM, I may identify it as a network of actors. In such a case, the concept of 
“network” is a dynamic interaction among actors (Larval, 2009). It provides the basis of a coherent 
small and large scale social system composed of interrelated units (Laumann, 1992). It also 
analyses human activities described under social behaviors (Scott, 2008). 
By investigating these dynamic network activities, I can identify the actors in order to be 
able to categorise and find out their typology. Depending on the context, when describing complex 
networks by seeking a means of reconciling, managing and altering them to stability and 
sustainability, I may use the two terms ‘actor’ and ‘network’ as interchangeable or complementary 
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with each other. Each of the three most popular network management approaches: instrumental16, 
institutional17 and interactive18 combine the two terms (Kickert, 1997). 
  “The term ‘network’ refers to an analytical technique used in the social and behavioral sciences, 
or to an organizational form studied in disciplines such as economics, organizational theory, 
management and public administration” (Whelan, 2012, p. 11). Whelan argues that in order to 
analyze networks of security and stability, an interdisciplinary methodology is indispensable. It 
helps in reviewing, studying and properly analyzing the main approaches to address networks and 
the ways to apply them within a given field of study. “The objective of network analysis is to 
identify a set of actors in a ‘structure’ of relationships and the implications of such relationships” 
(Whelan, 2012, p. 13). The questions ‘who are the actors, what are their structures, what 
relationships do they have among themselves and with others, what are their activities, what are 
their interests/motives, what are their strategies, and in which area do they operate?’ are the basic 
concerns for policy formulation.  
 Since the onset of the policy network discipline various experts have given definitions and 
descriptions, with each researcher defining it according to their field of study. For instance, in the 
social sciences, it has been defined as new forms of social organization (Borgese, 1995) and in 
economics as network industries and network technologies. This indicates that the use of the term 
“network” depends on the context it is used in as it varies from discipline to discipline and even 
within a particular discipline. Social science disciplines involve the discussions of policy networks 
but in various forms. Most of them are interdisciplinary in one way or another. For instance, as 
                                                          
16 When focusing on altering dependency relations 
17 When focusing on rules, incentives and culture 
18 When focusing on communication and negotiation 
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(Scott 2000 and Castells 2000) indicate, social actor and network analysis can be created by 
employing new information systems which pinpoint various aspects with various methods. 
 In the contemporary literature, the term policy network has been generally used for political 
discussions, especially that between government and interest groups. It embraces different levels 
and types of policy relationships. Dryzek (2006) cites numerous activities that may fall under 
public policy actor and network analysis for the improvement of public policy. These activities 
start from data creation and data compilation, and lead to the engagement of evidence, testimony, 
argument, and interpretation in order to examine, evaluate, and improve the content and process 
of public policy.  
 Rhodes argues that "the term policy network is used in three main ways in the literature: as a 
description of government at work, as a theory for analyzing government policy making, and as a 
prescription for reforming public management” (Rhodes, 2006, p.426). In the context of instability 
and post-conflict, each of these three ways needs to be analyzed separately within the nation’s 
circumstances. When comparing these three ways and systems, Rhodes seems to be supportive of 
the government policy-making network system. He projects that policy networks are subject to 
conflict, chaos, concussion, and incapability, due to unavoidable unlimited participation. This 
leads to fluctuating results, unstable interactions and access, interaction based on consultation 
rather than negotiation or bargaining, absence of consensus, and unequal power relationships. He 
also argues that such an unbalanced relationship creates conflict among large participants sharing 
a few resources, without alternatives, that they have limited access, or that some have more access 
than others. 
 Obviously, misunderstanding local customs creates policy complexities in the involved 
organization. Freedman states "the complexity in policy created complexity in the interactions 
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among the multiple organizations, which ultimately resulted in an ineffective policy" (Freedman, 
2006, p.482). Freedman argues that it "is essential for policy analysis to consider not only what 
government does, but also what is done or not done outside of government. Taking this broader 
view, organizations may have substantial impacts both on the design of public programs and on 
the social policy environmental outside of government” (Freedman, 2006, p.483).  
 Most of the traditional literature and scholarly works on policy actor and network analysis 
focuses on institutional actors rather than non-institutional actors. There is less conceptualization 
and theorization towards instability and post-conflict situations, where there may be no functional 
institutions. In my findings, post-conflict discourses are the most relevant to the case of Somalia, 
especially when it comes to policy analysis. Thus, my analysis is mainly built on the concepts used 
in the newly emerging literature, which is potentially useful for post-conflict situations. Most of 
the modern discourses on network analyses (especially those of social/public policy), focus on 
identifying the key actors in a network, the most influential members of a network, the connections 
in the network, challenging forces, and the interaction between various actors and participants (or 
victims) in the network (Jordan, 2005; Hajer et al, 3003; Cohen, 2006; Kahler. 2009).  
 Normally, “policy network analysis attempts to take the work of sociological network analysis 
and superimposes it on the public domain” (Suskind et al., 2009, p. 106). As a result, the 
approaches of policy actor and network analysis take into account several forms of human 
behaviour, relations, interactions, and activities including formal, informal, individual actors, 
collective actors, and bargaining characteristics of policy actors. In the process of analysing each 
of these factors in post-conflict situations, the analyst needs to look at the transformation process 
in both formal and informal networks resulting from socio-political waves of chaos to transition 
to post-conflict peace and stability.  
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 Any model developed to identify the above factors needs to be analysed “to the different phases 
of policy development such as issue definition, agenda building, policy formulation and 
implementation” (Marin, 1992, p. 43). In detail, each element of the networks needs to be defined 
“within three distinct forms of power: bargaining power, social power, and the power of existence” 
(Kahler. 2009, p. 12). The substantial concepts of these two authors are complementary to each 
other, and the combination of the two supports my ‘multi-dimensional approach - MDA’ to 
analysing theories of the policy-formulation process. Through such, I set environmental network 
analyses, “which provide explanations, and not simply descriptions, tell stories of why actors act 
and to what effect” (Sabatier, 1999, p. 234). The multi-dimensional approach is the best way to 
look at each of the factors from different angles, of which each potentially leads to stability and 
sustainability in its own way.  
  
2.7: Application of Policy Actor and Network Analysis at three levels in the 
case of Somalia 
 In my dissertation, I thoroughly review a number of different policy actors and network 
concepts in order to find the one most suitable to the post-conflict situation in Somalia. Therefore, 
in order to cover all the major social and marine environmental/economic policy actors and 
networks in the country, I identify the number of stakeholders, including corporate and political 
activists that are involved in or may be involved in maritime affairs in the Somali basin. Then, I 
classify them into three scales: international/regional, national, and provincial/local. In this 
classification, I briefly study and analyze the documented and undocumented policy of each one 
of them. In this analysis, I look at the collapsed policy networks in Somalia and how current ones 
replaced them. In my analysis, I follow these steps to analyze the particular situation of marine 
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environmental policy actors and networks in Somalia at each of local, national, regional, and 
international levels. 
   
 Even though my analysis is on socio-political and economic networks which frame 
environmental networks, I frequently refer to ‘social networks’. A social network system is the 
centre of all networks and organizational analysis, and as I analyse actors and networks, I discus 
organizations, institutions, governments, and organized or unorganized self-styled groups. Marin 
(1991) argues that people form and implement organizational networks, but Kahler (2009) proves 
that social networks are implanted and operated within all organizations. This means that there are 
political networks, social networks, insecurity networks, policing networks, economic networks, 
pollutant networks, and community interpersonal networks.     
     In order to understand how these networks can be applied in the three domestic levels of the 
nation: local, provincial and national, there is a need for a brief description of the key actors and 
networks at each of the three scales. Yet, a policy analysis on these actors and networks should be 
linked with those of the region and the globe at large. I thus need to incorporate into the analysis 
two more significant levels which are the international and the regional aspects. Thus, I consolidate 
all the six scales into three which are: International/regional, National, Provincial/Local scales.  
 What is obvious is that poor capacity has contributed to misunderstanding of the complex policy 
actors and networks and the problems they cause. In this circumstance, in my analysis, the most 
direct sources to consult include certain professions of international law, policy, conventions, 
agreements, state-stakeholders’ foreign policies towards post-conflict states, and memorandums 
of understandings. Military interventions undertaken in former post-conflict countries, for 
peacemaking/keeping, are also apparent references within this theme. After having gathered 
48 
 
sufficient materials regarding the area under analysis, and keeping in mind a consideration of what 
can be possible over what is legal and/or ideal, I analyse the possibility of altering these forces into 
efficient networks of stability.  
 In this chapter, I provide a brief introduction leading to a theoretical framework analysis, but in 
the subsequent chapters: three, four and five, I provide detailed information regarding the 
identification, definition, description, discussion, and analysis of the key networks. Specifically, I 
focus on explaining the key networks/stakeholders’ names, backgrounds including the networks’ 
origins, locations, causes/triggers, and brief histories; capacities including economic bases, 
revenues, legalities, and executive administrative capacities; manoeuvers as  the networks’ 
activities which are often skillfully and strategically managed movements;  motives including the 
networks’ interests and goals/objectives; dissections as the networks internal fragmentation, 
relationships with foreign networks and the local communities as the key terms of the horizontal 
and vertical alliances; and the typologies in which they can be categorized. Even though I analyse 
and categorize most of the actors and networks under these eight facets, some actors and networks 
may not be describable under them, due to their nature or nature of activities. In chapters 3, 4 and 
5, I provide critical and comprehensive analysis, explanations and identifications of these 
networks. 
 Below is a sample of the table which are illustrated in the following three chapters to identify 
and describe the actors and networks of stability, potential stability and instability at the three 
scales of this study. 
Name Background     Capacities Motives Maneuvers Dissections Relationships Typology 
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 In Somalia, formal and cooperative policy networks collapsed along with the local political 
structure. Usually, “when a policy issue becomes politicized, the old policy community is broken 
up and an issue network emerges. This, in turn, creates an unstable and unpredictable situation 
within the policy sector” (Daugberg, 1998, p. 24). Formal actors are replaced by stakeholders who 
are opportunistic and interconnected in one way or another, willingly or unwillingly, and positively 
or negatively. They are competitive in most of their interactions with each other, however, there 
are certain occasions and issues such as defending or pursuing common interest that force them to 
be cooperative. Accordingly, in my study, I consider various stakeholders as the existing actors 
and networks, and will call them the networks of instability or potential stability, which leads to 
marine environmental degradation and insecurity at the three scales of global/regional, national, 
provincial/local (see triangle 2). On the basis of the three-scaled analysis, and informed by the 
literature on community-based environmental policy systems in former war torn societies, I make 
recommendations to build actors and networks of sociopolitical and economic stability in order to 
create marine environmental and resource sustainability in Somalia. 
 The purpose of this qualitative semi-structured case study is to examine the impact of the 
networks of instability on the country’s maritime environment and security during the 
governmental vacuum in Somalia. Identifying which of the actors are permanent, temporary, 
occasional, and understanding their motives and strategies will be essential to assessing which 
actors and networks may have the potentiality to become contributors to stability. I prefer to 
identify problems which are not limited to marine environmental degradation and insecurity per 
se, but extend to socio-political and economic instability that may cause/lead to turmoil and hinder 
environmental protection. The linkage between socio-political and environmental degradation, 
which has been increasing over time to time, needs to be understood in depth, because the solution 
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for one is the solution for the other. Some literatures opine that it is environmental degradation 
which mostly causes or contributes to socio-political instability (Lubchenco, 1998), while others 
opine the other way around (Fagan, 2007; Fisher, 2004). Throughout my analysis, I need to address 
each problem with its relevant issues and interdisciplinary subjects.  
 
2. 8: Research Methods 
 In my research methodology, I adopt qualitative library work, in order to emphasize the 
importance of looking at variables found in the natural setting (Wolcott, 2008). It helps me to 
generally understand the origins and impacts of the problem, as well as its diverse motives and 
capacities, and to give it prominence. When analyzing data collected by ENGOs or governmental 
offices from the field, I apply a qualitative analysis based on a library work.  
 My goal is to examine stakeholders who are generally antagonists to each other, though some 
of them may enter temporarily alliances. One of the most widely conceptualized frameworks for 
formulating complex policy is to seek a degree of recognition, reconciliation, cohesion, and 
cooperation among the relevant actors. The important point of these concepts is that a network of 
stability can be established through consensus with and among the constructive stakeholders, while 
destroying the explicitly destructive ones. This leads me to scan the literature on negotiation, 
mediation and consensus. For instance, Stern’s theory of coherence relies on “evidence on the 
factors that determine environmentally significant behaviours and that can effectively alter them” 
(Stern, 2002, p.1).  
 The combination of coherence and self-coordination theories assist in creating democratic and 
non-democratic policy networks in order to formulate local environmental policy linked to 
national, regional and international policies (Scharpf, et al., 1994). Self-coordination theory is 
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based on internal management experience (Katzy, et al., 2011; Polanyi, 2000). In this regard, the 
most appropriate method that I can employ is a combination of a cluster of environmental policy 
frameworks consisting of systems thinking, holistic, integrative, cohesive, and participatory 
approaches, which I call a ‘multi-dimensional approach’. Within this approach, I identify and 
define policy networks, while recognizing the importance of all stakeholders, the interdependence 
of all activities, and the interdisciplinary needs of research. Whelan (2012) argues that the most 
appropriate framework to analyse national and international networks of security (in terms of their 
motives, goals, dynamics, and effectiveness) is to apply a multi-level and multi-dimensional 
methodology.  
 Utilizing theoretical framework aims to understand a specific subject in a specific zone in a 
specific time so that the researcher can learn what, when, where, who, and how to answer the 
research questions. To get the most relevant answers to these questions, I keep narrowing down 
the themes, and I consider the date, the objective, the approach, the target, and circumstance of the 
literature. I engage the problem from networked activities through a qualitative case study which 
is linked to global dimensions. In my study, I first search dissertation databases combining all the 
possible sources, then, I endeavour to figure out the most relevant groups of them, and thirdly 
select specific groups of databases.  
 I investigate the origin of conflict between foreign socio-political and economic-led forces and 
local communities/fisheries, and how their activities have impacted on the marine 
environment/ecology. This investigation leads me to analyze both the actors and networks of 
instability and those of potential stability with the aim of creating a stable network from the 
grassroots level. Somalia’s policy has been based on a top-down approach, but due to the country’s 
fragmentation into clan-based territories, critical circumstances have forced some of the coastal 
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communities to self-mobilize for their self-defence; thus bottom-up policy approaches are 
applicable in Somalia. In the context of instability, all the actors and networks are based on an 
opportunistic system motivated by greediness and self-enrichment and, thus, are out of control. 
Consequently, throughout my analysis, I review the literature on policy theories, and create a 
central framework for the activities based on the interactions of bottom up and top-down ideas. I 
will recommend policy strategies that can work in the country, both in the contexts of instability 
and stability. Even, in the context of socio-political and economic stability, a governmental 
administration may not be able to directly differentiate between stable and unstable (accurate from 
inaccurate) networks. Therefore, to set forth transparent and trust regulations, “policy networks 
are sets of formal institutional and informal linkages” (Daughbjerg, 1998, p. 21-22).  
 
Conclusion 
 In chapter one, I found that due to governmental breakdown Somalis are not in a position to 
effectively use their own marine resources which have been exploited by foreigners. Similarly, 
they have no capacity to protect their environment which has been degraded by both internal and 
external polluters. On top of these two problems, there is no reliable security to prevent further 
deterioration and repair the damage. The complex actors and networks of instability engaged in 
each of the country’s politics, economics, and social issues are more vigorous than those of 
stability and potential stability. However, there is a window of opportunity as the country is 
progressively entering its post-conflict situation. At this stage, there is a strong need for marine 
environmental policy and security considerations.  
 Hence, in chapter two, I sought an appropriate methodology to answer my research question/s. 
Reviewing literature and seeking a theoretical approach, I found that most of the traditional 
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literature on resource management and policy analysis is not applicable to Somalia’s present 
condition of instability and post-conflict situation. Instead, scholarship on post-conflict situations 
that aim to facilitate community-based policy in the context of instability at provincial/local level 
is rather appropriate. To understand actors and networks of stability, potential stability and 
instability related to socio-economic and political insecurity and marine environmental 
degradation at the local/provincial, national and international/regional levels, I apply a 
multidimensional approach to policy analysis drawing on a qualitative library work. 
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Chapter Three 
International/Regional Scale Analysis on Foreign Actors and Networks of 
Stability, Potential Stability, and Instability in Somalia: 
Who are they? What are their Objectives, and Strategies? What are their Capacities? 
3.1. Introduction 
The international and regional actors and networks of instability, potential stability, and 
stability in Somalia include regional and international lobbyists, militaries, navies, and intelligence 
agencies. There are also various state and non-state economically motivated actors and networks 
of instability. These networks exploit the country’s natural resources and degrade its environment 
by unsustainably exploiting its natural resources.  
In this chapter, I identify AMISOM, Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, Western Intelligence units, 
NATO, assorted foreign illegal marine poachers, and oil exploiters as the most notable networks 
of instability, potential stability, and stability. Ethiopian and Kenyan forces operate both as 
members and non-members of AMISOM, due to their multilayered missions directed by their 
countries. Henceforth, I discuss them as Ethiopian and Kenyan involvements in Somalia.  
Under each of the nine headings in this chapter, with the exception of the last two, there 
are six sub-sections which each focuses on a particular network. In each of these sub-sections, the 
network’s background, including its location, origin and geographical scope; administrative and 
economic capacities; maneuvers and challenges; motives and interests; minor-groups 
encompassed; relationships to both other foreign actors and networks and local stakeholders; and 
typology of whether it can be categorized under stability, potential stability or instability, will be 
described.  
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3.2.A: AMISOM 
3.2.1: Background/Origin and Geographical Scope 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) represents the main regional military 
network operating in Somalia. In 2006, the UN Security Council and the African Union’s (AU) 
Peace Support Mission, under the auspice of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Drought 
and Development (IGADD), had suggested authorizing the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia 
(UN Security Council Resolution, 2006). AMISOM was established on February 20, 2007 by the 
UN Security Council for the purpose of stabilizing Somalia (Kedir, 2013). It is a branch of IGADD, 
which is also a branch of the African Union (Kedir, 2013). IGADD was established in 1988 as a 
vehicle for sub-regional developmental integration among Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti 
(Paarlberg, 2002). 
Uganda sent the first battalion to Somalia in 2010 (Horseedmedia, 2015). This battalion 
encountered severe resistance from Al-Shabab militants, who killed hundreds in different attacks 
(Horseedmedia, 2015). Burundian contingents joined the Ugandans to strengthen AMISOM’s 
mission, but Al-Shabab took similar measures, resulting in the killing of hundreds of Burundian 
soldiers (Associate Press, 2015). Then, Djibouti and Sierra-Leone answered the IGADD’s call for 
more regional forces, and contributed their troops to strengthen AMISOM. Later on, the forces of 
Kenya and Ethiopia, who were already hunting terrorist groups and individuals in the country, also 
joined AMISOM. Kenya did not, however, change its battalion’s title, being the “Kenyan Defence 
Forces (KDF),”and nor did the “Ethiopian Troops”. Depending on achievements and other 
interests, both Ethiopia and Kenya have participated in the AMISOM membership as they have 
found fitting. KDF made its base in Kismayo operating throughout Jubbaland, while Ethiopian 
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Troops are based in Mogadishu patrolling throughout South-central province. As such, I will 
discuss the latter two forces separately in this chapter.  
Currently, AMISOM consists of military forces composed of Ugandan, Burundian, 
Ethiopian, Kenyan, Djiboutian, and Sierra-Leonean personnel. There are also limited police forces, 
consisting of Nigerian and Ghanaian troops. At this stage, Ugandan troops are devoted to training 
Somali military and militias to be self-sufficient (Radio Mogadishu, 2012). The rest of the 
AMISOM troops are stationed at their headquarters camp in Mogadishu. Their missions are limited 
to self-defence and self-protection. They occasionally assist the Somali military in attacking Al 
Shabaab’s strongly-held towns and cities. AMISOM’s geographical scope and missions are visibly 
active throughout the South-central province of the country in which the capital city and the federal 
administration are included. In emergency situations, forces have been deployed in both Puntland 
and Somaliland to conduct onetime operations (Radio Mogadishu, 2012).  
 
3. 2.2: Capacity and Economy 
AMISOM is accountable to the IGADD, AU, and the European Union, but the organization 
only infrequently answers to them (Mehler, et al., 2008). It seems that AMISOM’s executives 
censor reports of the organization’s activities, and report only those which are positive and 
monetarily appealing. This not only affects AMISOM’s operational administration and execution, 
but also the financing of its activities. AMISOM is funded by a logistical support package, the EU 
Africa Peace Facility and the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, through bilateral support (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance, 2012). Beyond this bilateral agreement, several states including the 
UAE, EU, UK, US, France, and China extend direct financial support to AMISOM (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance, 2012). Numerous other private international security companies and 
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international funders assist AMISOM in achieving its main goal, which is to wipe out the Al-
Shabab terrorists from Somalia and its neighbouring countries. Its annual budget is estimated to 
be over 2.5 billion (AMISOM, 2015; Kraska, 2011), but this estimation fluctuates based on the 
operations undertaken (Kraska, 2011). 
In terms of administrative and military capacities, to this date, the AMISOM forces which 
are over 22,000 soldiers (Brown, 2015) have been unable to clear the Al-Shabab even from the 
capital city. Apparently, there are at least three reasons for this failure: 
1) Unfamiliarity with the local culture,  
2) Unfamiliarity with the geographical nature of the land,  
3) Carrying out state-individual-based missions rather than a coalition, and that each of the 
AMISOM member states pursues its own interests; mainly economic and political in Somalia 
rather than the coalition’s mandates (Ulusow, 2014). 
 
3.2.3: Motives 
 Ethiopia and Kenya describe AMISOM’s motives and mandates as being: to protect the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), to prevent Al-Shabab from having access to the seaport 
and airport in Mogadishu and Kismayo, and to provide humanitarian support assistance for the 
impoverished Somalis (Cilliers, et al., 2010). Their main argument is that AMISOM’s interest is 
to chase away Al-Shabab from the region even if it costs millions of lives. Al-Shabab has already 
taken the lives of approximately half a million people, of whom the majority are innocent civilians 
that are uninvolved in the conflict between the AMISOM forces and Al-Shabab (Cilliers, et al., 
2010).  
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Although AMISOM’s assigned mission is peacekeeping, it seems that its officials and 
personnel do not yet understand their role as preventers of conflict, peace-
makers, peacekeepers, or peace enforcers. On several occasions, officials of AMISOM both 
directly and indirectly indicated that they did not want to defeat Al-Shabab, but want to scatter 
them to prolong their highly paid mission (Bujumbura, 2014). This affirms that AMISOM’s 
explicit interest is to gain money, military experience, and intelligence (Kraska, 2011). AMISOM 
has already learned invaluable lessons from the Somali rival militias including Al-Shabab and 
civilians (Kraska, 2011).  
AMISOM’s divergent motives and self-interests override the coalition’s original purpose. 
Instead of operating for the cause of creating a long-term stability and post-conflict reconstruction 
in Somalia, (Orakhelashvili, 2011) each battalion pursues its country’s individual interest. The AU 
and EU believe that the stability of Somalia is in the interest of the international community. As 
such, AMISOM peacekeepers’ interests are expected to be reflective to those of the world 
community at large. In order for AMISOM to achieve its security interest, the EU has assigned 
AMISOM to simultaneously enable the stabilization and distribution of humanitarian assistance 
(Cilliers, et al., 2010). 
The implementation of AMISOM’s mandates seems occasional for two reasons: the first 
is the lack of coordination among AMISOM’s member states, and the second is a lack of clarity 
in IGADD’s mandate, vision, mission, goal, and principles. In retrospect, IGADD’s initial aim was 
to bring the war between Somalia and Ethiopia to an end, and consolidate peace by promoting 
economic development (Paarlberg, 2002). In 2002, this aim was transformed from economic 
development to politics and military concerns (Tavares, 2010), and IGADD’s membership 
increased to include Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda on the list (Paarlberg, 2002). 
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The latter objectives are yet to be authorised and publicized. IGADD’s expansion has, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, resulted in depriving Somalian and Eritrean people of 
their rights to participate in the organization’s activities, including consultation and information. 
Although AMISOM operates on the ground through the use of foot-soldiers, it is IGADD that 
usually has direct involvement in its political activities in Somalia. As such, AMISOM is primarily 
IGADD’s military arm, but it is also active in the country’s political and economic spheres. 
Publicly, Somalis complain about AMISOM’s involvement in drafting Somalia’s constitution, 
national jurisdiction, citizenship law (GaroweOnline, 2015), policy, planning, political agenda 
(Shay, 2006), humanitarian, and developmental programs (Kraska, 2011). Since its name 
‘AMISOM’ is ambiguous and not restricted to a particular project, the mission of AMISOM is 
broad and open to every sector. In my research, I came to the conclusion that AMISOM can be 
divided into two: The Ethiopian and Kenyan armed wings that know what they are doing in 
Somalia, but are ill-intentioned. The rest of the AMISOM forces are unaware of their motives, but 
are using Somalia to gain experience for future interventions and invasions.  
 
3. 2. 4: Manoeuvres  
In 2015, AMISOM created the Formed Police Unit (FPU), alongside its military wing, to 
work with the Somali Police Force in executing joint security patrols within the capital city and its 
suburbs (AMISOM, 2015). Nigeria and Ghana contributed by sending police officers mainly for 
training the local police (AMISOM, 2015). This has reached the level where the country’s national 
police stations are administered and controlled by AMISOM commanders (Huriwaa, 2014; 
AMISOM, 2015). In the AMISOM mission statement, none of these activities has ever been 
mentioned (Amisom-au.org. 2013). AMISOM’s engagement is sporadic. Their forces are mostly 
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seated in their camps while Al-Shabab militants continuously wage war against them. It is only on 
rare occasions that the AMISOM forces wage war against Al-Shabab militants.  
AMISOM contingents, especially those of Kenya and Uganda, have been recurrently 
accused of committing atrocious crimes, including sexual assault, rape, abduction, torture, and the 
killing of civilians in Somalia (Mkutu, 2007; Omar, 2012). After 
the media gave extensive coverage of these events, AMISOM issued ‘Resolution 26’ which stated 
that two multinational sectors will be formed, with one based in Kismayo and the other in 
Mogadishu (Makokha, 2015). The resolution decrees that criminal activities committed by 
AMISOM member individuals be reported to the headquarters of AMISOM, while notifying the 
concerned country.  
3. 2. 5: Relationships 
In its early years, AMISOM’s operation was appreciated by the entire international 
community (Communiqué, 2007), but since then the credibility of AMISOM has been fluctuating. 
Currently, it has strong partnerships with certain EU states (such as the UK and Scandinavian 
member states) as well as the US (Global Policy Forum, 2009).  
Ugandan forces entered Somalia with a shortage of troops, equipment, technology, and 
financial and human resources. They sought help from many Western and Arab states but obtained 
few responses. Many Western countries such the US avoided any military involvement in Somalia, 
and were reluctant to provide funding for such purposes (Global Foreign Policy, 2015; Radio 
Mogadishu, 2015). To this date, AMISOM’s relationship with the regional states is not strong and 
reciprocal. The organization seeks financial assistance from mission to mission, but the responses 
are not prompt (AMISOM, 2012, 2013, 2014).  
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AMISOM has occasionally tried to consult with some of the local elders (Galgadud, 2013). 
However, most of the local elders and young politicians may not be sincere in their participation 
and collaboration with the AMISOM and any other foreign forces. Some wait for orders from 
AMISOM instead of advising them. They make assumptions that they are under occupation and 
they have no choice other than to act as sycophants (Kabukuru, 2015).  
3. 2. 6: Typology 
The vast majority of the Somalis are averse to the presence of any of the regional or 
international forces in their country. They anticipate that these forces will be permanent, and will 
continue to harass them and exploit their natural resources. Syrian peacekeepers that entered 
Lebanon in 1976 did not leave until Syria itself collapsed and fell into chaos (Forest, 2007). In 
Afghanistan, the US military forces that came there in 2002 largely employ foreigners, while 
citizens are considered to be belligerents (Abrahamsen, 2011). A justification was made that 
Afghanis are not trustworthy and at the same time are not reliable enough to handle the tasks 
assigned to them (Abrahamsen, 2011). Similarly, in Somalia, most of the employees of the 
AMISOM, airport, seaport, and even government agencies are foreigners while Somalis are jobless 
and starving in the street. Moreover, due to its legality and official purpose, AMISOM can be 
considered to be an actor and network of potential stability. 
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3. 3: Ethiopia 
3. 3. 1: Background and Geographical Scope 
Ethiopia is politically known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is located 
in the Horn of Africa by the east of Somalia, with Eritrea to the north and northeast, Djibouti to 
the east, Sudan and South Sudan to the west, and Kenya to the south. In the pre-colonial eras, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia were historically one country called Abyssinia.  
From time immemorial, Ethiopia and Somalia have been in conflict. There have been 
intermittent deadly wars triggered by either religious, territorial or political conflicts19 (Lefebvre, 
1991). Dividing Abyssinia into several countries has contributed to existing conflicts in the region, 
and has also created more. These existing conflicts are among the major reasons for the current 
instability in Somalia and the region at large. For instance, Somali speaking people in the region 
are genealogically one unique tribe whose faith and culture is one (Wines, 1992). However, in 
1945, the British colony divided Somalia into nearly 7 regions: British-Somaliland, Italy-
Somaliland, Socotra Islands, Ogaden (Somali Western), Liban, NFD, and Djibouti20. Somalis have 
been seriously irritated by this division. They relate the matter to the former religious and ethnic-
based conflicts between them and Ethiopia, considering that the aim of the British colony was to 
empower the Ethiopians against the Somalis. They question why Ethiopia is the only country never 
to be colonized in Africa, while Somalis have been colonized by each of the Portuguese [1920], 
                                                          
19 Before Somalia’s independence, those wars were purely based on religious and cultural conflicts, but since independence, they 
became territorial and political wars. 
20 The British Somaliland is the current Somaliland province of Somalia, while Italy Somaliland is the rest of Somalia, Socotra 
Islands are under the control of Yemen, Ogaden and Liban are under the control of Ethiopia, NFD is under Kenya, and Djibouti 
is an independent country.  
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Ethiopians (pre and post-European colony) (Ferdinands, 2011), French, Italians [1924, 1926-1960] 
(Fretter, 2008), and British [1880-1960] (Cahnman, 2009).  
The British divided Somalia into 7 regions and assigned each to one of its neighbouring 
enemies. It is not only Somalis that live with such kind of resentment in the region. In another 
instance, when Eretria gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, it physically attacked seven 
of its neighbour states including: Ethiopia (Negash, 1997; Murphy, et al., 2013), Sudan, Djibouti, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen (Negash, 1997; Murphy, et al., 2013). Eretria did not limit its attacks to 
the immediate neighbours, but also extended them to Somaliland, the state of Somalia, and Qatar 
who share no border with it (Mehler, 2008; Carillet, et al., nd; Tesfagiorgis, 2011). It has claimed 
that each of these countries annexed some parts of its legitimate lands or islands.       
The latest political and territorial war between Somalia and Ethiopia was from 1976 to 
1988 over the Ogaden region21 of Ethiopia, which Somalia considers as its own. In this war, more 
than the 10 socialist states mentioned in chapter one sided with Ethiopia and bombarded Somalia. 
Ethiopia and Kenya renewed their 1964 mutual defense accord, at least, three times; 1978 
(Kabukuru, 2015), 1980 and August 28, 1987 (Globalsecurity, nd). The deal calls for the two 
countries’ armed forces to jointly counterattack Somalia in the event of an attack by Somalia 
(Globalsecurity, nd).  
The traditional land and religious conflicts have transformed into conflicts surrounding 
political and marine resources (Abir, 2006). Ethiopian warships and fishing vessels were 
frequently found in the Somali EEZ, ostensibly for economic and military purposes (Huriwaa, 
2012; Mehler, 2015). Politically, Ethiopia set up its provocative embassy inside Somalia’s 
presidential palace where the flag of Ethiopia is draping over that of Somalia (Arman, 2015). Add 
                                                          
21 an ethnically Somali region also known as Somali-Western 
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that Ethiopia has embassies and consulates in each of Puntland and Somaliland provinces of 
Somalia without the permission of the Somalia’s federal administration. Moreover, it signed 
military and diplomatic treaties with each of these two provinces (Arman, 2015).  
Out of precaution, Somali citizens are suspicious of Ethiopian manoeuvres. This made 
Somalis paranoid, bewildered, and susceptible to terrorism. The impact of this war is still visible 
in the minds of Somalis who envision to recapture the Ogaden and Liban regions from Ethiopia. 
In 1991, Ethiopia renamed the two regions as “Region 5” of Ethiopia (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008).  
3. 3. 2: Capacity and Economy (legal, administrative/executive and revenue) 
As of July 1 2014, the population of Ethiopia is estimated at 96,506,031, which is 
equivalent to 1.3% of the total world population (Global Fire Power, 2015; Worldometers. info, 
2016). Approximately a quarter of the Ethiopia’s population are government forces in operation 
including various types of federal and provincial military, police, intelligence, snipers, or other 
related forces operate either in the ground or underground (Global Fire Power, 2015; Editorial 
Staff of African Globe, 2014; Dewar, 2008). 
In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has the strongest military, and is politically, socially and 
economically strong as well, and at a continental level, it has been recognized as the second or the 
third-strongest military power (Mehler, et al., 2015; Editorial Staff of African Globe, 2014; Global 
FirePower, 2015). In 2015, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) service was estimated 
38,794,315 equipped with a huge number of modern sophisticated shelf propelled guns, towed 
artillery pieces, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, rocket projectors, and all kinds of war aircrafts 
(Russel, 2016).  
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Therefore, the Ethiopian forces are the most powerful stakeholder in the political affairs of 
Somalia. This power compels Ethiopia not only to manipulate Somali politics, but also to usurp 
the entire region’s activities towards Somalia’s politics and resources. Most of the regional states, 
particularly those of the frontline states, being Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, do not dare to 
exercise their political interests in Somalia without the consent of Ethiopia, because it is Ethiopia 
that controls IGADD (Bereketea, 2012). Even though the Ethiopian administration claims to be a 
democratic system, their forces still operate in an autocratic system (Editorial, the Guardian, 2015). 
Ethiopian forces in Somalia fluctuate between 40,000 to 70,000, which are always in and 
out of the country (Mehler, et al., 2015). For instance, in 2009 these forces temporarily withdrew, 
but their withdrawal was described as a political retreat and military tactic. They came back after 
a year as a member of AMISOM pursuing Al-Shabab terrorists, but later on announced they are 
not a member of AMISOM (Tefera, 2011). It is the Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defence that executes 
these military undertakings (Tefera, 2011). 
In terms of legality, Ethiopia initially took unilateral action in invading Somalia, as the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) emerged and declared that they would rule Somalia with Sharia 
Law in 2006 (Bereketea, 2012). Several states, including the USA, as well as human rights 
organizations condemned the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia, considering it to be a violation of 
Somalia’s sovereignty (Bereketea, 2012). Later on, the US Under-Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Jendayi Frazer convinced the US to support the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (Prince, 
2010). She also pressured Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, to fully invade Somalia and 
deal with it aggressively (Prince, 2010). In one of her instructions, she told the titular TFG’s 
President, Abdullahi Yusuf, and the Parliament Speaker, Adan Madobe, that it is not fair that a 
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population of 7 million control the largest coast in Africa, while the neighbouring over 80 million 
do not have access to the sea (SomaliNet, 2007). 
Political analysts argued that the invasion of Somalia was illegal under international law, 
involved violations of human rights, was immoral to the international community, a political 
mistake to the region, and not in the interest of Ethiopia (Prince, 2010). However, within a few 
months, the Ethiopian forces conquered the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu, and the coastal 
cities. This is the first time Ethiopia gained access to the Somali seawaters.  
Ethiopia’s economy is mainly based on agricultural production of coffee, honey, wheat, 
teff, and maize (Todd, 2014). Ethiopia is also rich in gold, iron, civet, ivory, and livestock (Todd, 
2014). However, it seems that the government relies on foreign donations more than its own 
resources. This indicates that the country’s natural resources of economy are only a conducive to 
the expected foreign donations and diplomatic deals (Mehler, 2015; Todd, 2014). Moyo (2009) 
argues that aid constitutes more than 90% of the Ethiopian government budget.  
 
3. 3. 3: Manoeuvres 
Ethiopia is fully engaged in Somalia militarily, politically, socially, and economically. 
Each of these engagements affects Somalia’s and the region’s security, socio-political stability, 
and environmental sustainability. As such, even though these three sectors are intertwined, I 
discuss Ethiopia’s military and political manoeuvres while pinpointing its economic concern from 
the sea and fresh water resource’s perspectives. 
Omar (2014) argues that, in Somalia, the Ethiopian armies had been engaged in mass 
killing, bombardment, shooting, torturing, terrorizing, imprisoning, robbing, and raping since their 
full incursion in the middle of 2006 up until January 13, 2009. Most Somali political observers 
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view Col. Gabre, an Ethiopian military commander, as the most powerful authority in South-
central Somalia and the federal administration (Arman, 2015; Fox News World, 2013). Ethiopia’s 
intervention of Somalia has created fiery social tension and political turmoil at the domestic level, 
and political divisions full of doubts among the regional states (Bereketea, 2012). Sudan, Eretria, 
Djibouti, Tanzania, and other states oppose Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia (Mentan, 2010).  
Politically, Ethiopia, sometimes acting under the guise of AMISOM, with the help of the federal 
executive branch of Somalia, has endeavored to divide the South-central province into at least four 
provinces. The effort has already established the administrations of Jubbaland, South-West 
Somalia, Hiiraan-Shabelle, Galmudug state, and Mogadishu which should be administered by a 
federal law. However, none of these administrations have become effective (Ulusow, 2014). 
3. 3. 4: Motives 
Ethiopia’s original justification for invading Somalia was to defend the Somali interim 
government and the warlords from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) (Mehler, 2015). As the most 
permanent stakeholder in the region, it seems to be promoting its own political agenda, which is 
to prevent or frustrate the resurgence of a strong Somali state (Moi, 2002). Ethiopia is sceptical 
about accepting a stable Somalia because it is worried that Somalia may renew its claim concerning 
the Ogden region in Southern Ethiopia. Garad describes Ethiopia’s interest/motives in three pillars: 
1) The potential threat of a strong Somalia that can lobby for (or fight for) the Somali Ogaden 
region that is currently part of Ethiopia, 
(2) The Ethiopian leadership of the IGADD regional organization in the absence of a Somali state 
that can counterbalance it, and, 
(3) Ethiopia’s privilege in the west as the region’s favourite bulwark against Islamism (Garad, 
2015, p. 4). 
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These three factors are commonly known as Ethiopia’s policy towards Somalia as they 
have been followed since Somalia’s independence. A fourth factor exists due to the fact that 
Ethiopia is a landlocked nation which needs access to Somalia’s seaports (Adeyemo, 2000). The 
historical conflict between the two nations which could erupt over religious and cultural 
differences is also evident as the fifth factor. 
In terms of the importance of marine resources, even though Ethiopia is a landlocked 
country, it is a signatory to almost all of the agreements and other affairs on both the Indian Ocean 
and the Red Sea (Gatsheni, 2013; AFP, January 30, 2009). It is not yet clear whether Ethiopia 
represents Somalia in these agreements/conventions, intends to secure regional security, or has its 
own agenda. Ethiopia argues that her fishing vessels harvest from the international seawaters off 
Somalia’s EEZ, but the Somali fisheries argue that they have witnessed them fishing in the EEZ 
(AFP, 2009). This economic interest has not been limited to seawaters but also to freshwaters.  
Since 1995, Ethiopia has been constructing huge dams on the Shabelle River22. The river’s 
water has been blocked and diverted from Somalia to Ethiopian bushland (Calas, et al., 2010). In 
short, Ethiopia’s interests are a combination of political, social, cultural, military, territorial, and 
economic considerations. She is taking advantage of Somalia’s lack of an effective government. 
Political analysts believe that Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Zenawi, had the vision of a “Super cop” 
mini-empire in the Horn. To succeed in this, he claims to bring peace, freedom and stability to 
Somalia, even though, he failed to bring this to his own country (Prince, 2010). 
3. 3. 5: Relationships 
In the case of Somalia, Ethiopia has a close relationship with the US and other Western 
states. It is strongly supported by these powerful states in their fight against serious terrorists in 
                                                          
22 Shabelle River Basin is over 307,000 sq.sq. kmsKms shared by Ethiopia and Somalia (Mohamed, nd). 
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the Horn of Africa (Tefera, 2011). Ethiopia, as well as some other neighbouring countries such as 
Kenya, take advantage of the US’s political agenda by meddling in the politics of Somalia. As 
such, Ethiopia is able to interfere with any peace process intended to bring Somalia back to a state 
of stability and prosperity (Ahmed, 2013).  
Ethiopia also has a relationship with the executive branch of the Somalia’s federal 
administration as well as each of the provincial state presidents. The terms and reciprocity of these 
relationships are still unclear. What is obvious is that neither the federal nor any of the provincial 
administrations make their own decision without the consent of Ethiopia (Tekle, 1994; Somali 
Current, 2015). All the political disputes in Somalia, be they federal or provincial, are solved in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Ulusow, 2014). If the federal president and one of the provincial presidents 
have a dispute over any issue, one reports his adversary to one of the Ethiopian Ministries or 
directly to the presidential palace, depending on the case’s gravity (Wahab, 2007). Even though 
the Ethiopian administration has repeatedly advised Somali leaders to independently manage their 
own affairs (Somali Current, 2015), they are still devalued. This makes the presence of the 
Ethiopian forces in Somalia highly welcomed by the Somali federal and provincial governments, 
but not the citizens.  
Ethiopia’s relationship with the local Somalis is very bitter and based on force and 
subjugations against Somalis at each of national, provincial, institutional, clan, group, and 
individual levels (Hobyo, 2014). The presence of Ethiopians in Somalia is not limited to military 
and intelligence forces. There are numerous groups and individuals who are in the country for 
trade, employment and travel through the sea to Europe or Saudi Arabia. Recently, Ethiopians 
started migrating to Somalia by the hundreds in search of a better life. Even though Somalia is 
below poverty line, Ethiopian nomads consider it a land of opportunity. The number of Ethiopian 
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youth entering the Bosaso city of Puntland for jobs is more than those who enter it in transit. These 
Ethiopian migrants join both local fishers and pirates, but they face xenophobia and hostility from 
some locals who want to see them leave (Aljazeera.net, 2015).  
Ethiopia was suspected of arming and commissioning Al-Shabab terrorists to destabilize 
not only Somalia but also Kenya (Juma, 2015). Some internal and external political analysts 
condemn the Ethiopian forces for having a hidden relationship with their opponents, Al-Shabab. 
Al-Shabab militants wage wars against the AMISOM bases except those of Ethiopia. The local 
media and civil society groups searched for the relationship between Ethiopia and Al-Shabab, in 
search of an explanation for why Al-Shabab has never attacked the Ethiopia contingents in 
Somalia. They concluded that Al-Shabab is a product of the Ethiopian intelligence and a tool to 
destabilize Somalia. They destabilize the region, create job opportunities for the Ethiopian 
military, justifies Ethiopia’s security presence, and creates an open-ended environment of socio-
political crisis which attracts humanitarian aid into the Horn of Africa (Weintstein, 2008).   
 
3. 3. 6: Typology  
Taking into consideration the historical wars between Somalis and Ethiopian 
administrations, it seems that vast majority of the Somali people have no confidence in the 
Ethiopian forces in their country. Regardless of these forces’ aims, Somalis consider them to be 
invaders and colonizers. Ethiopian forces could hardly trust Somali citizens and their traditional 
leaders, and vice versa, for three major reasons:  
1. The long-rooted wars were followed by a newly emerged economic interest on marine resources  
2. Each of the two countries have been controlled by a dictatorship with an iron governance system 
that has intensely influenced citizens’ behaviours 
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3. Both Somalis and Ethiopians are religious fanatics by nature. Since the old Abyssinia became a 
hub for both Christianity and Islam, each of the two faiths struggle to make their religion the only 
one recognized and believed in. As a result, the majority of the Christians in the region have 
adopted the radical interpretation of Orthodox Christianity, while the vast majority of the Muslims 
adopted the radical Islamic interpretation called Wahhabism23 (Mohamud, 1970).    
Due to such reasons, Somalis either directly attack the Ethiopian forces or are disloyal to 
them, showing them outward obedience while secretly plotting against them. This sustains 
retaliatory conflicts between Somali civilians and Ethiopian forces. Therefore, I conclude that the 
Ethiopian forces currently fall under the actors and networks of instability.      
 
3. 4: Kenya   
3. 4. 1: Background and Geographical Scope 
Kenya is located in Eastern Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean to the east, Somalia to the 
northeast, Ethiopia to the north, South Sudan to the northwest, Uganda to the west, 
and Tanzania to the south. Kenya shares both land and marine borders with Somalia. It has a 
coastline consisting of an estimated 536 kilometres (333 miles) bordering with Somalia24. Since 
the two countries’ independence, there has been a land dispute over the NFD region of Somali 
inhabitants under Kenya’s rule (Emmanuel, 2015), but no war has occurred. 
Since 1991, there have been hundreds of thousands of Somalis immigrating into Kenya 
(Moret, 2006). To this date, Kenya hosts approximately 140,000 Somalis in 6 different refugee 
camps: Kakuma, Hagardheer, Dhagahley, Ifo one, Ifo two, and Dadab (UNHCR, 2014; Human 
                                                          
23 As usual, the radicalization behavior goes in seven stages which are: suspicion, fear, contempt, hatred, conflict, and crime. 
24 This estimation may be subject to the delimitation of the disputed maritime boundaries 
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Rights Watch, 2009; Mogire, 2011). There are also approximately 20,000 unregistered Somali 
refugees living in the Kenya’s capital and second capital city, Nairobi and Mombasa respectively 
(Moret, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2009).      
 
3. 4. 2: Capacity and Economy (legal, administrative/executive, and revenue) 
Administratively, Kenya has been in transition to democracy since president Moi was 
ousted from power in 2002 (Wendoh, 200625). The country’s governance is based on a democratic 
parliamentary system which accepts only a limited number of political opposition parties 
(Wangala, et al., 2007). Even though Kenya is a democratic state, there is no clear-cut job 
description among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (McMahon, 
2006; Wendoh, 2006). This makes the country’s administrative system vulnerable to corruption. 
The parliament consists of 222 members. Cabinet ministers should come from the parliament. 
Moreover, cabinet members also serve as chairs of the parliament committees (Belda, 2006). 
Unlike the Prime-Ministerial systems in the developed states like Canada, in some parts of Africa, 
if the ministerial cabinet members are also members of parliament the executive system could be 
susceptible (even though it is liable) to corruption, conflicts of interest, and negligence (Nichols, 
2015; International Commission of Jurists, 2015). This kind of political system impairs the 
enforcement of transparency and accountability.  
In terms of economic status, Kenya’s economy is based on agricultural products led by 
coffee, tourism, industry, transport, communication, foreign exchange, macro-economic service, 
and aid (Hope, 2012). Kenya’s economic growth amounted to 6.9% and 5.7% in 2012 and 2013, 
                                                          
25 Stakeholders Conference. Cape Town, South Africa Conference on Separation of Powers in Sub-Saharan Africa for leading 
stakeholders from South Africa, Namibia, Malawi, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia (Trick, 1999).  
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respectively, while the 2014 estimate and the 2015 projection show economic expansion of 5.3% 
and 6.5%, respectively (IMF, 2015, p. 302). The World Bank, IMF, Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) and several other international institutions and UN bodies generously assist Kenya in the 
implementation of coastal developmental projects. They continuously implement projects for 
enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, fisheries capacity 
building, and tourism projects (World Bank, 2014a; 2015b). 
Some economic analysts argue that, for the last two and half decades, Kenya’s economy 
has been surviving and booming as a result of the influx of Somalis (Leonard, nd). The Western 
and Arabian donations to Somalis have been treasured in Kenya, but often end up in the hands of 
the Kenyan government and Kenyan citizens (Teff, 2012; Kabukuru, 2015).  
 
3. 4. 3: Manoeuvres 
The case of the conflict between Somalia and Kenya over the continental shelf is an explicit 
example of how Kenya exercises its power over Somalia. In 2007, Kenya unilaterally redefined 
its “EEZ limit that runs due east along the 1o 38’ south parallel and thus substantially to the north 
of a theoretical equidistance line” (Schofield, 2008, p. 105)26. It argues that the demarcation should 
be running in a perpendicular line from the land boundary into the sea (Mutambo, 2015). Kenya 
justifies its claim in referring to the UNCLOS’ method of measuring the outer delimitation of the 
continental shelf.  
On the other side, Somalia defines its border as being equidistant to the south-easterly 
direction. It stretches its line from its coast baseline and small Islands in the vicinity of the terminus 
of the land boundary. This border, then, reaches the sea in a perpendicular form that gradually 
                                                          
26 To claim others’ seawaters, some States may take an advantage of the apparent technological complexity and legal loop holes. 
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declines to the eastward Kenya, by running on top of the Lamu basin. In this case, Somalia obeys 
the UNCLOS’ definition stating that the continental shelf of a coastal State is “of the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extends beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin” (UNCLOS, Article 
76). Unlike Kenya, Somalia is the second state, after Canada, which has announced its seawater 
territory as its EEZ which extends up to 200nm (Schofield, 2008)27.  
The 
image of the disputed continental shelf (Somalitalk.com).  
On April 7, 2009, without legal interpretation, Kenya convinced Somalia’s Prime Minister, 
Sharmake, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating that the delimitation between 
the two coastal states be considered a “maritime dispute,” which now remains in an unresolved 
status. The two parties have already failed to settle their disputes peacefully as guided by section 
1 of UNCLOS (IMO, 2012; UNEP, 2007). 
Since Kenya is stable and has the necessary means, it has quickly made its submission to 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), attaching a copy of the MoU signed by the 
                                                          
27 Article 1 (1) of the Somalia marine law No. 57 as well as law No. 37 of 1972, state that Somalia's territorial sea includes portions 
of the sea to the extent of 200 nautical miles. Somalia also influenced Benin, El Salvador, Ecuador and Peru to announce the same. 
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Somali Prime Minister. On August 9, 2009, Somalia’s Parliament revoked the MoU and 
condemned Kenya for invading its 1.2 million breadth square sea waters (Somali Parliament, 
2009). On August 5, 2014, Somalia filed a court case against Kenya to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) required the two sides to submit their 
positions within 4 months, and Somalia had submitted it on July 13, 2015.  
On September 19, 2016, the first round of the ICJ court hearing was opened in the Hague, 
but the final decision was deferred until September 2017. In the first round, Kenya argued that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction since the two parties have an alternative dispute settlement before 
resorting to the court (Mutambo, 2016). On the other hand, Somalia argued that there were several 
attempts to solve the dispute through bilateral negotiations, but all bear no fruit. Kenya counter-
argued that “all the meetings between the two countries over the issue were only preparatory and 
were meant to draw up an agenda for the discussion” (Mutambo, 2016, p.1). Somalia insisted on 
arguing the ICJ to define the boundary as laid down by the UNCLOS and other international sea 
laws where Kenya wants to legalize the 2009 MoU (Müller-Jung, 2016).  
It seems that the UNCLOS has insufficient information about the marine definitions and 
demarcations of Somalia, because Somalia has not made an updated scientific submission 
(UNCLOS, 15 July 2011)28. Given both sides of this conflict, it may be said that Kenya seems 
more professional, persuasive, prepared, and competitive than Somalia, and in the ICJ many 
maritime disputes seem to have been won due to persuasiveness. The case of the dispute between 
Nigeria and Cameroon over the oil-rich Bekassi peninsula was taken to the International Court of 
                                                          
28 This could cause the ICJ decision to be subjective to the information available, definition submitted, scientific analysis, and 
clarity of the two sides’ arguments.  
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Justice in 2002, and Cameroon won. Besides legal evidence, Cameroon was more persuasive than 
Nigeria during the court process (Fisher, 2012).  
Kenya has political, economic, military, intelligence, and knowledge capacities which 
allow it to play a significant role in either stabilizing or destabilizing Somalia. But unlike Ethiopia, 
Kenya often respects international conventions and laws. As a result, it tries to intimidate both 
Somali leaders and civilians until they submit themselves to Kenya’s guidance and instructions. 
Kenyan politicians instruct those of Somalia by convincing them to accept their guidance by 
reasoning that Kenya is knowledgeable and has a close connection with the contemporary world. 
Thereby, they may outwardly help Somalia politically, economically, socially, and security wise, 
but focus on pursuing their own interests.  
UNCLOS, using its technical assistance provision, is in charge of resolving the disputes 
between these two countries by not limiting it to a case of sovereignty, such as measuring the sea-
bed and sea-boundaries (Murunga, 2009). The cases of resource exploitation, fish quota, shared 
natural resources, pollution, and penalties should be resolved alongside the sovereignty case. Here 
UNCLOS would employ its Section 2 of Part XV which concerns the provisions of compulsory 
dispute resolution procedures. The Convention places the onus on the coastal state to establish the 
outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200nm from the 
baselines not to exceed 350 nm (UNCLOS, Article 76). 
 
3. 4. 4: Motives 
Kenya has both political and economic motives, which are explicit in the conflict between 
Kenya and Somalia over the maritime dispute referred to above. The economic concerns seem to 
be prioritized. Kenya obtains financial support from the Western and Arab world for two main 
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reasons; detaining and prosecuting Somali pirates and hosting Somali refugees (Horn, 2012). 
While all the state and non-state financial assistance and investments going to Somalia for any 
purpose are deposited and managed in Kenya, Kenya is the primary beneficiary while Somalia is 
the secondary one. Kenya enjoys tremendous financial gains from hosting Somali refugees (Betts, 
2013). Kenya’s main agenda is based on annexing 1.8 thousand Km2 (over 37,000 square Miles) 
of Somalia’s continental shelf (AllAfrica.com, 2013). This area is rich in fish, minerals, oils, gases, 
and aquatic vegetation (Hussein, 2013). Kenya’s objective is to obtain these resources. Initially, 
Kenya’s justification of the occupation was security, but finally it turned to claiming that the area 
is its own: 
Kenya’s original rationale for invading Somalia was to protect its citizens and tourist-based 
economy from al-Shabab’s predations. For many this argument seemed reasonable as al-
Shabab was accused of kidnapping several expatriates from Kenya. According to a U.S. 
official who spoke on condition of anonymity, there were credible reports that the Kenyan 
government had planned on gaining a strong sphere of influence in the lower region of 
Somalia long before the al-Shabab-affiliated incidents (Samatar, 2013).  
 
In the media, Kenya announced that the Somali region adjacent to its border is a buffer 
zone for the protection of Kenya (Garad, 2015). But the extensive developments and military 
excursions disclosed Kenya’s hidden agenda which is to conquer Somalia’s both land and marine 
zones adjacent to its borders for economic purpose. Kenya played strategic games to access the 
Somali rich coast of Kismayo, Somalia. It signed an agreement with the Ras Kamboni clan-based 
militia stationed off Ras Kamboni seashore which has been designated as a sub-branch of Al-
Qa’idah by both Somalia and the USA (United States Congress, 2010). The terms of the agreement 
were Kenya to lobby for excluding Raskamboni militia from the list of terrorists, and helping it 
78 
 
relocate into Kismayo city (Stewart, 2012)29. Indeed, Kenya’s game became noticeable as it 
occupied the base of the militia, and started exploring for gas and minerals on the coast of Somalia 
(Journalist for Justice, 2015). Kenya has given military, medical, material, technical, and financial 
assistances to the military to capture Kismayo (the third capital city of Somalia) from another 
clan’s militia led by Colonel Barre Hirale (Garad, 2015). The deal was successful and the militant 
group turned into a provincial government ruling the Jubbaland semi-state. 
Recently, Kenya has also started advancing on the land border with Somalia (SaadaalNew, 
2015) and also constructing dams on the Dawo Lake of Somalia’s Juba River30. Kenya’s military 
forces, known as Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), have been repeatedly accused of exporting 
charcoal, wildlife, fish, sugar, and other Somali-owned properties from the Kismayo port which 
they control in the name of AMISOM (Makokha, 2015; Mareeg Media, 2014; Journalist for 
Justice, 2015). This has escalated instability both in Somalia and Kenya by allowing Al-Shabab to 
carry out a chain of attacks and suicide-bombings in both countries. Al-Shabab has briefly captured 
several towns in Kenya, and launched multiple attacks against military camps, schools, 
universities, malls, mosques, and churches in the main cities of Kenya killing thousands of military 
personnel and civilians (Journalist for Justice, 2015).  
Many of the operations carried out by Al-Shabab in Kenya were undertaken by Kenyans 
who might have used locally made equipment. This takes into consideration that Al-Shabab’s 
network is not limited only to Somalia, but also has bases in Kenya (Throup, 2012). A large number 
                                                          
29 The scheme began by releasing and commissioning the deputy leader of the militants, Mr. Ahmed Madobe who was captured by 
the Ethiopian foot soldiers after being injured by US helicopters in 2008 (Throup, 2012). After imprisoning him, the Ethiopians 
and Kenyan forces not only released him, but selected him as the President of the Jubbaland Province of Somalia29 headquartered 
at Kismayo (Hansen, 2013; Garad, 2015)29. This was the result of an open agreement between Ethiopia and Kenya based on the 
two country’s 1976 alliance against Somalia (Thompson, 2015)29. In order to weaken Madobe’s power, Ethiopian intelligence 
worked to separate Ras Kamboni militants from Al-Shabab and weaken their leader’s clan-based power. Madobe’s clan, Ogaden, 
were chased away from the Ethiopian border by pushing them against the Kenyan border so that they would seek help from Kenya. 
30 Basin is 233,000sq. Km, 65% in Ethiopia, 30% in Somalia and 5% in Kenya (Mohamed, nd). 
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of Al-Shabab members are not Somalis but from many different countries (Hansen, 2013). The 
KDF, the national military, the police and the Kenyan intelligence agency, known as the National 
Intelligence Service failed to prevent, detect or defeat most of these deadly attacks, until the Recce-
Squad and Kanga Squad Companies came to assist (Nation Media Group, 2015). Recce is an 
expressly force trained at military colleges in Russia. They are administered by the General Service 
Unit of Kenya which is independent from the Ministry of Defence (Nation Media Group, 2015). 
Unlike Recce, Kanga Squad Company is a private security company owned by Kenyan and Non-
Kenyan business individuals.   
 
3. 4. 5: Relationships 
Kenya has diplomatic and economic relationships with numerous Western, Arab, Asian, 
and African states as well as non-state actors and their networks. In East Africa, Kenya has a 
sympathetic reciprocal relationship with most of the Western states including the US (Bureau of 
African Affairs, 2015). As a result of this consistent and trustworthy diplomatic relationship, 
Kenya is the first beneficiary of Western developmental aid and political support. For instance, the 
Canadian embassy to Eastern Africa’s eight countries is located in the capital city of Kenya, 
Nairobi. If any of the citizens of these countries want to apply for an entry visa to Canada has to 
come to Kenya in person. Some of the UN world headquarters, such as that of UNEP, are located 
in Nairobi. As such, Kenya is the only country in Africa that almost all world states respect.  
In the case of the maritime boundary with Somalia, for instance, Kenya has contracted with 
various oil and mineral companies to explore the contested territory which is rich in oils, gases, 
minerals, and biodiversity (Moss, 2013). These oil companies include: Africa Oil Corp., Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp., Black Marin Energy, CAMEC, CNOOC Ltd, CPC Corporation Taiwan, 
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Dynamic Global Advisors, Flow Energy, QAFCO, Lion Petroleum Corp., Parx-Continental Oil 
and Gas, Lion Energy Corp., Somken, Vangold Resources Ltd, Swiss Oil Company, and White 
Nile Ltd. The companies are the most complicated foreign networks of instability and 
unsustainability in Somalia, creating socio-political, economic, and environmental issues in the 
area, and having already drilled over 40 wells (Amina, 2013).  
Several Western states, such as Norway, whose oil companies are among the above-
mentioned, have an economic relationship with Kenya and support it in any way possible (Pedro, 
2013). Recently, Kenya signed a bilateral agreement with the Qatari government for farming a 
large precinct of its border with Somalia and the Ras Kamboni’s mainland, which is a region of 
Somalia. The two parties are still negotiating the rental price (The Telegraph, 2008). Kenya has 
approached some other Arab states about renting or buying hectares of its coast and mainland 
bordered with Somalia with the intention of adjusting hundreds of kilometers of the Somalia’s 
coast and mainland (Aburawa, 2012). This is an explicit sign of that Kenya has already considered 
both Somalia’s land and sea to be its own.  
 
3. 4. 6: Typology 
Had there not been this conflict over maritime boundaries, Kenya could have been deemed 
as a network of stability. Given their current situation, Somalis feel that Kenya is trying to adjust 
their continental shelf by intimidating and subjugating them, instead of through diplomatic means. 
Secondly, there has been no historical physical confrontation between the two nations or between 
the two states. Thirdly, Kenya complies with the international law compared with Ethiopia. This 
makes Kenya flexible, democratic, trustworthy, and negotiable. Therefore, as soon as the case over 
the continental shelf is solved, both Kenya’s ill-intention and Somalia’s ill-feeling will be ended. 
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Maritime boundary delimitation removes the problems caused by jurisdictional 
uncertainty, reduces the potential for disputes and conflicts, and facilitates a long-term approach 
for the management of all maritime issues including fisheries, research, continental, baseline, 
coastal, and ocean management (Degan, 2007).  Certainty, “equity, and stability are thus integral 
parts of the process of delimitation” (Degan, 2007; UNCLOS, para. 244). In short, since Kenya 
does not frequently violate international law and human rights conventions, in post-conflict 
Somalia, it can be categorized as an actor and network of potential stability. 
 
3. 5: Western Intelligence Forces 
3. 5. 1: Background and Origin 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI), Military 
Intelligence Section 5” (MI5), Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6), and their coalitions of local 
informants/infiltrators are the most complex networks operating in Somalia, due to the sensitive 
nature of their operations. The CIA first came to the country after the first brigade of Islamic 
extremists emerged in 2005, but had been observing the area since 1992 (Scahill, 2013). After 
approximately a year, the FBI of the US and MI5 and MI6 of the UK joined the CIA’s mission in 
the country (Wayne, 2013). All these operative agencies made their regional office in Mogadishu. 
This was in response to the decisions made by the US post 9/11. In order to take tough new 
measures, the Pentagon transferred the Horn of Africa region including Somalia, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan from CENTCOM31 to AFRICOM 32(Holoway, 2008).   
                                                          
31 CentCom is the US central command military facility headquartered in the Middle East, but also controlled several African 
States from Morocco to Djibouti. 
32 United States Africa Command, (U.S. AFRICOM) is one of six of the U.S. Defense Department's geographic combatant 
commands and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African 
regional security organizations. A full-spectrum combatant command, U.S. AFRICOM is responsible for all U.S. Department of 
Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters. 
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 3. 5. 2: Capacities and Economy (Legal, administrative/executive and revenues) 
 In terms of legality, like any other actors operating in Somalia, neither CIA nor FBI has 
ever sought permission from the host country. The same is true of the M15 and M16. They neither 
consult nor share actionable intelligence information with any of the national or provincial 
administrations. Instead, they conduct their operations directly relying on their agent networks on 
the ground. In their operations, they do not distinguish between government officials and lay 
persons. Administratively, both the CIA and FBI branches in either the US or any other parts of 
the world are governed by the US’ Homeland Security and Department of Defence (Krouse, 2003; 
Theoharis, et al., 1999). The equivalent applies to the MI5 and MI6.  
Economically, each of these intelligence units is financed by their government (USA and 
UK). Phil Mudd, a former CIA counterterrorism officer, indicates that the budget and executive 
efforts extended to FBI intelligence is higher than that of Minneapolis state (Graff, (nd.). The CIA 
is funded under the Act of 1949, but any annual or occasional project budget allocated to it must 
be processed through the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defence. 
Procedurally, the funding must be passed by the Congress and approved by the President (the 
Guardian, 2015; Darling, et al., 1990). Yet, the nature of any information about a given operation’s 
funding, be it ordinary, extraordinary, special, or emergency must be confidential (Darling, et al., 
1990). 
 
 
                                                          
AFRICOM began initial operations on Oct. 1, 2007, and officially became an independent command on Oct. 1, 2008. (US Africom, 
www.Africom.mil). 
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3. 5. 3: Manoeuvres 
The CIA is directly involved in the pursuit of and targeted attacks on Al-Shabab, Al-
Qaida’s networks operating in Somalia. In pursuing Al-Shabab leaders, the CIA targets terrorist 
suspects in various complex networks of instability in the country. It has deterred numerous 
security intrigues before they were undertaken by terrorists (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). 
Those insecurity plots were chiefly a threat to the entire world, particularly to the Western interests. 
The CIA collaborates with the FBI for physical implementation of anti-terror measures inside 
Somalia. The FBI carries out ‘Operation Rhino,’ which was to investigate and follow up on Somali 
youths who leave the US for Somalia to become suicide bombers33 (Comey, 2013). These activities 
can have a stabilizing effect, but they have negative implications too. Parents reported that the FBI 
tortured their kids and forced them to declare that they were members of Al-Shabab, even though 
they were not (Chomsky, et al., 2013). Many Somali youth and mothers fear the FBI in Mogadishu 
more than anybody else (Dailymail, 2014). 
Since the formation of the non-interim government, the US has moved more military and 
intelligence (CIA) personnel into Somalia (Garaad, 2015; Scahill, 2014). The CIA, in collaboration 
with FBI, has built a special house called the “Pink-house” near Mogadishu’s international airport, 
which is divided into a prison similar to that of “Guantanamo Bay34” and residential apartments. 
Most of the prisoners therein have never been or heard from since the day they were captured. The 
few released prisoners testified that they were severely tortured and forced to serve as unpaid 
informers for the CIA or its agents (Gettleman, 2011; Scahill, 2014).  The CIA was also 
condemned for acting as sharpshooters who kill on sight (Caasimada, 2013). They use the 
                                                          
33 With the intention of committing suicidal war tactics of killing oneself alongside with a number of rivals. 
34 In Cuba as well as the Abu-Ghuraib of Iraq. 
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Ethiopian forces called Liu-Police who were authorized to kill suspects on sight (Caasimada, 
2013), but often kill innocents in clan-based reprisals.  
 
3. 5. 4: Motives 
The US’s motives, as demonstrated by the CIA and FBI, are always linked to its regional 
political agenda, starting with the prevention of Islamic terrorists emerging in Somalia, who can 
take advantage of the country’s lawlessness and feeble economy (Caraley, 2002). Therefore, in 
order to stabilize Somalia, the US seeks to help re-establish governance by enhancing Somalia's 
federal process and eliminating the terrorist groups (Ahmed, 2013). Yet, it seems that the US is 
losing public confidence. Local informants/infiltrators are in charge of spying and following up on 
individual and group activities. Most of these infiltrators are Somalis by birth, but hold American 
passports. The approach of the US is always twofold; the use of Ethiopia’s military and the use of 
Somali-American intelligence.  
Due to the long conflict that has transpired between Ethiopia and Somalia, Somali citizens 
have a well-founded fear of anyone who is allied with Ethiopia. This situation helps Islamic 
terrorists to gain popularity, and to continue destabilizing the region. When youth were personally 
tortured or hear of others being imprisoned and tortured, they have incentive to join either the 
pirates (see chapter 4) or the terrorists when they get a chance. The same happens when they are 
impaired from working or restricted from education. Usually, the US uses Ethiopian foot-soldiers, 
military experts, intelligence, and political organs to defeat insurgents in Somalia. Nevertheless, it 
is evident is that the US-Ethiopian policy of occupying Somalia has backfired: 
“Somali Islamists, particularly, Al-shabab, in fact resemble the battle-hardened and 
ideologically uncompromising Taliban of 1996, ready to rule a country. In this sense, the 
anti-Islamist propaganda of 2006 has fulfilled itself. Somalia since 2006 is possibly the 
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clearest example for the failure of US (and Ethiopian) counter-terrorism policy, which 
actually has produced what it was supposed to counter” (Hoehne, 2009, p. 12). 
 
On December 7, 2007, the US introduced a resolution to the UN Security Council, which 
would authorize the African Union peacekeepers to defend the TFG (Gettleman, 2011). Many 
Somali politicians, spiritual leaders, traditional elders, and academics interpreted this resolution as 
giving license to an Ethiopian incursion aimed at wiping Somalia from the map of the Horn of 
Africa. It created resentment in the hearts of the moderate Somalis, while increasing animosity and 
cruelty in the hearts of the extremists. In the South-central, there were a number of organized and 
unorganized protests against the resolution. In relation to this matter, the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) warned that this move in the Security Council could trigger a regional conflict (ICG, 2008). 
Instead, the ICG proposed that the UN should avoid favouring one rival over the other, and instead 
pressure both sides to negotiate (ICG, 2008).  
Since 2007, the US forces have been conducting drone and helicopter attacks against Al-
Shabab, resulting in many civilian casualties, without notifying the government of Somalia 
(Qaranimo.com, 2015). Furthermore, in 2013, the US and the UK (the latter having a go-ahead 
from the European Union) have tried to establish federal member states in South-central Somalia, 
while ignoring the country’s Federal Government35(Ulusow, 2014). These activities indicate that 
the US and UK consider Somalia to be a failed state. From 2002 to 2008, the US has been 
reconsidering its policy towards conquering an active state. It realized that conquering only 
increases the number of failed and problematic states who will only become a burden and security 
                                                          
35 Parliamentarians and Independent Commission on Constitutional Review were already undertaking this onus of theirs. (hard to 
understand this footnote, re-word).  
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threat to the US itself (Harper, 2012). Following this assessment, the definition of ‘failed state’ 
was modified as any state that is: 
“…a potentially serious security threat: the inability of many states to police themselves 
effectively or to work with their neighbours to ensure regional security represents a 
challenge to the international system … If left unchecked, such instability can spread and 
threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and friends” (Harper, 2012, p. 
106).  
 
The Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics describes a ‘failed 
state’ as one that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has 
no effective control over its territory and border (John, et al., 2008). According to one of the main 
policy institutions of the UK, a ‘failed state is that which is tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, 
and bitterly contested by warring factions and hospitable to and harbouring non-state actors – 
warlords and terrorists’ (Walls, et al., 2009). In their missions, the MI5 and MI6 imply these 
definitions but never evaluate or update the country’s situation. Even though MI5 and MI6 were 
established to defend the UK from both internal and external plots by collaborating with military 
forces, it seems that neither of the sections collaborates with the UK’s main intelligence agency 
known as Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) (Spence, 2002), let alone cooperates with the Somali 
government36. In the case of Somalia, however, its operations are ambiguous and unpredictable. 
 
3. 5. 5: Relationships 
Even though the Western intelligence forces begin their operations in the country without 
seeking permit from any of the Somali governments, they have occasional cooperation with each 
                                                          
36 It is not yet clear whether generally the UK considers Somalia as a country in a war situation or in a post-conflict situation. In a 
war situation, MI5’s onus increases, entailing the form of an advent order by coordinating government policy concerning 
alliances (Great Britain, 2013). 
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of the governments and traditional leaders. The CIA and FBI have provided military and 
intelligence supports, including finance, equipment, technology, training, and advice to the Somali 
Nation Security Agency and federal military troops (Krouse, 2003; Gentleman, et al., 2011). The 
CIA-trained Somali commandos are outfitted with new weapons and flak jackets, and are given 
sunglasses and ski masks to conceal their identities (Gentleman, et al., 2011).  
Due to a lack of proper information and self-confidence, the US navies have played a major 
role in both starting conflicts (Gentleman, et al., 2011) and increasing their complexity. Their 
actions have created further discrepancies and conflicts. Other times, they attract belligerence. For 
example, since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the US naval and cargo ships have 
been targeted by pirates and marine terrorists such as Al-Qa’idah and other related terrorist groups 
(Chalk, 2005). In this regard, the US seafarers are prey to diverse enemies, simply because their 
navies are known and regarded with hostility (Murphy, 2007). Most of these terror acts were 
undertaken by relatively well-armed and well-planned groups, and this demonstrates the existence 
of a close connection between pirates and political terrorists operating on seawaters.  
 
3. 5. 6: Typology 
As a result of the Western attitude towards the country’s national and professional leaders, 
the US and UK intelligence and military forces have never had a positive relationship with the 
Somali citizens. Yet it seems that a considerable number of the Somali citizens are sympathetic to 
them, due to their counter-terrorism goals. To a reliable extent, Western states are democratic and 
defend human rights. Secondly, their activities are not overwhelmed by corruption and 
malfeasance. Thirdly, they adopt effective and efficient means of accountability and transparency. 
Fourth, they do not have a history of hostility and resource rivalry with Somalia. Fifth, since they 
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are not neighbours of Somalia, they are not suspects of planning land and sea grabs. These positive 
qualities categorize them as potential actors and networks of stability. 
 
3. 6: Turkey  
3. 6. 1: Background and Origin 
Turkey is the only Non-Western and Muslim state that is a member of NATO. It is also 
one of the top ten strongest states in the world. On October 17, 2015 the Global Fire Power (GFP) 
has recognized Turkey as the 10th world super military power (GFP, 2015). Turkey has always 
supported Somalia’s restoration and reconstruction (Kirişci, 2001). Some of the most effective 
institutions and companies involved are: Turkey international cooperation and coordination 
Agency (TIKA), Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), Presidency for Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Red Crescent, Directorate for Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet), Office of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and other 
ministries as well as a large number of Civil organizations and business companies (Özkan, 2014). 
 
3. 6. 2: Capacity and Economic Status (legal, administrative/executive and revenues) 
Turkey is the second most active state in NATO’s mission in Somalia, after the US. It was 
a part of the UN & US-led military operations “Restore Hope” in the early 1990s (Lyons, et al., 
1995). It is currently involved in Somalia’s affairs through several channels including 
humanitarian, development, political, social, educational, economic, business, governance 
structure, infrastructure, and state-rebuilding initiatives. Most of these projects are run through 
ministry to ministry cooperation, where each Turkish ministry extends its work to Somalia as if it 
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was a district in Turkey (Shay, 2014). The Turkish institutional networks (ministers and NGOs) 
operating in Somalia are under strict control by the Turkish government. 
 
3. 6. 3: Manoeuvres 
When the AK Party won and Erdoğan became Turkey’s head of state, attention was given 
to the advancement of Somalia. This effort was given even more support when a severe drought 
hit Somalia in 2011 (Aynte, 2012). On September 11, 2011, in the 66th UN General Assembly, 
Recep Tayib Erdoğan forcefully drew attention to the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia (Shay, 
2014). In Somalia, Turkey has distributed over 201 million tonnes of food, drink, medicines, and 
clothes since 2011 (Özkan, 2014). It has built numerous feeding centres and refugee camps for the 
internally displaced people (IDPs). Turkish NGOs such as AFAD played a significant role in this 
task. As droughts lessened, Turkey has begun development projects, which focus on reconstructing 
destroyed government buildings, and constructing new ones. It has renovated and expanded the 
main hospital (Digfeer)37, the main international airport, the main seaport, the main highway, and 
the presidential palace. Furthermore, it has built many new public offices, centres, playgrounds, 
hospitals, and educational institutions.  
Several hundred Somali high school graduate students are sent to Turkey annually for post-
secondary education. Turkey also opened secondary and post-secondary schools in Somalia. 
Almost all of these activities are based on assistance extended to Somalia, even though some of 
them are also beneficial for Turkey’s economy, future development, political position, and 
prestige.  
                                                          
37 Digfeer hospital is concurrently renamed as Erdoğan Hospital in honour of PM. Erdoğan. 
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Turkey has been progressively working on creating an environment of good governance 
and strong political power in Somalia through diplomatic missions, representations, and lobbying. 
It condemns political meddlers, security spoilers, and boycotters of peace processes (ICG, 2015). 
On March 6, 2012, the Turkish Airlines became the first international flight to land at Somalia’s 
International Airport since 1991 (Turkishairlines.com, 2013), and the Turkish embassy was the 
first to reopen in Mogadishu in April 201338. On August 18, 2011, Erdoğan became the first head 
of state to visit Somalia, since 1991 (J.L., 2011).  
 
3. 6. 4: Motives 
Turkey’s primary motive for assisting Somalia stem from trade interests to be commenced in 
Somalia and extended to Africa at large. In this case, for Turkey, Somalia is the gateway to the 
market for natural resources in Africa. Secondly, Turkey’s interest is to create a favorable and 
permanent environment in Africa, so that it can establish a reliable market for its products thereby 
securing political influence among Africa’s political and economic decision makers.  
Thirdly, Turkey is seeking to gain confidence for future dealings with the continent (Özkan, 
2014). Fourth, Turkey’s motive seems to be exercising its power in the world as the 8th most 
powerful country in the world, militarily and politically (Bender, 2014). Fifth, being the most 
powerful of all the predominantly Muslim populated states and the descendants of the last Muslim 
Empire, Turkey considers itself as the head of the Muslim world. Turkey annually allocates $18.2 
billion budget for its ministry of defence (Bender, 2014, p. 8).  In this context, Turkish government 
manifests interest in re-building the Ottoman Empire. The Somali ancestors were a part of the 
Ottoman Empire in the name of Adal Sultanate or Abyssinian Muslims from 1529 until 1543 
                                                          
38 after all the foreign embassies in Somalia were closed in July 1990, i.e. several months prior to the breakout of the civil war 
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(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2005). It is worthy to note that the name Somalia was applied to this 
area at a later day, in the middle of the 19th century. 
Even though the Erdogan’s government has shown remarkable economic and diplomatic 
progress, it is facing some political and security challenges. Erdogan has been repeatedly 
condemned for being an authoritarian leader. “He established himself as the single most powerful 
Turkish politician since Kemal Atatürk” (Cornell, 2014, p. 8). As a result, there are both armed 
(Kurdistan Worker's Party - PKK) and unarmed (religious civilian movements led by Fethulahi 
Gulen) oppositions intending to overthrow the Erdoğan’s administration. Environmental protestors 
seeking to preserve Gezi Park national heritage in Istanbul transformed to political strikes against 
Erdoğan’s heavy-handed repression of demonstrators (Cornell, 2014). There, a political crisis has 
begun and Erdoğan was considered as one of the actors of the Arab spring political movement 
undertaken by civilians with the religious background against the long-rooted military rulers in the 
Arabian and other Muslim states. This political concept started to grow when Erdoğan openly 
condemned Sisi’39s coup d’état, in which Sisi overthrew President Muhammed Morsi, and started 
to meddle the Egypt’s politics directly and indirectly (Cornell, 2014). 
 
3. 6. 5: Relationships: Turkey has a reciprocal relationship with each of the EU (Chiva, 
2014), the US, and UK, as well as states in the Arabian Gulf and the Horn of Africa (Great Britain, 
2012). As a member of NATO, Turkey has guaranteed physical protection, moral support, 
financial exchange, and diplomatic respect from the vast majority of contemporary communities. 
Turkey has a long relationship with Somalia which can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire 
                                                          
39 Sis, Abdilfatah is the current President of Egypt who overthrew the democratically elected President Muhamad Morsi. 
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(Melton, et al., 2010). In 1548, Somalia was one of the leading nations that allied with or became 
a member of the Ottoman Empire (Fretter, 2008). 
3. 5. 6: Typology: Turkey has developed a positive relationship with the Somalis to the 
point where many Somalis are ready to die in the defence of Turkey. They are not involved in 
corruption or malfeasance. It can be described as the most outstanding of the foreign actors and 
networks of stability. 
 
3. 7: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
 3. 6. 1: Background and Origin 
Other than the direct involvement of regional and international states, there are a number 
of inter-state and non-state organizations playing significant roles in shaping Somalia’s internal 
political, security and economic dynamics40. NATO is among the leading actors of mysterious and 
multipurpose operators in the Somali basin. To patrol the marine intersection of the Red Sea and 
the Indian Ocean, NATO has headquarters in Djibouti which is the most geographically strategic 
location (NATO, 2013). 
 3. 6. 2: Administrative and Economic Capacity 
NATO is self-sufficient in terms of administration and economic capacities. It is a state-
funded and state-governed organization which means “individual NATO member states and 
partners set up trust funds to provide resources to help partner countries implement practical 
project” (NATO, 2015, p. 2). NATO is the one that supports numerous regional and international 
                                                          
40 The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), United Nations Development Operations Office (UNDOS), United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are among the considerable number of networks of stability, while illegal 
poachers are mother-networks of instability. In this theme, I focus on the North Atlantic Trade Agreement (NATO), the EU Naval 
Force (NAVFOR) while combining the IMO and the above stated UN branches under one sub-heading. 
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bodies. “Since 2007, NATO has accepted to assist the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by 
providing strategic airlift and sealift support to AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia 
under AMISOM” (NATO, 2015). It provides logistics, technologies, finance, experts, advice, 
instructions, and guidelines to its counter-parts including AMISOM. It has repeatedly extended 
assistance to Burundi forces of AMISOM by air and sealift, or by escorting them from Bujumbura 
to Mogadishu. NATO is the most powerful of the actors involved in Somalia’s political and social 
landscape, as well as economic and marine resources. At the same time, there are several states 
such as Norway and Sweden that collaborate with NATO in assisting AMISOM in diplomatic 
endeavours through Ethiopia (NATO, 2015).  
 
3. 6. 3: Motives 
Generally, the central objective of naval arms control has been to reduce instability and 
uncertainty resulting from naval weapons and operations (Rauf, 2005). Specifically, in Somalia, 
its mandate is to monitor the transnational movements in Somali waters. Both the US and UK have 
been constantly issuing warnings on the instability in Somalia and the necessity of sending NATO 
there. “In September 2011, the head of the British intelligence agency MI5, Jonathan Evans, 
warned that Somalia now was suspected of harboring as many terrorist plots against the United 
Kingdom as Pakistan” (Moyar, 2015, p. 188). More than one hundred youth were reported to be 
undergoing terrorist training in Somalia (Moyar, 2015).   
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s policy responses have been unilateral and ad hoc 
rather than integrated and involving international consensus. At the beginning of the new 
millennium, NATO revamped its air forces, inventories, and navies (Heffernan, 2008). 
Sophisticated aircraft and sea vessels were added to the ocean surveillance system (Sokolsky, 
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2005). Its missions include complex marine, land, national, regional, and international security 
protection, but due to lack of clear boundaries, NATO does not always have a clear-cut policy 
towards maritime security. Having transformed itself from a collective defence union to a 
collective security agent, NATO not only plays multiple roles, but also has multiple identities 
(Moyar, 2015). Consequently, NATO had become a two-tiered and unreliable alliance. Moyar 
argues that the members of NATO can be divided “between those willing and able to pay the price 
and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO 
membership-be they security guarantees or headquarters billets-but don’t want to share the risks 
and the costs” (Moyar, 2015, pp. 183-184).  
Recently, the US State Department designated over 28 organizations, to deal with foreign 
terrorist groups which may operate inside or outside the US (Sam, 2008). All of these 
organizations expect funding or technical support from NATO. In fact, allies under the NATO 
umbrella do not have a collective agreement about most of the missions that have been emerging 
one after another (Byers, 2005), even though many innocent lives and livelihoods are lost every 
year in counter-terrorism wars.  
 
3. 6. 4: Relationships  
NATO collaborates with the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Operation Atlanta off Somalia 
as a part of the international naval operation to prevent piracy (Tharoor, 2009). Somalis and some 
political commentators argue that NATO’s operations are often based on neutrality and targeting 
criminals, but have been degraded by that of the NAVFOR. It has been repeatedly reported that 
NAVFOR’s presence in the Somali basin is more about protecting the operation of foreign fishing 
vessels than preventing piracy (Hussein, 2013). This is contrast to the aim of the Global Maritime 
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Partnership (GMP) which has been closely allied with NATO. GMP’s primary purpose was to 
achieve security in the maritime domain on a reciprocal global relationship, regardless of political 
differences among the states of the world (Heffernan, 2008).  
NATO also collaborates with Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) which is a privately funded 
and independent non-profit organization headquartered in Colorado, USA. OBP was developed by 
One Earth Future Foundation in 2010, during the peak of piracy activity in the Somalia’s Gulf of 
Aden in order to support NATO in the achievement of its assigned maritime missions. Rather than 
focusing on armed forces, OBP takes a stakeholder driven approach by “mobilizing stakeholders 
from the maritime community, developing public-private partnerships to promote long-term 
solutions at sea and ashore, and sustainable deterrence based on the rule of law” (OBP, 2010, p. 
2). It operates in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, Morocco, and Malacca Strait by subcontracting 
local organizations. 
Nevertheless, OBP remained stuck to the Strait of Malacca of Southeast Asia41 where 170 
seafarers were held as hostages, 67 attacks were waged, and over 185 attacks and counterattacks 
took place in 2014 (Zho, 2015). This caused a lack of reciprocal coordination between the two 
organizations, and made NATO navies less effective. Murphy, commenting on Admiral Mullen’s 
idea of creating the “Thousand-Ship Navy-TSN” strategy, states that the idea was that “navies and 
other users of sea such as shipping companies should, regardless of their capabilities or technical 
sophistication, work to promote global maritime security by cooperating to confront problems such 
as arms smuggling and terrorism” (Murphy, 2007, p.74).  
At the local level, NATO cooperates with neither the federal government nor provincial 
administrations. Instead, it occasionally communicates and negotiates with non-state actors such 
                                                          
41 It also randomly operated at the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa. 
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as local elders, fisheries, warlords, and even pirates (Dunidaonline.com, 2015; Hobyo.com, 2012). 
It seems that they do not care about the foreign poachers and toxic polluters in the country’s EEZ. 
When Somalia’s national and provincial governments submitted complaints, NATO brushed them 
aside, and other times insisted that they have no evidence or satisfactory information about the 
matter (Bennett, 2012).  
In the Gulf of Aden, NATO, NAVFOR, joint military operations, coordination across 
stakeholders, and regional prosecution and incarceration initiatives have tackled piracy. However, 
the relationship of these forces with either the OBP or IMO is obscure. It seems these forces are 
country-based efforts which cannot solve piracy. Every country is suspicious of others and cannot 
voluntarily allow their foes to patrol their rightful seawaters. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia 
have rejected the Americans proposal to patrol the Strait of Malacca. Instead, they resorted to 
China and ASEAN’s joint patrols for counter-piracy measures and sea situation monitoring 
(ReCAAP, 2014)42. Besides legal procedures, there must be effective modern technologies and 
tools to prevent criminal acts. 
In the case of Somalia both politically and militarily, NATO collaborates and assists the 
Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), AU, IGADD, AMISOM, Contact Group on Somalia, 
and other concerned agencies. It shares information and knowledge in “studying, planning, 
programming, executing, managing, monitoring, procurement, marine and air movement 
coordination, communications, IT, logistics, human resources, military manpower management, 
and contingency planning with them” (NATO, 2015, p. 2; Douglas, 2008). 
 
 
                                                          
42 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, 2014. 
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3. 6. 5: Typology 
By simultaneously addressing two problems; foreign illegal fishers and marine security in 
the Somali basin, NATO could be a fully reliable actors and network of stability. NATO directly 
fulfils its mandate, which is to deter terrorism activities entering and exiting Somalia along its full 
coast. Its operations are free from corruption and any other form of ill-intention, and there are no 
personal interests involved. Since the organization was structured as a network of stability, it 
adjusts its activities to both international law and the tactics of marine criminals. All in all, NATO 
member states are open-minded, and can be communicated and negotiated with. Therefore, NATO 
could be among the networks of stability, provided it gives fair respect to the local fishers’ interests 
in the sea. Given the current situation, however, it falls under the category of potential stability.  
 
3. 8: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 
3. 8. 1: Background: CGPCS was formed on January 14, 2009, based on the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1851 (2008) voted on by over 60 countries and international organizations43. 
It is funded by the United Nations International Trust Fund to prevent and combat piracy (Mazurek, 
2015; Oceans Beyond Piracy [OBP], 2012). CGPCS is a global forum whose objective is to reduce 
and ultimately eradicate piracy off the coast of Somalia. It is registered as a joint venture company 
with the federal government.  
3. 8. 2: Manoeuvres: CGPCS is a forum to facilitate the discussion and the coordination of 
actions among states and organizations to combat piracy in Somalia. It seems that CGPCS was 
established to act as a Somali coast-guard unit. However, its roles and responses are not clearly 
visible in the field. In 2011, the CGPCS claimed that they reduced the number of successfully 
                                                          
43 Which contains both members and non-members of the Security Council  
98 
 
pirated ships from 47 in 2010, to 25 in 2011 (thecgpcs.org, 2011). Most of the commentators do 
not know what caused the reduction of piracy, however. OBP and independent researchers believe 
that the newly recruited pirates who have no experience in either sea operation or captive treatment 
outnumbered the former fishers who turned to piracy for a purpose. As a result, the business was 
spoiled (Horn, 2012).  
3. 8. 3: Relationship: CGPCS has close relationship and cooperation with NATO and 
Blackwater rather than Somalia’s federal government. Since the CGPCS is a foreign initiative, 
founded, funded, governed, and utilized by foreign states, some of which have been suspected of 
illegal fishing and toxic dumping in Somalia, the pirates gained remarkable support from the public 
for the continuation of their illicit activities. 
3. 8. 4: Typology: In order to categorize the typology of this global forum in terms of 
stabilizing or destabilizing the marine security, its pros and cons should be weighed against each 
other. It is quite difficult to definitively know let alone monitor and evaluate, the CGPCS’s day-
to-day activities, however. Since it is based on the UN Security Council’s resolution, and it has 
been recommended by over 60 states, the CGPCS is a legitimate international organization. 
Therefore, it is regarded as an actor and network of stability, provided it improves its collaboration 
with the federal government. 
 
3. 9: Clandestine Regional State Actors and Networks 
3. 9. 1: General Background 
In this section, clandestine regional and international state-networks consisting of certain 
African, Asian, and European who exploit Somalis’ marine and human resources will be discussed. 
At the regional level, I focus on Egypt, Eritrea, Seychelles, and Yemen while focusing on Spain, 
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Italy, France, and a cluster of Asian states at international level. All these states, except Eritrea, 
are motivated by economic interests. Egypt is motivated by Ethiopia’s Blue Nile fresh water and 
the rest of the states by Somalia’s marine resources. These networks are neither formal nor 
officially active, and as such, their impact is less significant than those stated above. Accordingly, 
I collectively annotate their capacities, manoeuvres, motives, relations, and typology rather than 
detailing each one of these factors separately.  
 
3. 9. 2: Regional Networks’ Manoeuvres and Motives 
Each of these states has underground forces whose objective is to restrict the roles of some of 
the AMISOM member states’ forces. Egypt and Eritrea have parallel agendas, which is to use 
Somali clan forces and organized militias for a proxy war against Ethiopia. Egypt mobilizes Somali 
militants against Ethiopia with the aim of diverting Ethiopia’s focus from constructing the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile (Ayeb, 2013), which discharges from Ethiopia’s 
highlands. Given this situation, Ethiopia is ready to fight both Egypt and Somalia, and in this effort, 
they try to subjugate Somalis. TesfaNews of Ethiopia wrote “If not Bewilderment, it is Paranoia! 
Ethiopia’s ruling party affiliated media strangely surprised by Egypt’s Mistral warship purchase 
and sees it as a threat to Ethiopia. Although land locked, it advised the government to prepare 
itself for any eventuality” (TesfaNews, September 27, 2015). 
Eritrea created a conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia to weaken Ethiopia’s military and 
economic capacities. The two countries have been engaged in a war since 1991. In 2010, the 
Eritrean officials made it their mission to give training and other mechanical support to Al-Shabaab 
in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region. Its motive was to fortify Al-Shabaab’s power in battling 
against the TFG, the African Union troops, and particularly to counter Eritrea’s enemy - Ethiopia 
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(AMISOM, 2012, the Associated Press, 2013). The “Security Council specifically asked Eritrea 
to refrain from “harboring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organizing, training, or inciting 
terrorist groups in Somalia” (AMISOM, 2012, p. 12). Recently, it seems that the involvement of 
Egypt and Eritrea in the area is weakening due to internal political and economic incapacities, 
while Ethiopia’s is bourgeoning as an authoritarian regime (Tesfagiorgis, 2011; Woube, 2005). 
The Seychelles Islands only have limited economic interest in Somalia. Their desire is to 
continue freely fishing between the marine boundaries of the two states (Hussein, 2013). Similarly, 
Yemeni fishing fleets illegally fish all over Somalia’s EEZ on a daily basis. In terms of terror 
networks, Yemen is the bridge connecting the Afghanistan-based Al-Qa’idah to Somalia by sea. 
It is also a safe transit route for individual volunteers and logisticians from other parts of the world 
to join Al-Shabab in Somalia.    
 
3. 9. 3: International Networks’ Manoeuvres and Motives  
Spain, France and Italy have a clear economic interest in Somalia’s marine resources 
(Neumann et al., 2012). Spain illegally catches thousands of tonnes of fish from the Somali basin 
every year (Balton, 2004; Mazurek, 2015). Fishing companies from France have also been illegally 
harvesting fish and other marine resources from the Somali EEZ (Waldo, 2013). Italy has 
economic and political motives in Somalia, despite its assertion that its primary objective is to 
bring Somalia back to a degree of political stability. In terms of economic motives, Italian fishing 
vessels make up the largest group of European vessels illegally fishing in the Somali basin (Goth, 
2009; Greepeace, 2009).  
Politically, Italy, as a former colonial power in Somalia, tries to exclude other states from 
Somalia’s political affairs (Samatar, 2003). In addition, Italy is the first and most frequent dumper 
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of illegal toxic wastes in the coasts of Somalia (UNEP, 1998). The fishing vessels of Russia, 
Greece, Ukraine, and Portugal are also participants in illegal fishing activities in the Somali basin 
(Waldo, 2013; Mwangura, 2010). The presence of these European state-actors/networks of illegal 
fishers has encouraged Asian non-state and state illegal fishing activity as well. Asian illegal 
fishing vessels from Yemen, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and India have been harvesting 
fish and other marine mammals from Somalia’s EEZ alongside with those of the Europeans 
(Waldo, 2013).  
The foreign fishing vessels’ aggression is reflective of a particular part of the Somali’s 
behaviour and culture that is based on ‘never forgive and never forget’. This sustains feelings of 
revenge and the prolongation of agony among Somalis. In this context, it is worth noting that in 
2013 the Belgian government invited a delegation headed by the President of Hubin and Heeb, a 
semi-state under Galmudug state, to Belgium. However, the government arrested the president and 
his dignitaries upon arrival (Aljazeera, 2013). The local community has agreed to seek revenge by 
beheading any Belgian citizen on sight anywhere in the world (Hobyo, 2013; Aljazeera, 2013). 
The local spiritual leaders were determined to convince the henchmen to seek legal-based solution 
instead of using violence, yet, many of them were not convinced (Aljazeera, 2013). When spiritual 
leaders preach about forgiveness, the elders and the youth attack them both verbally and physically 
(Hobyo, 2013).   
 
3. 9. 4: Relationships 
Somalia was under Egyptian rule from 1875 to1884 and both states were under the coalition 
of the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire (Fretter, 2008). Since then, Egypt has been intimately involved 
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in Somalia’s social and religious activities (Fretter, 2008). Almost all of the religious schools in 
Somalia have been instructed and managed by Egyptian teachers.  
Egypt and Eritrea have requested that Iran, Libya, Hezbollah, and Syria extend arms and 
logistical assistance to various Somali warlords, Islamic extremists, provincial administrations, 
armed rebels, and other belligerent factions. From their side, they provided training, uniforms, 
weapons, and military advice to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which sought to attack and 
destabilize Ethiopia, and encouraged their allies to reciprocate (Hiiraanonline.com). When the ICU 
won the power struggle and ruled the country with the help of the US (Hiiraanonline.com), they 
immediately diverted this support to the opposition to the ICU, being Al-Shabab. They realized 
that the ICU has made it their mission to restore Somalia, but Al-Shabab continues to destabilize 
the region. This only prolongs instability in Somalia.  
 
3. 9. 5: Typology 
 In short, these states that operate secretly and illegally are not in a position to be considered 
anything other than networks of instability. Egypt and Eretria destabilize Somalia and Somali 
citizens in order to destabilize Ethiopia, while the rest have no interest other than stealing 
Somalia’s marine resources. The bottom line is that these actors and networks operate based on 
what is economically known as “survival of the fittest,” where every network struggles to possess 
as much of Somalia’s resources as possible, especially those of the sea. Therefore, all of these 
clandestine regional and international states fall under the actors and networks of instability. They 
steal marine resources, dump hazardous chemicals, and negatively influence Somalia’s political 
dynamics.   
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3. 10: Illegal, Illicit (Immoral), Unreported, Underreported, Unregistered, Undocumented, 
and Overfishing (IIUUOF) (Networks of Insecurity, Instability and Unsustainability) 
 The networks of illegal poachers consist of a myriad of illegal actors, each of whom targets 
one or more of the resources in the Somali marine territories. Some of the fish exploiters hunt large 
pelagic fish while others target the small pelagic fish. The intention of others is to hunt lobsters, 
sea-lions, shrimps, crabs, and turtles, while others harvest only seaweeds for medical and 
decoration purposes. On top of that, there are illegal toxic dumpers and other forms of sea polluters. 
Due to their illegal operations, these networks act like thugs and thieves. They strictly hide 
anything about their identifications and activities. Their operations are often based on hit and run 
tactics. Therefore, it is hard to identify them and distinguish their backgrounds, let alone to learn 
their administrative and economic capacities. Moreover, since they originate from various 
countries and private companies, their capacities vary from one to another.  
In this section, I discuss these complex networks in an interrelated way by focusing on 
“IIUUUOF” activities as basic triggers of maritime insecurity and unsustainability. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2004) has published “Fish 
Piracy: Combating Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUUF).” The document explains 
how illegal fishers turn into pirates. It argues that the need to fish illegally is what leads fishers to 
hijack, re-design, re-model, and re-flag vessels by operating in other jurisdictions. Reviewing the 
global problems caused by IUUF, the OECD anticipates the diminishing effectiveness of the 
fisheries management, local economic opportunities for legitimate fisheries and reductions in food 
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security. In reality, the problem extends beyond these three factors, but these are the causes of 
instability, insecurity and unsustainability44.     
 Many academics (e.g. Weber, 1993; Viders, 1995; Helfman, 2007) have focussed on 
overfishing and its effects on the world’s fish stocks. They conclude that stocks are heavily 
overfished and marine ecosystems are increasingly under pressure from pollution, sea traffic, 
global warming, loss of biodiversity, and acidification of the seas. Markus (2010) reports that after 
one and a half decades of both legal and illegal overfishing (2000-2010), general food shortages 
and environmental disasters have drastically increased in the world. In addition to these threats, 
the activities known as: “Illegal, Unreported, and Underreported - Fishing - IUUF” notes that fish 
stocks have been devastated over time and such devastation weakens developing countries’ food 
supplies (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/177. 2007).45 
 As sea-food supply is jeopardized, marine security is also jeopardized because the fact is 
that hunger leads to anger, which is followed by violence. Currently, fish provides animal protein 
to more than 2.9 billion people, and fishing employs more than 200 million people of different 
occupations (Helfman, 2007). The percentage of the world population dependant on fish either for 
food or for employment is increasing on a daily basis. At the current rate of over-fishing, 
forecasters predict that the ecological systems that support the fish population could collapse by 
2045 (FAO, 2007).  
 In addition to the loss of vital protein sources, illegal fishing attracts and facilitates piracy 
and armed marine conflict that allows criminal organizations to traffic people, narcotics, and 
                                                          
44 Proven, et al. (2008) argue that efficiency does not depend on effectiveness, because the latter is always analyzed with a 
positive achievement which could have never been accomplished by individuals. 
45United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/177. (2007), deplored the fact that “illegal, unreported, and underreported 
[fishing] constitutes a serious threat to fish stocks and marine habitats and ecosystems, to the detriment of sustainable fisheries as 
well as the food security and the economies of many states, particularly developing states. 
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weapons throughout the world. Consequently, confrontations among seafarers and coastal 
communities may overlap with illegal fishing. The question which then arises is how can the 
IIUUUOF be controlled? In order to measure the security threat of illegal fishing, one needs to 
examine it through the lens of overfishing and its effects. This means the main tragedy resulting 
from illegal fishing is overfishing, which in turn causes conflicts, piracy and marine terrorism. 
 If one reads closely, the UN Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the year of 1995 entails that illegal fishing cannot be controlled by navies due to the 
limitations of their legal mandate and training systems46. In fact, heavily armed navies may not 
have a clear mandate to control illegal and or over fishing, and several other fishing related illicit 
activities carried out across the seas and oceans. Even where there is a mandate at the national 
level, know-how could be missing. Navies have never been trained for fishery-oriented tasks; 
neither have they engaged in struggles to combat smuggling and stowaways (Nijhoff, 2000; 
Murphy, 2009). 
It is only post-cold war that navies that have started to engage in tackling piracy activities, 
while their main focus has been to engage in military attack and counter-attack operations 
(Middlemiss, et al., 1991). Even though they have heavy weapons and satellite information, navies 
rarely stop crimes on the oceans or seas (Murphy, 2007). Thus, it seems they are not yet ready to 
challenge the rise of marine insecurity, neither partially nor fully. Given the presence of unprepared 
navies, new waves of heavily armed illegal fishing vessels owned by privately operated economic 
mafias that are neither licensed nor registered under any state have emerged. The newly arisen 
                                                          
46 This convention seeks to lay down a comprehensive regime for the conservation and management of fish stocks, and it is full 
of clauses to combat illegal fishing; yet it remains short of finding means of overcoming illegal fishing. 
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illegal fishers use false documents, names of temporary companies, and the flags of weak states 
that may not even be aware that their flags are being used by these fishers.  
Illegal fishers and mineral pursuers increasingly hunt resources within the EEZ of 
independent states. In their illegal and illicit operations, they mostly target tuna, shark, and turtles. 
These are the primary foods of many communities in the world,47 especially communities in the 
tropical zones such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where 80% of world’s tuna is harvested (FAO, 2000). 
Since most of those illegal fishers are experts in marine natural resources, they target regions where 
they can find the type of species or minerals they are seeking at a particular time. For instance, if 
they are hunting species that do not need high nutrients, they know that it is likely to be available 
in shallow waters, rocky areas, coral reefs, and tropical marine zones (Rahmstorf, 2009). They 
exploit these resources, regardless of whose territory it is. Local fishers also have the same 
knowledge and experience, and cannot be cheated. As a result of the over exploitation of these 
areas for income and, thus, marginalization of normal subsistence activities, marine conflicts and 
piracy arise more quickly and frequently.   
Even though the civil war has had serious consequences for Somalia’s marine resources, it 
has been a victim of external powers. Madema (2004) supporting Henry Sidgwick’s theory of 
externalities and following assessments, argues that the primary reason for overfishing is that fish 
availability is declining to a state of complete collapse. Fish shortages in almost all the seas and 
oceans play a significant role in the increase in illegal foreign fishing fleets who overfish in 
Somalia’s EEZ.  
                                                          
47 The FAO estimates that about one billion people world-wide rely on fish as their primary source of animal protein (FAO Annual 
Report, 2000). 
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In its post-conflict state, Somalia’s marine resources may become a target for irrational 
management and a lack of conservation, as was the case in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Richards, 
1996). These illegal fishers and related companies exploit Somalia’s marine resources, entailing 
the equipment of scorched-earth tactics. Some of them constantly approach members of the local 
communities and officials of the government institutions. They invite them to be 
partners/stakeholders by giving them some allowances and bribing them. This reaches the level 
where local police may confiscate private property and hand it over to foreign companies48. At this 
stage, local fishers resort to piracy and marine terrorism. Their fishing zones were exploited and 
or confiscated by armed foreign fishing trawlers with the help of some local leaders and agent 
militias. Some of the local communities were disenchanted with fishing and turned to agriculture 
as a means of sustenance. However, there were also other foreigners restricting their advancement 
in agriculture with the assistance of some local leaders. As a result, some local communities 
engaged in piracy49 and or marine terrorism (Harper, 2012). Therefore, all forms of foreign illegal 
fishers are categorized as actors and networks of instability. 
 
3. 11: Oil Explorers as Networks of Instability, Insecurity and Unsustainability 
 Like the preceding section, this section addresses numerous multidimensional oil/mineral 
exploiters whose activities are strictly secret and not available to researchers, unless one is privy 
to their dealings. In this context, I provide a general description on their profiles and their activities. 
Oil exploration, excavation, extraction, and exploitation has already affected several countries in 
                                                          
48 In Vietnam, local police took over local private farms and gave them to wealthy Chinese companies. 
49 Expecting either to be imprisoned in one of the western countries, especially in the US or be captured, but find no law to arrest 
and try them, then, ultimately will be released. If being arrested in any of the Western countries, they will definitely seek asylum 
there in after the completion of their prison term. Other two possible scenarios are either to get killed or become a millionaire with 
in dawns and dusks. In the case of the former, which is the worst scenario case, they are prepared to take the risk, having in mind 
the Somali old so-called wisdom which says: “death is better than humiliation.” 
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the world in terms of environmental, social, political, the economy, and security. Notable among 
these are Ivory Coast (Richard, 2003), Nigeria, Algeria (McLeish, 2010), Kenya (Bliss, 2015), 
Yemen (Rise, et al., 2010) and Brazil (Odell, 2013). Some of these countries understand the effect 
of oil companies on their resources and environment. As a result, they have confronted them. For 
instance, the Rondonia region of Brazil formed an anti-oil network which was expanded 
throughout the country to expand advocacy for a new economic direction away from oil 
exploration and exploitation. This network invited multi-national oil corporations and other private 
sectors into discussions of transnational environmental activism (Guadalupe, et al., 2004).  
Somalia has been trying to extract oil from its land and seas since pre-independence, but has 
never been successful. The current federal government promised to produce oil within six years 
from 2012-2018 (Hussein, 2013). Currently, there are dozens of oil companies searching for oil in 
Somalia, particularly in the Puntland and Somaliland provinces. Among the companies that are 
already drilling the coasts and main-land of Somalia are: Africa Oil Corp, Agip, BP, Chevron, 
Conoco, Exxon Mobil, Kilimanjaro, Royal Dutch Shell, and Somali-Oil & Gas. Italy’s Eni, 
Petronas of Malaysia, China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Black Marlin 
Energy, London-based Tullow Oil, and Texas-based oil company Anadarko Petroleum Corp., and 
British Petroleum are also planning to join (Huriwaa Media Network Share, 2010). 
Furthermore, the media promotes oil availability in Somalia even where there is no basis 
for this claim. The Guardian’s Editor, Solmon, argues that Somalia’s marine and coastal land are 
as rich in oil as Kuwait’s (Editorial of the Guardian, 2012). This kind of freelance promotion 
attracts oil companies to compete for the country’s land and sea, ultimately resulting in 
environmental degradation, socio-economic conflicts, insecurity, instability, and unsustainability 
in resource management. Environmentalists, socio-political analysts, and economists argue that 
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exploring and exploiting oil in any part of a war-ravaged nation like Somalia will only initiate and 
intensify conflict and economic destruction rather than act as a catalyst for peace and economic 
development (Balthaser, 2014).  
In Somalia, oil and mineral explorers caused various forms of pollution and insecurity, 
including deforestation, costal area clearance, soil erosion, toxic dumping, oil spillages, 
community conflict, political disputes, reconciliation impairment, and civil war prolongation. 
Most Somalis are eager to see oil and gas produced and exported from their country. The economic 
benefits of oil extraction for economic purposes may, however, inadvertently pave the way to 
greater human suffering, increased foreign military intervention and, ultimately, the partitioning 
and presaging of land resulting in a definitive disintegration of Somalia as a sovereign state.  
Oil companies in Somalia highlight four interferences: 1) difficulties in accessing oil, 2) 
poor infrastructure and processing capacity, 3) insecurity, 4) and the absence of functioning 
institutions in the country. As a result, oil companies will depend more on individuals than 
institutions and governmental contracts (Balthaser, 2014; Clapper, 2014). This forces Somali 
youth to react negatively in two ways: 1) to attack oil companies in any way possible and, 2) to 
join other illicit actors and networks such as violators, robbers, terrorists, pirates, drug-traffickers, 
human-smugglers, and oil/mineral exploiters. Consequently, both foreign and local actors 
precipitate instability, insecurity and unsustainability. Therefore, all the oil and mineral industrial 
actors in Somalia are categorized as actors and networks of instability.  
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2. 12: The Role of the Somali Diaspora 
The origin of the term ‘diaspora’ goes back to the Jewish population dispersant during the 
world war one and earlier (Sheffer, 2003). The Jewish communities were dispersed both in the 
region of their country and continents beyond. Following that identification, Somali diasporas can 
be divided into ‘shadow diaspora’ and ‘diaspora’. The former can be described as those who 
inhabited or temporarily live in some of the Africa states,50 while the latter can be described as 
those who adopted the citizenship of the Western countries.  
Even though the gap is shrinking, the shadow diaspora is socio-politically more influential 
than the diaspora, while the latter is economically more influential than the former. Unlike 
diaspora, the shadow diaspora is quite organized and close to its culture. Somalis living in the 
diasporas are more individualistic and motivated by personal interests. However, they strongly 
contribute to the country’s economy by sending huge remittances either to their family members 
or for the reconstruction of some parts of the public infrastructure. In 2013, UNDP referring to the 
estimate released by the Human Development Report in 2012 estimates annual remittances sent 
by Somalis in the diaspora back home to the amount of $ 1.6 billion (UNDP, 2013), and in 2014, 
Haji-Abdi estimates it $ 1.9 billion (Haji-Abdi, 2014). The remittances have saved the lives of 
millions of Somalis, initiated and maintained developmental projects, repaired damaged 
infrastructure, and saved the country’s economy from collapse. 
Nevertheless, portions of the remittances fall in the wrong hands including pirates 
(Eichstaedt, 2010), warlords (Ember, et al., 2004), terrorists (Shay, 2014), and political and 
security destabilizers (Haji-Abdi, 2014; Shay, 2014). The impact of the lack of income, 
                                                          
50 The Somalis who temporarily live in the region include those who are in the process of travelling to the Western countries in 
Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Johannesburg, and Cairo. 
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employment, funding, and stable livelihoods makes people untrustworthy and unreliable creating 
piracy and terrorism activities. This demonstrates how economic capital has been an important 
indicator for community well-being. “Social capital refers to the ability and willingness of 
community members to participate in actions directed to community objectives, and the process 
of engagement” (Magis, 2010, p. 22). 
The Somali federal government vigorously invited Somalis in the diaspora to return to their 
country with their knowledge, investment, and experience. However, the risk involved in their 
return became well-founded. Many of them came back with developmental projects but were killed 
upon arrival or after they established their projects (Haji-Abdi, 2013; Shay, 2014). As a result, 
most diaspora academics are reluctant to risk death in Somalia. In its place, the diaspora and 
shadow diaspora members who failed to achieve any progress abroad have hastened to fill the gap.  
The majority of those who solicit political and executive/administrative positions in 
Somalia are deemed to be mostly the unsuccessful ones of the diaspora communities. More than 
half of the government responsibilities were occupied by these incompetent diaspora individuals. 
Another critical mistake, that has become the norm, is the appointment of unskilled, inexperienced, 
and unprepared individuals from the diasporas only because they hold university degrees. In the 
modern governmental system, an educational background is not enough to make one competent to 
hold a senior technocratic or political position without any experience. The best choice is to employ 
those who have in-depth local working experience from the Ministry’s lowest to highest levels 
and, who have also gained the required educational qualifications in the field. 
The major obstacles to implementing environmental and resource management in Somalia 
are individuals’ political ambitions and material greediness. There, mostly warlords and money-
lords collaborate with diasporas. Most of the federal executive, judicial and legislative members, 
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of whom nearly half are from the diasporas, are busy in political campaigns and money-making 
by any means possible. They have little or no time for environmental protection, resource 
management and the country’s stabilization. The collaboration between the diaspora members and 
the local activists who lived in chaos for 25 years can barely depict the country’s post-conflict 
situation. Both groups should be provided with specific awareness on good-governance and how 
to brainstorm and distinguish between negative and positive administrative actions. Particularly, 
they should be encouraged to study the country’s collective values and interest, public protection, 
proper resource consumption, environmental sustainability, and local knowledge. In short, to make 
Somalia’s institutions free from maladministration, negligence and corruption, there must be good 
governance which requires not only avoiding the brain drain but the return of qualified and skilled 
Somalis who left the country and adopted other citizenships. The government must take effective 
initiatives to protect these returnees’ lives and properties.  
 
13. Conclusion 
 The foreign actors and networks of instability in Somalia are Ethiopia, Spain, Italy, France, 
Seychelles, Eritrea, Egypt, IIUUUO foreign fishing vessels, and oil exploring companies. Their 
motives are based on looting Somalia’s resources and keeping it in chaos and conflict situations. 
These networks employ selfish strategies executed with both military forces and conspiracies. 
Unlike this list, AMISOM, Kenya’s non-military diplomacy, NATO, and US/UK Intelligence 
Agencies are networks of potential stability. Turkey demonstrates sincerity and earnest effort to 
rebuild Somalia both politically and economically. Therefore, Turkey is only and most outstanding 
foreign network of stability in the country. 
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Table 1: International/ Regional (Mainly Political and Economic Networks). 
 
Name 
Background     Capacities Motives Maneuvers Module  Relationships Typology 
AMISOM South-
Central 
Somalia 
Powerful to 
local Networks 
Peacekeeping Mostly Self-
defiance 
7 African 
State 
Reliable 
Associations 
Potential 
Stability 
Ethiopia South-
Central 
Somalia 
Financially rich, 
militarily 
strong, morally 
poor, 
administratively 
volatile 
Security, Political 
and Economic 
Pursuing Al-
Shabab 
Random 
military 
intervention 
LiuPolice 
and 
Military 
Reciprocal 
relationship 
with foreign 
state-
networks and 
Somali 
leaders 
Instability 
Kenya South-
Central 
Somalia 
Medium  Multidimensional 
motives led by 
economic 
Operative 
military 
forces  
KDF, 
Special 
Branch & 
Support 
Forces  
Unclear  Diplomatically 
Potential 
Stability, but 
KDF 
instability 
CIA, FBI, MI5, 
MI6   
 
All over 
Somalia 
Strong enough Counter-
Terror/Piracy 
Criminal 
investigations 
Complex 
intelligence 
units  
Secret 
foreign/ local 
agencies  
Potential 
Stability 
Turkey South-
Central 
Somaliland 
and 
Puntland 
Strong  Restating Somali 
state 
Aids on 
social, 
political and 
economic 
sectors 
Several 
NGOs and 
Ministerial 
projects 
Good 
relationship 
with both 
local and 
foreign 
stakeholders 
Stability 
NATO Indian 
Ocean and 
Red Sea 
intersection  
Very strong Counter-
Terror/Piracy 
Surveillance  Navies 
from all 
NATO 
member 
states 
Mostly secret 
partnerships 
Potential 
stability 
Clandestine 
State Networks 
South-
Central 
Somalia 
and 
Puntland 
 Economically 
Strong, morally 
very poor 
Economic 
opportunists 
 Theft based 
hit and run, 
and also 
robbery  
Eritrea, 
Egypt, 
Yemen, 
Seychelles, 
Spain, Italy 
and France 
Some allied 
with local 
groups, but 
most of them 
among them 
Instability 
IIUUUO 
Fishing 
Somalia’s 
coast to 
coast 
Medium  Economic Theft-Fishing 
&Toxic 
Dumping  
Numerous 
Asian & 
European  
Foreign and 
Local 
Networks  
Instability 
Oil Exploiters  Somalia’s 
Land and 
Sea 
Medium  Economic  Drilling and 
degrading  
Western & 
Arabian 
Companies 
Occasional 
operations   
Instability 
SomaliDiaspora  Outside 
Somalia 
Strong Economic, 
Developmental, 
and Socio- 
Political  
Unorganized 
political and 
economic 
interferences  
Westerners, 
Middle-
Easterners, 
and 
Africans 
Unorganized 
local and 
foreign 
relationships 
Potential 
Stability 
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Chapter Four 
4: Status and Role of the National Institutional and Non-Institutional Networks of Stability, 
Potential Stability and Instability 
4. 1: Introduction 
Somalia is under the control of complex domestic networks allied with foreign networks51. 
There are divergent motives and goals motivate different actors to exploit the country’s natural 
resources unlawfully and unsustainably, which leads them to engage in physical conflicts resulting 
in political instability. Focusing on the national jurisdiction, the Constitution on the National 
Legislative Procedures (CNLP)52, is the most suitable tool to define and describe the roles, 
responsibilities, and powers of Somalia’s three government branches, Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary53. Courts arrive at their verdicts regarding political powers and administration issues 
based on the Somali National Charter written in Mpagathy, Kenya in 2004 and the CNLP. When 
dealing with environmental, social, civil, and criminal matters, however, the Somali national law 
set forth in 1960 with the birth of the country, or that of 1987, are referred to.  
 This chapter is organized into 3 sections, each of which contains 3 headings (3X3). The first 
section discussed Legislative, Executive, and Judicial matters; the second War-lords, Money-lords 
and Faith-lords; and the third discusses the 3 key non-state actors pertaining to fisheries and coast-
guards. Under each heading, there are at least six sub-headings. The identification and 
categorization tools are separately highlighted in the first and second sections, but briefly and 
collectively addressed in the third section.  
                                                          
51 see the end-noted map titled “who runs Somalia by BBC.com.  
52 also known as the Harmonized Draft Constitution.  
53 Even though it is still being drafted, the latest constitution is being implemented alongside the country’s original constitutions 
from 1960 and 1987, but in an ad hoc system (the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013). 
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4. 2: Legislative Branch/Parliament 
4. 2. 1: Background 
At a federal level, the Legislative Branch (Parliament) is divided into the House of the 
People of the Federal Parliament (HPFP) and the Upper House (UH). The latter is yet to be 
established. It is only the HPFP that is active (CNLP, Article 55 (a, b)). Due to the absence of the 
Upper House and extensive corruption in practice, the HPFP works in the form of an unofficial ad 
hoc system. In the CNLP, there are four chapters on the duties specified to each of the two houses 
either jointly or individually (Article 56, 2012), but they are loosely defined. 
Article 111G of the CNLP requires the establishment of the National Independent Electoral 
Commission (NIEC), which is mandated to conduct Presidential and Federal Parliamentary 
elections as well as to register voters and review the voter’s roll. It states that the members of the 
HPFP must be elected by the country’s citizens through a direct, secret, and free ballot system 
(Article 64 (1), p. 15) in a balanced manner (Article 64, 3). This law is intended to take effect in 
2016. The current Members of Parliament (MPs) were selected by clan chiefs supported by 
traditional elders. Any government post, especially a ministerial post or its equivalents, must be 
similarly filled through a clan-based quota known as 4.5 clans. Four of Somalia’s five clans share 
power in an equal proportion, but the fifth one gets half because it is considered to total in number 
half of each of the other four (Hersi, 2015). Even though the constitution does not clearly mandate 
such a system, the 4.5 formula is a practical phenomenon in employment systems of all the political 
and technocrat government institutions (Hersi, 2015). The holder of any government post is 
considered to be a representative of a particular clan. 
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4. 2. 2: Administrative Capacity 
In terms of administrative capacity, the Federal Parliament internally divides into 14 
Committees54 of which each is assigned to specific duties besides the collective tasks of the house. 
Even though the number of the Committees is large, there is no specific Committee for 
environmental protection or resource sustainability. Furthermore, even though the country is 
sitting on the largest coast in Africa, which is under attack from all the corners, there is no 
Committee for marine affairs. This limits the Federal Parliament’s tasks to general socio-legal and 
political affairs. Had these Committees conducted their duties regularly, the house’s administrative 
capacity would have been sustainable and reliable. However, currently, the house’s administrative 
and power capacities are fragile. The most outstanding obstacle is a lack of competent MPs. Since 
the current MPs were selected by clan elders rather than constituent voters, the majority of them 
do not have formal education or experience.    
 In terms of eligibility, the constitution requires a parliamentary candidate to be a Somali citizen. 
At least one particular sub-clan of the citizens called “Isaq,” being the Somaliland secessionists, 
renounced their Somali citizenship. The constitution also requires a candidate to be a registered 
voter, but there has never been a voter registry in the country, and it is not easy to establish one. 
Furthermore, the article stipulates that the candidate’s citizenship must be valid, updated, and 
unrevoked by a court. In practice, during the last 25 years there has been no authority that suspends 
or revokes one’s citizenship. Moreover, even though the article indicates so, there is no NIEC that 
                                                          
54 These Committees include: 1) Oversight, Review and Implementation Committee; 2) Rules of Procedure, Ethics, Discipline and 
Immunity Committee; 3) Judiciary, Religious Sites and Religious Affairs Committee; 4) Internal Affairs, Regional Administration 
and Security Committee; 5) Truth, Reconciliation and Restitution Committee; 6) Committee on Budget, Finance, Planning, 
International Cooperation and Financial Oversight of Public Institutions; 7) Foreign Affairs Committee; 8) Defense Committee; 9) 
Human Rights, Women and Humanitarian Affairs Committee; 10) Social Services Development Committee; 11) National Resource 
Committee; 12) Information & Media, Public Awareness, Culture Post and Telecommunication Committee; 13) Committee for 
Roads, Ports, Airports, Energy and Transport; 14) Committee for Economy, Trade and Industry. 
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is able to verify whether the candidate meets the criteria set out in this article (chapter 57 (a, b, c, 
d). Article 64 (2) also states the number of the HPFP total 225 members, but in practice there are 
275 members55. 
The conditions for removal of one’s HPFP membership are simple, more natural than 
preventive measures, not based on the contemporary civilizations, and not democratic. For 
instance, it states that membership to the HPFP can be lost as a result of death, consistent failure 
to perform duties, and an acceptance of resignation (Article 59, a, b, c, d, e, and f). In terms of 
Legislative powers, the HPFP represents all the people of Somalia, and the legislative duties 
assigned to the HPFP are: 
(a) To participate in amending the Constitution in accordance with Chapter 15; 
(b) To pass, amend or reject legislation tabled before it in accordance with this Chapter and 
Chapter 15 of the Constitution; (c) To study laws passed by the Upper House of the Federal 
Parliament;(d) To delegate to the Upper House of the Federal Parliament legislative duties, 
with the exception of its duty to participate in the procedures for amending the 
Constitution” (Chapter 65, (a – d). 
 
4. 2. 3: Economic Base 
 The HPFP has been consistently financed by Norway, Belgium, Sweden, the European 
Commission, UN Development Program (UNDP) (UNDP, 2012), Department for International 
Development (DFID)56, and UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)57  
(IPU.org, 2012). These donors grant both monthly payments and project-based payments58. The 
                                                          
55 The current parliament does not focus on the unresolved issues on the ground, but it may be useful in the near future when the 
country is in a post-conflict situation. From the 275 Members of Parliament (MPs) in the Federal Parliament, 14% are women. 
Surprisingly, the federal government is extremely broad of giving an effort to 14% women in its parliament which they see it 
stepping towards gender balance. 
56 The DFID is a leading foreign development project which is a part of the UK's work to end extreme poverty. 
57 The BCPR was established to support innovative approaches to crisis prevention. 
58 The Project has also been integral in facilitating implementation of the Somalia New Deal Compact in relation to Peacebuilding 
and State Building Goal 1 (PSG1). It focused on developing law-making, oversight and representation skills, building functioning 
parliamentary administrations and infrastructures, and facilitating parliamentary outreach and civic engagement. In fact, it is an 
apparent example of how the HPFP is financed by foreign sources (IPU.org, 2012). 
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HPFP has also been financially supported by the governments of Sudan, Turkey, Qatar, and United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) upon requests (UNDP, 2012; Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2015).  
 
4. 2. 4: Manoeuvres/Activities 
The HPFP divides itself into committees that carry out different duties (Article 68, 2) 
through various procedures59. The legislative duties assigned to the HPFP include: preparing, 
passing, amending, or rejecting any law tabled before it;  approving the Independent Commissions 
(IC), monitoring institutions and holding them accountable; summoning the PM, the CMs and the 
Chairmen of the IC giving a vote of confidence or no confidence in the PM and the CMs, and 
electing and dismissing the FP as accounted for by the Constitution (Article 69, 1 &2).The HPFP 
has the authority to initiate, draft, reject, and send draft legislation to the federal president for his 
signature and publication (Article 81). Due to diminished efficacy and efficiency, the HPFP is still 
weak and unorganized internally. It is yet to even make an address change since its formation in 
Kenya in 2004. To this date, the HPFP’s main address is in a foreign country, being Kenya60. 
It seems that the constitution currently being drafted is being influenced by both foreign 
actors and networks of instability and domestic warlords and faith-lords and, as such, being 
overwhelmed by political manoeuvres based on corruption, selfishness, greediness, clannish 
interest, group interest, nepotism, and deception (Zho, 2015). As a result, every check and balance 
is implemented through clan calculation. Therefore, neither Article 58 nor Article 6461 is 
                                                          
59 These procedures include: “when draft legislation is brought before the House of the People of the Federal Parliament, it shall 
task it to the relevant House committee so that it may be studied… The House of the People of the Federal Parliament and its 
committees shall sit in public, in accordance with the general principle of transparency in government. The rules of procedure shall 
define when it is necessary for the House of the People to have a closed door session” (Article, 81& 82). 
60 Federal Parliament of Somalia, c/o Somali Embassy in Kenya, Likoni Lane, Off Dennis Pritt Road, Kilimani P. O. Box 623- 
00606.Sarit Centre, Nairobi, Kenya. 
61 Defining the Membership Criteria for the Federal Parliament and the Number of the Members of the House of the People 
respectively. 
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practically implemented. This entails that both houses are inactive at the present time, but remain 
a potential asset for the upcoming governmental administrations. Yet, another concern is whether 
this parliament will obey Article 60, which restricts the term of office of the HPFP to 4 years from 
the day of the announcement of the election results (Article 60, (1)). The HPFP can propose the 
dismissal of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FP) if he is accused of treason, or 
gross violation of the Constitution or the laws of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Article 92). 
Motions against the president were brought forward twice, but none of them has been successful. 
The UN’s Special Envoy to Somalia, Mr. Kay frankly declared that the president bribed the 
majority of the MPs and was not held to account as a result (Anadolu, 2014).  
Within the federal parliament, there are several blocks of conflicting networks based on 
self-interest, warlords’ interests, clan-interests, and the interests of religious groups 
(somaliamediamonitoring.org, 2013). Firstly, among the Parliamentarians there is a block/network 
of religious groups, who, despite sitting in the name of their respective clans, are more loyal to 
religious cults than the clans they officially represent. This block is internally divided into sub-
religious cults, but in certain circumstances, they may collaborate and act as a unified network.  
The second block consists of retired or defeated warlords whose main objective is to 
prevent the establishment of any effective government in the country, even though they are the 
national legislators. The third block of MPs consists of individuals who collaborate as a special 
network while each one of them pursues his or her personal interest. The fourth block consists of 
those who are loyal to their respective clans who selected them for the membership of the 
parliament. Thus, the representatives of each clan are an independent network. This block is still 
divided into clan-based members where the representatives of each clan (instead of constituency) 
defend and pursue the interest of their clan.  
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4. 2. 5: Motives 
The constitution ascertains that an MP’s responsibility is to prioritize the national interest 
over personal and group interests. Article 61 states that: “When fulfilling his or her duties, every 
member of the Federal Parliament shall be guided by the best interests of the nation as a whole… 
has a special responsibility to represent the constituency he or she has been elected from, regardless 
of their political or party affiliations” (Article 61 (1 & 2). However, the faith-motivated block of 
MPs protects the interests of the religious group, which they unofficially represent, by leaking 
government information to them, and planning socio-political and economic programs and tactics 
with them. The retired and defeated warlords block effective governance. This occurs out of fear 
of losing the immunity they currently enjoy as MPs (Article 70), so as a result they deter any strong 
governmental administration in the country. The third network’s motivation is based on personal 
interests such as money graft, power, self-promotion, and resource exploitation. The fourth 
network’s motive is to defend a clan’s rights while depriving others’ rights.  
Worse yet, the vast majority of the Members of the Parliament (MPs) are greedy, and intend 
to accumulate money regardless of legality. For instance, due to these complex internal 
blocks/networks, the country's biggest challenge has often come from within the government’s 
two executive divisions, the Prime Minister (PM) and the Federal President (FP). Upon the 
intensification of conflicts, the legislative branch hastily intervenes. However, the majority of the 
MPs side with the FP by carrying out a motion of no-confidence against the PM, after receiving a 
sum of cash from the President (Anadolu Agency, 2014; Haji, 2014). That is why they are busy 
serving votes of no-confidence against the executive branch. This has resulted in the appointment 
of three Prime Ministers, one after another, before the federal government celebrated its second 
121 
 
anniversary. Two of these PMs have been dismissed before they executed their first fiscal year 
work plan. Each of these PMs has stepped forward with a clear agenda, but they were unexpectedly 
dismissed (Nickolas Kay, 2014).  
Politicians and academics can determine that MPs are not in a position to work on 
environmental sustainability in post-conflict Somalia. Most of the journalists, academics, and 
political analysts conclude that the reasons for dismissal of the PMs are twofold: Firstly, the 
president determined to work only with a PM who is obedient to him and serves his interest before 
the country’s interest, and secondly, most of the MPs have been eager to receive cash bribes given 
by the FP from the government’s treasury (Hersi, 2015; Ulusow, 2014). This allows them to buy 
their voices in votes of no-confidence (Anadolu, 2014). As a result, the current federal government 
is facing numerous challenges which are more or less similar to those which have hindered the 
transitional governments, who all ended up being non-functional.  
Since the motives of the 275 MPs are divergent and the other two branches of the 
government are lagging both inter and intra-regulated as well as internal reciprocal relationships, 
they are open to interference and influence from the networks of instability. Any networks of 
instability can use their wealth to influence a group of MPs, because the majority of the 
parliamentarians are susceptible to bribery (Anadolu, 2014; Nickolas Kay, 2014). Corruption plays 
a significant role in promoting networks of instability, as demonstrated by the fact that “There 
have been consistent reports of the Islamists [sic] group Al-Shabab recruiting fighters directly from 
the government army and vice versa by offering them higher wages” (Harper, 2012, p. 23). 
Presently, the illegal blocks and networks lack the time, intention, interest, motivation, and 
expertise necessary to protect the country’s natural resources and environment. Their main motives 
are to protect the interest of a particular group or to seek self-interest rather than serve the national 
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interest. Still, this does not mean that the country’s parliament is one of the networks of instability. 
There are influential individuals who have the necessary education and spirit to serve the interest 
of the country’s post-conflict situation in the interest of socio-political stability and environmental 
sustainability (Hersi, 2015). 
 
4. 2. 6: Relationships 
Since Somalia is an Afro-Arab state and has been a party to all of the relevant unions and 
conventions, its seats in both the African and Asian Arab states, have been reserved during its 
absence and weakness (UNDP, 2012). Only Arab Inter-parliamentary Union temporarily 
suspended Somalia's membership due to its civil war and the dissolution of its parliament, but later 
on reactivated in 2012 ((Arab, IPU.org nd.). Therefore, the House of the People of the Federal 
Parliament (HPFP) has a good relationship with the African Parliamentary Conference (APC62) 
(APC, 2004), Arab Inter-parliamentary Union (AIPU63), IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union64 
(IGAD, 2012), and East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) (EALA, 2014). It also has a 
friendly relationship and recognition-based interaction with Caribbean nations and European 
parliaments.  
 In terms of the MPs’ internal conduct, in order to advance their interests each clan 
representative establishes liaisons with one or more of other clan representatives. Such liaisons are 
always based on clan compromises involving a degree of give and take. Moreover, over half of the 
                                                          
62 APC, Cotonou, Benin, 1 - 3 June 2004 
63 The Arab Inter-parliamentary Union (AIPU) is an Arab parliamentary organization composed of parliamentary groups 
representing Arab Parliaments. It was born in the wake of the October war of 1974, as a result of the atmosphere of Arab solidarity 
and Arab joint action, which encouraged Arab cooperation through political, professional and other institutions (http://www.arab-
ipu.org/English). 
64 The Protocol establishing IGAD Inter -Parliamentary Union came in to force on   28 November 2007 after being ratified by four 
IGAD member states: Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia. 
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MPs are quasi-foreigners. They are dual citizens of Somalia and one of the Western, African, or 
Arabian countries, and they do not reside in Somalia. For instance, the Speaker of the Parliament 
and over 30 others have Norwegian passports and their families live in Norway. Likewise, the PM 
and approximately 50 members of the Executive have Canadian passports. This entails that MPs 
give insufficient attention to rebuilding the country, and show apathy towards the ongoing 
corruption and mismanagement.   
   
4. 2. 7: Typology 
Having two houses65 without a clear job description could create complications and 
constant conflicts. Each of them may endeavor to prevent power seizure, as each is trying to widen 
its power without increasing its responsibilities. In addition to that, even though the Legislative 
office is the fundamental body of the government, it is lacking in many ways. The vast majority 
of the Members of Parliament work solely to pursue personal interests based on a mentality of 
group or self-promotion. In the federal Legislative office, there is also an outstanding shortage or 
lack of knowledge in good governance. These convergent internal networks within the same house 
of parliament mostly act as networks of instability, but could be altered to be networks of stability 
as they are technically the country’s legislative branch of governance. When looking at the 
malfeasance of the country’s MPs, however, one can conclude that the Legislative office is one of 
the networks of instability. When considering their mandates and legal responsibilities, in the long 
run, however, there is the opportunity to transform this body into a network of stability. I categorize 
the HPFP as an actor and network of potential stability which needs restricted control for 
transparency and accountability.  
                                                          
65Albeit only one is being built. 
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4. 3: Executive Branch 
4. 3. 1: Background  
The executive branch consists of two elements66; the Presidential Palace presided over by 
the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FP or the President), and the Cabinet presided 
over by the Prime Minister67. The FP is the Head of the State, and head of the executive branch, 
serving as the symbol of the national unity and the guardian of the constitution68. The FP is elected 
by the HPFP in a joint session69 (Article 89, a). His rights and responsibilities are: to serve as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces70, appoint the Prime Minister (PM), sign laws passed 
by the HPFP, and hold an annual session with the HPFP (Article 90, a, b, c, d, e, f,). Following the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers (CMs), the President can appoint senior federal 
government officials, the heads of the federal government institutions, as well as ambassadors and 
high commissioners. He is also authorized to sign international treaties proposed by the CMs and 
approved by the HPFP (Article 90, g, h, i). 
 
4. 3. 2: Executing Administrative Capacity 
The Cabinet is divided into the PM and the CMs. The PM is the Head and the highest 
executive authority of the Federal Government (Article 97). Therefore, he is responsible for 
appointing and dismissing members of the CMs and government officials71 as well as presenting 
                                                          
66 Since the activities of the Ministries are inconsistent, I focus on the activities surrounding socio-legal issues to identify how the 
management is in progress. 
67 Which consists of the Prime Minister, the deputy prime minister (s), ministers, state ministers, and deputy-ministers 
68 To guard the constitution, he appoints the chairman of the Constitutional Court, the High Court, and other judges at the Federal 
Government Level in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission 
69 Presided over by the Speaker of the House 
70 In this capacity, he is authorized to appoint and dismiss the Commanders of the Forces at the Federal level 
71 except those who are constitutionally appointed by the President. 
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the CMs and government programs before the HPFP for endorsement (Article 100). The CMs 
consisted of Ministers, Deputy-Ministers and State Ministers. Every Minister is personally 
responsible for the functions of his/her Ministry, and Deputy-Ministers shall function under their 
respective Ministers, while State ministers shall carry out specific functions assigned to them by 
the PM (Article 102). The CMs’ collective responsibilities are to: formulate and implement 
government policies, approve and implement administrative regulations, prepare and draft laws to 
be tabled to the HPFP, prepare the annual budget and finalise the accounts, set the national 
development plan, appoint and dismiss senior public officials, propose the appointment or 
dismissal of ambassadors,72 and implement laws73 (Article 99, a – i). 
Articles 110 and 111 mandate that the country must have Independent Commissions (ICs), 
which consist of members with relevant expertise at the Federal and Provincial Governmental 
levels. In detail, it decrees that the ICs’ mandates and operations must embody and reflect the spirit 
of human rights, democracy and transparency, without being subject to the direction or control of 
any person or institution (Articles 110). However, the vast majority of the Commissions’ members 
have no educational background let alone expertise. Furthermore, they serve the interests of those 
who appointed them or those whom they are afraid of, such as external powers like the Ethiopian 
secret forces. Article 110 states that the Cabinet should be consulted when appointing the 
Commissioners, and their neutral decisions should be accepted, but this has never happened in 
practice. 
The constitution states that an Anti-Corruption Commission must be formed, the purpose 
of which is to serve as an independent, impartial, and inclusive representative. Its duty, among 
                                                          
72 Also the consuls and diplomats 
73 ensure national security, and protect state interests. 
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others, is to investigate allegations of corruption that implicate the public sector (Article 111C.). 
The commission is also mandated to prevent, investigate, and publish corruption allegations, and 
to freeze, seize, confiscate, or return any gains from criminal activity within the scope of national 
or foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations (Article 111C). Yet 
federal government officials constantly engage in corrupt activities including embezzlement, 
misappropriation, trading government properties, power abuses, and many other forms of illicit 
self-enrichment and civilian subjugation (Salad, 2014). 
In terms of security, Article 111H of the CNLP mandates the establishment of a National 
Security Commission (NSC), which is to be independent and comprised of security experts from 
all sectors. The first draft of the CNLP coincided with the emergence of piracy and terrorism in 
the country’s territorial waters and mainland. Perhaps, for this reason, the NSC’s main priorities 
are: combating piracy, demobilization of militias, social reintegration, policing, and ensuring 
civilian control of the armed forces. Its general mandate is to: 
“(a) Study and develop an integrated security framework to address the present and future 
needs of Somalia for review and adoption by the Federal Parliament;(b) Present proposals 
to ensure that human security is prioritized and incorporated into the national security 
framework;(c) Develop a framework through which the public may provide oversight and 
monitor security related expenditures;(d) Seek redress from abuses by security personnel” 
(Somali Federal Republic, 2012). 
 
The NSC formed and deployed Somali National Security Service (NSS) which should 
constantly collaborate with the American, British and Ethiopian intelligence units that operate in 
the country (see chapter 3 of this dissertation). Most of the high ranked NSS employees were 
trained in the US. The NSS recruited a special force to act as snipers, using methods whereby they 
cover their mouths just like the Al-Shabab does, and shoot their targeted opponents on the spot 
(Scahill, 2015). The American Naval Forces and the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) has 
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recommended that the NSC maintain a reciprocal relationship with NSS Somalia (Rourke, 2009). 
NSS operations using fairly comprehensive strategies and tactics, and hence, they detect a number 
of violations by the networks of instability (Rourke, 2009). 
 Upon the achievement of Somalia’s independence on July 1, 1960, the first national constitution 
was prepared in Mogadishu, the capital city which is located in the South-central part of the 
country that was under Italian trustee administration at that time. Therefore, there are close 
similarities between the Italian constitution in general, and the environmental laws and policies in 
particular, and that of present Somalia. It still seems that provisions reflected in English common 
law are more focused than those reflected in the Italian civil law (Daniels, 2012).  
The semi-compilation of the two country’s laws entailed, to a certain extent, the pre-
determination of Somali environmental law and policy. In the Southern part, the jurisdiction of the 
municipalities was confined to urban centres, whereas in the North the jurisdiction of the Local 
Councils extended to rural areas (Daniels, 2012). This allowed for easy to access municipal law 
concerning both urban and rural areas, which was convenient for both the Southern74 and Northern 
regions of the country. Thus, the laws pertaining to local governance in the Southern part of the 
country included Tax Law No. 1403 of 1939; Law No. 9 of September 30, 1956 on municipal 
Administration; Law No. 15 of June 25, 1958 on Administrative Elections (Ahmed, 2013). 
Thereafter, these laws were easily amended with the amalgamation of the Northern laws 
for the same purpose as the Local Government Ordinance, 1953. Aside from these western laws, 
Islamic law and local customary laws are reflected in Somali society as well. These traditional 
laws are more or less the most effective environmental policy in the country as they provide 
                                                          
74 In this theme, South means South-central and Puntland – former Italy Somaliland, while North means Somaliland – former 
British Somaliland protectorate. 
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morality-based guidance for environmental sustainability. In this sense, the traditional 
environmental laws and policies that have been effective and, somehow, reliable, are widely 
applied in the nomadic areas. 
 
4. 3. 3: Economic Base 
The executive branch of the federal government receives financial support from several 
sources, including the governments of Turkey, Qatar, Norway, the UAE, and UK. Additionally, 
the international community raised funds for rebuilding Somalia in Belgium and Denmark (The 
Guardian, 2014). The funds are transferred to Somalia through the UNDP and World Bank in order 
to avoid corruption and mismanagement. The federal president has repeatedly stated that only a 
small portion of that money has reached Somalia, saying that most of the pledges became false 
promises. He also complained that the UNDP office for Somalia located in Nairobi, Kenya had 
been using the money for themselves instead of channelling it to Somalia through the executive 
branch of the government (Center for Research and Development [CRD], 2013). In response, the 
UNDP stated that, for the sake of transparency and accountability, it has the responsibility not to 
handover cash to unreliable bodies of the Somali government (Manson, 2013; UNDP, 2014).  
The Centre for Research and Development (CRD) located in Mogadishu, Somalia 
investigated the matter. It reached the conclusion that Somalia received less than 30% of the money 
pledged, but that this is the fault of the executive branch. The executive was lacking the know-
how on how to follow-up on the money, and did not know how to manage it when it was received 
(CRD, 2013). Domestically, the executive branch obtains revenue from the seaport and airport, 
while also earning revenue inconsistently from taxations, fines, and occasional international trades. 
There has, however, been ongoing, unlimited, and unrestricted corruption (CRD, 2013).  
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4. 3. 4: Manoeuvres/Activities 
Unlike many of war-torn Sub-Saharan African countries such as Sierra Leone (Paul, 2015; 
Gberie, 2009), in Somalia, the institutions in charge of dealing with resource management were 
effective when the civil war broke out. Most of the documents found in the government offices 
were destroyed, however, by the clan-based rebels. As a result, the federal government drafted 
new principles as rules and regulations pertaining to the management of marine resources, without 
integrating or abolishing the old ones. This makes the new legislation neither pragmatic nor 
modernized. It seems that it was drafted in a reactionary and emotionally charged manner, and 
without a prerequisite policy or plan. As a result, none of these rules have been officially executed 
to date. Somaliland and Puntland’s provincial administrations have developed their own 
documents, which are a combination of marine policy and regulations. These efforts undermine 
the norms of the new federal government. There is an urgent need to adjust these scattered policies 
and align them with federal policy. 
In Somalia, socio-legal based rules and regulations pertaining to marine and coastal 
concerns are the closest to reflecting maritime policy and management. Thus, the executive branch 
of the government, through the Ministry of Fisheries, enforces those rules and regulations which 
were set-forth either through presidential decrees or the bulletin of the national jurisdiction. As 
such, I focus on these rules and regulations as the basic principles of managing maritime issues 
including marine resources and environment.  
 The revolutionary government of 1969 had been powerful enough to control any negative 
economic activities that may not be beneficial for promoting environmental sustainability, cultural 
behaviour, public security, and government's political strategy. Article 42 of the national 
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constitution illustrates that the land, natural marine and land-based resources shall be state property 
and that the state shall issue legislation to utilize these resources (Somali National Constitution, 
1969; Somali Federal Republic, 2012). This does not mean that private actors have no right to 
consume natural resources for their own purposes, but it means the natural resources must be 
harvested according to the government's guidelines.  
Furthermore, article 5 of the Somali constitution of 1979 states that: "Territorial sovereignty 
shall extend over land, the sea, the water column, sea-bed and sub-soil, continental shelf, the 
Islands and air space” (Somali Constitution of 1979; The Transitional Federal Charter of the 
Somali Republic, 2004). As demonstrated by this article, environmental policy in the country was 
an issue of concern, but not all the issues were dealt with from an environmental perspective. The 
issue of environmental control was quite new to Somalia, so the enforcement of environmental 
policy has never been a priority.  
 Prior to the civil war, to manage the marine environment and combat complex emerging 
problems, the Somali government set some national rules and regulations which can be considered 
as an abstract of environmental policy. Since every state in the world has the right to protect and 
supervise its regional seawaters, Somalia has taken some measures to collectively regulate and 
administer its coastal affairs. The government recognised that its navigation regulations were not 
strong enough, and issued an article of marine law, being Article 23, that is to be read with Article 
74 of the International Marine Law. This is also to be read with the provisions of the international 
law, which deals with the conservation and distribution of shared natural resources in equity1. In 
its last year, the Barre regime, recognised the equity gap there, and tried to fill it by issuing reams 
of presidential decrees pertaining to the environment. Due to the government’s general weakness, 
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however, there was little progress made on environmental protection, sustainability, and resource 
management1.  
 Currently, the federal government lacks the capacity to control the country’s marine borders, 
but it is seeking to build its financial, technical, political, and military capacities (Minister of 
Natural Resources, 2013). The government has planned to bring all maritime activities in the 
country under its control, but it faces tough challenges from the provincial administrations and 
private companies. The concerned institutions understand that the networks of instability strive to 
take advantage of the government’s fragile capacities (Shaul, 2007). Furthermore, there are 
complex sociopolitical issues that precipitate administrative clashes, which have already hindered 
several projects on or related to policies, plans, strategies, laws, and surveys related to marine and 
resource management.   
In terms of marine ecosystem and resources management, there has been a basic legal 
framework in place around fisheries and marine zone management, but there has been no capacity 
to implement it. In 2003, a federal charter including basic policy instruments dealing with the 
country’s environment in a harmonized way was drafted in the national reconciliation conference 
in Kenya. Article 45 of this charter requires the Federal Government to:  
“(1) give priority to the protection, conservation, and preservation of the environment 
against anything that may cause harm to natural biodiversity and the ecosystem. (2) All 
people in the Federal Republic of Somalia have a duty to safeguard and enhance the 
environment and participate in the development, execution, management, conservation and 
protection of the natural resources and environment. (3) The Federal Government and the 
governments of the Federal Member States affected by environmental damage shall: (a) 
Take urgent measures to clean up hazardous waste dumped on the land or in the waters of 
the Federal Republic of Somalia; (b) Enact legislation and adopt urgent necessary measures 
to prevent the future dumping of waste in breach of international law and the sovereignty 
of the Federal Republic of Somalia . . . (c) Take necessary measures to obtain compensation 
from those responsible for any dumping of waste, whether they are in the Federal Republic 
of Somalia or elsewhere; (d) Take necessary measures to reverse desertification, 
deforestation and environmental degradation, and to conserve the environment and prevent 
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activities that damage the natural resources and the environment of the nation. (4) In 
consultation with the Federal Member States, the Federal Government shall adopt general 
environmental policies for the Federal Republic of Somalia” (Somalia, 2012, p. 35; 
SomaliaWatch, 2002). 
  
  4. 3. 5: Motives 
 The executive branch has positive motives, despite circumstantial challenges. The national 
institutions endeavor to promote marine management, including resource conservation, 
environmental protection, sustainability, crime prevention, safety, and security. The primary goal 
of the national government is to build a strong coastguard that would have the capacity to enforce 
law and policy in each region of the country.  
 The federal government is working on strategies to develop an all-inclusive maritime security 
policy, which Somalia and its regional neighbours can jointly administer (Stockbruegger, 2011). 
The concerned ministries were ordained to draft the most appropriate policy formulation to carry 
on these tasks. As a part of that effort, on July 31, 2013, the government announced that it had 
formed a new coastguard force to combat all illegal activities, including piracy (BBC, July 31, 
2013). One day after this announcement, the government signed a bilateral agreement with the 
Atlantic Marine and Offshore Group, a marine security company owned by Norwegian individuals 
(AFP, 2013). However, due to a lack of clear-cut job descriptions among the national ministries, 
the company continued to act independently (Shay,2014). 
  The ministries are eager to implement their mandated tasks. Due to a shortage of skilled 
personnel and political instability, however, ministries have yet to update their mandates. Hence, 
most of the ministries do not clearly distinguish a designated duty from a subsidiary one, let alone 
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know what their top priority is75. Due to their limited capacity, the performance of these institutions 
has been lagging. There are two major challenges limiting their capacity, conflicts between the 
PM and FP and the assignment of tasks to unqualified personnel (Scharf, et al., 2015). These 
problems facilitate corruption, nepotism, negligence, and malfeasance. Thus, there is an explicit 
need to employ qualified personnel who are both moral and loyal.     
Since the division of power between the office of the FP and the PM is a new phenomenon 
in Somali politics, there have been constant conflicts over duties between the two. It seems that 
the current leaders are under the influence of the former government which was based on a 
presidential, authoritative, and dictatorial ruling system. Before the war, Somalia's main institution 
was the People's Assembly as supervised by the Judicial Supreme Court, but these institutions 
cannot effectively function within the current situation. The constitution itself makes no clear 
distinction between the FP and the PM’s duties, especially in its Articles 97 and 89a. Moreover, it 
is not yet clear whether the country’s political system is a presidential or a parliamentarian 
democratic system. As a result, recurrent conflicts arise between the two departments of the 
executive branch (the FP and PM). 
Perhaps the Constitutional Court defined in Article 107 will set forth new rulings pertaining 
to these duties. This would avoid overlap in day to day bureaucratic activities. Another contentious 
issue is that the constitution stipulates the eligibility for membership of the Council of Ministers 
to include, but not be limited to, members of the HPFP (Article 97, d). This leads to conflicts of 
interest, as well as susceptibility to corruption, nepotism, negligence, and the taking of leadership 
                                                          
75  Since environmental degradation is usually the result of economic exploitation, the pre-war environmental policy of Somalia 
can be viewed through examining the provisions concerning economics and development. According to Article 41 of the national 
constitution adopted in 1987, there are four main sectors dealing with economic and resource sustainability: The state sector, the 
co-operative sector, the private sector, and the mixed sector. This means that the government does control the processes of the 
private and co-operative sectors, however. The national jurisdiction was purely based on a top-down approach which gave the 
government the power to manage and control all forms of private resources and economic sectors in the country (Ahmed, 2013).  
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authority for granted. There is a lack of accountability and transparency in the whole process 
because both the monitor and the one who is monitored are the same people. 
 
4. 3. 6: Relationship 
 Externally, the executive branch of the federal government has a reciprocal relationship with 
the UN Security Council through the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) located at the 
Gigiri compound in Nairobi -Kenya, AMISOM, UNDP, Turkey, the Gulf-Arabian States, the UK, 
and USA (Great Britain, 2001). At a regional level, the executive has bilateral relationships with 
the African states whose soldiers are members of AMISOM. It specifically has day-to-day 
coordination and relationships with the frontline states, being Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It is 
not yet clear, however, whether the latter relationship is mutually beneficial. Most Somali political 
commentators speculate that Somalia’s executive branch is under threat to follow the instructions 
given by these frontline states, and are critical of whether the relationship is beneficial for Somalia 
at all (Alasow, 2014; Arman, 2014).  
Internally, there is no reciprocal relationship between the federal government and the 
provincial administrations, and no major task performed by any of the federal ministers in any of 
the provincial states. They are planning to extend their duties to cooperating with the provincial 
ministers. Internally, the national institutions consist of a variety of interlocking ministries. These 
are: The Ministries of Fisheries, Seaports, Marine Transportation, Economics, Agriculture, 
Environment, Defence, Commerce and Trade, National Planning and International Cooperation, 
and the Interior. There is also a growing marine force in the form of an organized police unit, but 
this force is in the process of transitioning into navy or coast-guard battalions. It is not clear, 
however, as to whether these forces are under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence, office of 
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the PM, or operate independently. There is also at least one renowned educational institution 
known as the Maritime and Fishery Institute. Since there is no environmental legislation, however, 
there is no proper framework for how these divergent institutions should collaborate and maintain 
progressive relationships among themselves or with other regional, national, and international 
institutions76. 
Pre-war, ministries dealing with fisheries and other marine affairs have had liaisons with 
some educational institutions. The Maritime and Fishery Institute is the sole institution offering 
maritime courses above the high school level, but lower than the equivalence of a college diploma. 
It is located at Lido, the most famous beach in the country in Mogadishu. The institute is divided 
into three departments, being fishery, navigation, and mechanics. The major courses offered by 
the three departments include fish gear, fish processing, oceanography, navigation, astronomy, 
seamanship, sea-signals, captain’s charts, fish-nets, applied mechanics, and boat building. The 
                                                          
76 Evidently, since Somalia has yet to develop effective national environmental policies and laws, it has almost failed to 
cooperate with other states76. This entails that the country does not benefit from international agreements on co-operation and 
assistantship. For instance, in the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22 states that: "States shall co-operate to develop further the 
international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by 
activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction" (UN Convention, 1972). This Principle, 
which was later turned from "soft law" to "hard law," would be very useful to a country like Somalia. Due to a lack of proper 
management and reciprocal international co-operation, however, the country did not benefit from this legal principle. Furthermore, 
when this principle was made into "hard law," provisions which obligate states to develop international laws pertaining to liability 
and compensation in the event of environmental disasters were included in the relevant environmental treaties (Adede, 1992). 
Those provisions define general principles, rights, responsibilities, and obligations concerning trans-boundary natural resources 
and environmental interference.  
In retrospect, from 1974 to 1977 there had been a large number of joint-venture vessels, which mainly consisted of companies 
from the Soviet Union, Japan, Rumania, Italy, and South Korea (Ahmed, 1994) legally fishing Somalia’s coasts. Later on, the 
Somali government gradually terminated almost all of the licenses of these companies. In 1984, only 14 vessels were licensed, 
especially to harvest demersal fish and lobsters for export (Ministry of Marine and Harbors, 1978). Since 1991, there had been a 
large number of foreign vessels harvesting marine resources from the Somali coastline even during the centralistic authoritative 
government (Ministry of Resources, 2013). These included foreign and joint-venture operations, of which only a few were officially 
licensed, while many others operated illegally or with uncertain and invalid licenses.  
According to the Maritime Code, fishing activities, whether conducted by Somalia or foreign nationals, may be carried out 
pursuant only to a concession given by the Ministry of Fisheries. A concession is a non-exclusive permit to fish in a specific area 
that may extend up to nine years and, may be subject to certain conditions provided for by the law (Ministry of Marine and Harbors, 
1978). Concessions may be revoked at any time if the public interest requires it, in which case adequate compensation is given for 
any fixed installations. Concessions may also be cancelled owing to the default of the concessionaire, in which case no 
compensation is payable (Sigh, 1984). Fishing without a valid concession or licence is punishable with imprisonment and fine 
(Sigh, 1984). Although fragmented information is available indicating that a number of larger vessels have been operating in Somali 
waters for many years, no complete record of the industrial harvesting has taken place in the Somalia’s EEZ.  
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institute was closed for 22 years, but reopened on October 21, 2012 and became fully operational 
on June 13, 2015 (Hiiraan Online, 2015). The reopening was funded by the Hasene Relief Somalia 
and the City University of Mogadishu. The institute had a branch in the town of Eil-Ahmed, 
located between Kismayo and Marka which was closed as a result of the civil war and has not yet 
reopened. 
  
4. 3. 7: Typology 
 The executive branch, alongside its various ministries and other national institutions, is among 
the actors and networks of potential stability due to its intention and legal status.  
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4. 4: The Judicial Branch  
4. 4. 1: Background/Origin 
The national jurisdiction and legal institutions within Somalia are derived from a 
combination of English, Italian, Islamic and Customary laws (Contini, 1969). The Italian and 
English laws were inherited from the colonies of the two parts of Somalia, being North and South, 
that were amalgamated upon the independence and subsequent unification of the two regions. One 
of the challenges was uniting the national legislation, where the Italian colony in the Southern part 
of the country had settled provisions and articles, with the different laws of Northern part settled 
by the British. In 1956 the Italian colony adopted a law which managed marine movement and any 
other matter related to the coastal affairs. The British colony had settled on some different 
provisions on this same issue in 1926. The two legislations differed in many ways, entailing that a 
great deal of effort was required to synchronise and unite them. 
 
4. 4. 2: Administrative Capacity 
The Judicial Branch (JB) consists of the Supreme Court (SC), Attorney General’s Office 
(AGO), Banadir Regional Court (BRC), and 4 District Courts (DC). Each of these courts was given 
its appropriate mandate, and expected to actively operate at the federal level and supervise each of 
the provincial and potential provincial states. However, most of them are not yet functional and 
still remain titular, due to deterrence by the networks of instability who oppose law and order 
machinery. SC and AGO courts struggle with arbitrating, rather than law enforcement, between 
the two houses of the Executive branch. The 4 District Courts are hitherto inactive. The BRC that 
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focuses on criminal and civil cases is resiliently operative only at Mogadishu zone, the capital city, 
of the south-central.  
To change this ineffectiveness, the Federal Government of Somalia with the help of the 
United Nations and other donor partners established “Banadir Courts Complex” in Mogadishu, for 
instance. The aim of this special court is to spread the country’s justice sector by creating a safe 
community that has access to justice and court professionals that can deliver justice services. The 
Ministry of Justice has taken this act as a part of a pilot project called Peace-Building and State-
Building Goals (PSGs) focusing on infrastructural rehabilitation, procurement of security 
equipment, and selection and training of judicial protection staff (UNDP, 2015). This indicates 
that the Judicial system is trying by any means possible to implement court services, but the 
situation is quite hard. On several occasions, the Judicial Branch (JB) intended to enforce certain 
enacted and gazetted laws, but failed (Shay, 2014). This demoralized not only the public but also 
JB’s employees and citizens’ legal experts. There are several forms of incapacities which are yet 
to be figured out and studied.  
The capacities of power and management skills are weak due to the federal government’s 
general situation of financial incapacity coinciding with corruption and a lack of knowledge in 
good governance (Shay, 2014). It also happened that laws were enforced upon minor criminals 
while those who committed gross crimes were not judged. The former category of criminals 
originated from poor families and weak clans/sub-clans while the latter criminals were recognized 
as sons of warriors (Shay, 2014). This may not result from corruption or nepotism per se, but rather 
that such regulations were enacted and gazetted although they could not be enforced.  
As for internal administrative capacity, there are several misunderstandings and 
disobediences which occasionally took place over certain criminal cases, official ranks, 
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appointments, and employments (Murphy, 2008). In addition to a financial and technical shortage, 
the Judiciary branch needs legal experts who are equipped with modern scientifically updated 
knowledge corroborated with local experience. As a result, the public’s regard for the role and 
response of the Judicial system is low. Instead, they mostly resort to traditional social justice 
system including customary-law and Sharia law.  
 4. 4. 3: Economic Base: The judiciary is financed under the executive branch by the countries 
and INGOs mentioned in the previous section. 
4. 4. 4: Manoeuvres 
In this section, I examine how the judicial branch (JB) departs from the CNLP, both in 
terms of drafting and implementing national jurisdictions77. The CNLP states that “the judiciary is 
independent of the legislative and executive branches of government whilst fulfilling its judicial 
functions. Members of the judiciary shall be subject only to the law” (Article 105) and the judicial 
proceedings shall be open to the public 78(Article107). The national court consists of three levels: 
The Constitutional Court, the Federal Government level courts, and the Federal Member State 
level courts (Article 108). The Constitutional Court has sole jurisdiction on matters of 
                                                          
77 In retrospect, it is worth to highlight the legislation pertaining to marine environment and fisheries managements. Somalia 
enacted four pieces of legislation as the law of the sea in the spirit of a ‘socio-legal policy during 1959, 1972, 1989 and 2011, but 
promulgated its main constitution in August 1979 and amended it in 1990 (Elmi, et al., 2015; Sacco, nd). That constitution was 
abandoned/inactivated following the overthrow of the Barre’s regime on 26 January 1991.  There were also numerous presidential 
decrees and special laws concerned environmental issues. For instance, in 1966, the Somali Democratic Republic issued one law 
that makes all Somali coasts united. Although many provisions of the law settled by the Italian colony were still considered valid 
for the same reasons because they became applicable to the existing situation (David et al., 1987), this law nullified others colonial 
laws.   
Since Somalia has never had a separate environmental policy, the principles of policy have always been within the national 
jurisdiction with socio-legal overtones. The spirit of the law reflects policy (Boon, et al., 2012). In terms of maritime environmental 
policy, there are rules and regulations comprising both legislation and social principles, which can be translated as a “maritime 
environmental policy” (Boon, et al., 2012). The national administration of Somalia has been very weak since its post conflict rebirth 
in 2000, when three transitional administrations were reformed one after another, and finally when the current non-transitional 
body was elected. The current draft of the CNLP seems to be the most updated and comprehensive instrument compared to the 
previous national jurisdictions, provided it is implemented.  
78 However, the article makes an exception in cases involving juveniles, rape, and other civil crimes. Indeed, these minor-considered 
cases are the once that destabilize the country’s security and environmental sustainability. Almost all forms of piracy and gangs 
are as a result of delinquency. 
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interpretation of the Constitution, whilst the highest court at the Federal Government level is the 
Federal High Court, and the highest court at the Federal Member State level is the Federal Member 
State High Court. 
In the Proceedings of the National Courts, if a case is presented before a court, but the court 
finds that such a case does not fall under their concern, the court shall refer it to the concerned 
court (Article 109). This has caused several disputes over referral issues. Even though Somalis are 
not familiar with the procedures of multiple courts and constitutional dealings, no court has yet 
referred a case to another. Article 109 states that “any court with judicial powers can decide on 
whether a matter brought before it is a constitutional matter or not”79. Letting any court decide 
where a case belongs has opened some loop holes due to subjective, discretionary interpretations 
of where a case should be tried. 
The Constitutional Court has exclusive powers, including: to hear and decide cases arising 
out of disputes between organs of the Federal Government, rule on cases concerning their 
respective constitutional powers and duties, cases concerning matters of interpretation of the 
Constitution not arising out of Court litigation, and cases challenging the constitutionality of a law 
passed by the HPFP (Article 109C). Article 109A, defining the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC)80, is insufficient as it does not define the procedures, requirements, techniques, and 
limitations of appointing, disciplining, transferring, and compensating members of the judiciary. 
These procedures, which should be addressed under article 109A, are not mentioned in any article 
of the constitution. As a result, almost all of the Commissions were undefined and thereby 
                                                          
79 if this will not contradict the exclusive powers of the Constitutional Court, as stipulated in Article 109C of the Constitution 
80 Which is comprised of nine (9) members: The Chief Judge of the Constitutional Court; (b) The Chief Judge of the Federal 
High Court; (c) The Attorney General; (d) Two (2) people who are members of the Somali Bar, appointed by the Somali Law 
Society for a four (4) year term; (e) The Chair of the Human Rights Commission; (f) Three (3) people of high reputation within 
Somali society, proposed by the Council of Ministers, and then appointed by the President for a term of four (4) years, and 
renewable only once. 
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incompetent. As such, these Commissions became illegal and illicit channels for domestic and 
foreign actors and networks of instability (Salad, 2014).  
 
4. 4. 5: Motives 
 The judicial branch’s (JB) main motive is to control three areas; national security, justice and 
public financial management. It also focuses on settling internal political crises by ensuring the 
stability of public and private security. Since the country’s security is under critical circumstance 
and there are hundreds of court cases open on a daily-basis, the JB tries to prioritize court cases. 
However, there is outstanding confusion in this regard. Whenever a security issue is prioritized, 
another becomes more urgent than that by demanding it be given priority. For instance, confronting 
political terrorism was prioritized but the civil cases on land disputes overwhelmed every other 
case on the table. Similarly, the piracy problem was prioritized but soon the threats of the Al-
Shabab networks overwhelmed it, albeit the JB tried to combat both piracy and Al-Shabab 
concurrently (Yara, 2012).    
 With the help of the international community, the JB underlined its determination to work on 
eradicating piracy and other maritime crimes (UN News Centre, 2011) as well as land-based 
political and social crimes (UN News Centre, 2011). It struggles to restore and rebuilding 
Somalia’s national jurisdiction by reactivating the country’s security institutions. Aside of hard 
laws, the office encourages the application of soft laws such as rehabilitating the militias and 
pirates rather than formal punishments for disciplining. 
 In terms of justice, the JB office is responsible for acting as the main model for justice. As an 
effort in that, the office pays full attention in ascertaining the main goals of the federal government 
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(FG). The primary objective of the FG is to hold a fair and free presidential election which is based 
on the voting system ‘one person one vote’ in August 2016.   
 In terms of public financial management, the JB has been endeavoring to find ways to reduce 
the effects of the long-rooted financial corruption inherited from the transitional administrations. 
Yet, there are several challenges to control. The governmental institutions are lacking proper 
leadership and personnel. For instance, the financial institutions suffer from the shortage of experts 
on macroeconomics. Even where there are a few, they are incapable of establishing economic 
auditing and transparency institutions. As a result, the JB cannot establish financial and resource 
regulations that meet the standards of the global economy and environmental sustainability. The 
same applies to regulating the management of political and security issues.  
 
4. 4. 6: Relationships 
 The judicial branch has relations with Interpol, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and 
other relevant international and regional legal institutions. Somalia’s judicial branch has been 
approached by each of these global institutions (Rourke, 2009). Internally, the branch struggles 
with how to organize local employees in order to establish both federal and provincial offices. It 
seems that the main office is confused about how to go about establishing and maintaining 
reciprocal relationships with the concerned international and regional offices (Shay, 2014). 
At the national level, the country faces a high level of corruption and conflicts of interest, 
and as such, laws are only followed in certain exceptional cases. In 2014, Somalia was recognized 
as the most corrupt state in the world (Infoplease, 2014). The country’s FP fights for the 
appointment of all government officials, including judges for the constitutional and federal courts, 
without evaluating the candidates’ qualifications and experience. These appointments are instead 
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fought for on the basis of the candidates’ clan lineage and membership of a given political party 
(SomaliNewsRoom, 2014). There have been recurrent disputes over the hiring of judges and 
lawyers at a federal level. These disputes are related to aspects of the candidates’ qualifications 
and experiences, clan representations, gender, loyalties, and patriotism. As a result of foreign 
pressures, in April 2015, the office of the Attorney General also hired six additional female lawyers 
(Goobjoog, 2015). This is a part of an effort to reform the judiciary.  
At the provincial level, one contentious issue is that each of the cabinet ministers, prime 
minister, president, and parliament issue new laws without hesitation. The Somali Bar Association 
has recommended that several federal and regional courts be established to handle cases on a 
provincial basis (Sabahi, 2014). In response, on May 20, 2014, the CMs approved a 
new Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, extending federal courts to the cities 
and towns captured by the federal government from Al-Shabab (Sabahi, 2014). New conflicts 
erupted over this issue, however. The leaders and activists of the prospective provincial states 
condemned the government for expanding the scope of its power. The dispute escalated into a 
physical conflict between the local militias and the military, and finally, Al-Shabab re-captured 
many of these cities (Somalia NewsRoom, 2014). After being endorsed by the HPFP, the Ministry 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs issued a new law establishing the Judicial Service 
Commission in June of 2014 (Goobjoog, 2014). The law seems biased in favor of the president 
and certain cabinet members who are in his political block, however. This has fueled the pre-
existing conflict over the implementation of the federal system81 (SomaliNewsRoom, 2014).  
                                                          
81 Fresh intra-region and inter-region conflicts arose and contributed to unstable politics and ineffective social service delivery in 
the country (Somalia NewsRoom, 2014). The core problem is that some regions feel they have less resources compared to their 
neighbours, and vice versa. Others are of the opinion that their neighbors will be a burden on them by taking advantage of 
federalism. Others argue that, as a clan, they used to inhabit one of their neighbour regions and they have the full right to go back 
to their original land, but the current occupants strive in defending their territories.  As a result, a considerable number of political 
commentators argue that Somalia could possibly end up in a new civil war because of poor and ambiguous relationships 
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4. 4. 7: Typology 
Even though the judiciary was supposed to be independent and free from any influence, it 
seems that the branch is dependent on the executive branch of the federal government. The 
judiciary is full of corrupt and unqualified personnel. As a result of constantly deviating from the 
law, the JB has been deemed an incompetent institution which mostly serves the motives of the 
networks of instability. But one must distinguish between the national jurisdiction, and the forces 
responsible for its enforcement. If the Judicial Branch’s written policy, law, plan, and 
administration are comprehended, amended, updated, and adjusted with regard for contemporary 
international and regional conventions, it would be a suitable framework for environmental 
sustainability in the country. Issues with corruption within the executives can be solved, so long 
as the members are held accountable for their misconduct. Therefore, the Judicial Branch of the 
Federal Government can be categorized as a network of potential stability. It is the foundation of 
governmental administration that would be an important asset for achieving environmental 
sustainability in post-conflict Somalia, as it would deter actors and networks of instability such as 
money-lords, faith-lords, warlords, illegal fishers, pirates, and marine terrorists.     
 
 
 
 
                                                          
between the parliament, the executive, bureaucracy, and judiciary branches (Lee, et al., 2009P). It has been difficult for Somalia and 
its international partners in IGAD, UNSOM to deal with a much wider group of stakeholders (clans, armed groups, religious 
leaders, political lobbyists, and business people). In Somalia, businessmen and religious leaders (faith-lords) replaced the warlords, 
and now act as Civil Society. There are no organized social unions such as medical, legal, engineering, and arts professionals in 
the country. 
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4. 5: Money-lords 
4. 5. 1: Background: In this section I attempt to analyse one of the three key non-state 
domestic actors within the networks of economic and political spoilers by emphasizing their 
identities, objectives, strategies, relations, and capacities. They consist of social movements as 
socio-political and economic forces. These forces, which I call ‘money-lords,’ are central to each 
of the other networks of instability. They consist of illegal and or immoral traders, unregistered 
bankers or money transferors-Hawala82, trade mediators, drug-dealers, and retailers. 
 
4. 5. 2: Manoeuvres 
Money-lords run a variety of businesses. In other words, they engage with almost all the 
economic sectors. The first cluster consists of owners of Hawala companies83, airlines84, hotels85, 
telecommunication companies86, media87, shopping centres, and residential luxurious houses for 
rent. The second cluster consists of exploiters and exporters of various types of the country’s 
resources, such as illegal loggers, drug-traffickers, money-launderers, fish/vertebrate-traders, and 
wildlife exporters. Each of these business groups makes money in immoral and illegal ways, to 
the point where local people refer to their profits as ‘blood-money’ or ‘dirty-money’88. Illegal 
                                                          
82 Banks other than Hawala Institutions specialized in money transferring Salaama Bank, IBS Bank, Prime Bank. 
83 Amaana, Amal, Dahabshil, Kaah, Jubba, Mustaqiim, Qaran, Tawakal, 
84 Daallo Airlines, Jubba Airways, Central air, African Airways, Somali Air.  
85 Outstanding hotels: Hotel SYL, Hotel Jazeera, Hotel City Plaza, Hotel Mubarak, Hotel Sahafi, Hotel Amira, Hotel Weheliye, 
Hotel Peace, Hotel Bakin.  
86 Hormuud Telcom, Hodan Global, Global Internet, Adeega AVC Plusm, Nationlink, a company specialized in the supply of 
electronic devices such as cellphones, home phones, tablets, and other devices of communication, Somalia Electric Station, the 
main base generates and distributes electricity in the capital city. 
87 Media; SNTV, Universal TV, Kalsan TV, Radio Mogadishu, Radio Kulmiye, Radio Dalsan, Radio Goobjoog, Radio Risaala, 
Radio STN, Radio Shabelle, SingJet Printing Agency, and tens of websites.  
88 In most of the Eastern African countries, and the United Arab Emirates, there are thousands of huge buildings owned by 
Somali individuals, but if one traces back the story of those owners, one concludes that they fall into one of the following 
categories:  
1. Former Senior Officer in Somalia (President, Prime Minister, Minister, or a Political Broker), who has taken the whole 
government treasure with him. This is, particularly, those who held high rank positions in Somalia from 2000-2016.  
2. Brokers for one or more of the UN organizations designated to deliver aid to Somalia. 
3. Warlords who quickly collected money either by gun-point or from the international community,  
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loggers cut-down any tree they have access to, burning and chopping it for charcoal, then exporting 
millions of heavy sacks of charcoal to the Gulf of Arabia (USA International Business Publication, 
2009). As they have already cleared out thousands of kilometres of the coast-line, they have now 
started cutting down the coastal mangroves (Hirsch, 2001). This has already resulted in severe 
desertification, which causes frequent droughts or instantaneous floods throughout the country 
(Farah, 2007). 
In terms of socio-political and economic manoeuvres, the money-lords are significant 
factors that political analysts, peace negotiators, and researchers have often overlooked, even 
though they play a large role in shaping the economic dimensions of socio-political security and 
stability. Throughout the 25 years of the civil war in Somalia, most of the efforts to restore peace 
have been focused on military and political factors. The reality, however, is that neither political 
nor militaristic activities can be attempted, exercised, and continued without an economic basis, 
and the main cause of civil war was economic. A capitalist economic framework has resulted in a 
“survival of the fittest” mentality, and unregulated competition in the pursuit of wealth. Since the 
beginning of the new millennium and a few years prior to it, many researchers (e.g. Ross, 2004; 
Malone, et al., 2005; Humphreys, 2003) analysed the economic and resource related aspects of 
civil wars. These researchers pinpointed that civil wars and local conflicts started over economic 
and resource related issues, using the term ‘economic war’ rather than civil war.    
 
 
                                                          
4. Former Pirates who, once they collected sufficient funds for themselves and their offsets, claimed they repented and changed 
5. Self-styled religious scholars who deceived thousands of clean-hearted Somalis in the name of God. 
6. Drug-dealers who export qaad narcotics either from Kenya or from Ethiopia to Somalia. These traders of qaad drugs bring 
back to these two countries over a million US dollars in cash collected from the various regions of Somalia, but originally wired 
from the Western countries for the survival of the impoverished people. 
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4. 5. 3: Motives 
In Somalia, wealthy businessmen mostly boycott or sabotage peace processes and 
governmental functions by attempting to destroy it from within, or influencing members of the 
processes to act in their service (Harper, 2012). They create an environment where any new 
governmental administration needs their financial assistance, either lending cash, taking 
emergency contracts, facilitating accommodations, providing office equipment, or providing a 
subsidy in goods. In fact, money-lords in Somalia engage in both hostile and peaceful activities as 
sources of money-making. As such, money-lords are directly or indirectly involved in all political 
issues in the country, be they internal or external.   
 The primary motive of the money-lords is to control the country’s economy and avoid anybody 
that may pose a challenge to the achievement of their goals (Harper, 2012). As a result, from a 
public perspective, they are suspected of being the masterminds of the assassinations taking place 
in the country. Many of the prominent men and women that were secretly killed were found to be 
involved with one or more of the illegal businessmen’s affairs in one way or another (Harper, 
2012). Some attempted to address the legal, environmental, moral, and social issues with illegal 
businesses. Other assassinated persons were found to be in competition with the money-lords in 
the market (Garoweonline, 2014). 
  In terms of relationships, money-lords exploit marine resources in alliance with foreign 
companies who do not normally target only war-ravaged countries, but are also active where there 
are strict laws and law enforcement capacities (Murphy, 2008). Evangelos states that financial 
networks, being money-lords, “strive to control the market and market information related to each 
of social, political and various sources of economics applying similar archetypal approach” 
(Evangelos, 2013, p. 29). The author emphasizes that the goals of financial networks are to benefit 
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themselves at the expense of others. In the case of Somalia, most of the financial networks, which 
I call money-lords in this study, have political ambition, like securing formal positions in the 
government, as their ultimate objective. The activities of Somalia’s money-lords affect the stability 
and sustainability of the country’s environment, ecology, economic, and security. Money-lords are 
an integral part of the networks of instability, because each of the networks of instability has a 
close relationship with them, and cannot succeed in their vile missions without them.  
  
 4. 5. 4: Exceptions 
  Of course, there are traditional business persons including certain money-transferors, 
medical and food importers, farmers, factory owners, owners of private educational institutions, 
and retailers who do not engage in nefarious activities. These are the third cluster of the theme. 
They consider their works as sources of income generation89, while the money-lords consider their 
works as a means to gain power, or at least control and suppress the rest of society with wealth. 
Therefore, unlike money-lords, traditional businesspersons are a part of the actors and networks 
of stability.  
 
4. 6: Faith-lords 
4. 6. 1: Introduction 
 Faith-lords90are leaders of religious cults whose goal is to transform their religious position into 
political and economic positions. These cults are generally divided into Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’, 
Al-Ittahad, Al-Islah, Tabliq, and Takfir. The basic principles of the latter three cults prohibit any 
                                                          
89 By undertaking their business for living and not for eliminating the lives of others. 
90 After the collapse of the ICU, an assorted network which can be described as Faith-lords appeared. 
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form of violence, albeit the latter – Takfir –  might, in the future, resort to extremist tactics, because 
they believe that any cult other than them is comprised of non-believers and should therefore be 
eliminated (Ibrahim, 1996). Tabliq’s mission is limited to disseminating Islamic principles such as 
performing prayers and connecting one’s self to the Creator (theguardian.com, 2009). Al-Islah, 
however, has always had political ambition, although they attempt to achieve these ambitions 
through peaceful and political methods (Shehata, 2012). Therefore, in this theme, I will divide the 
faith-lords into Warmongers and Peacemakers. 
 
4. 6. 2: Faith-lord Warmongers 
 4. 6. 2. 1: Background 
 Unlike the latter three religious groups aforementioned, the former two, Al-Ittahad and 
Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’, are warriors and, as a result, agree to work together in order to confront 
the Western interests in the country as well as to discipline local thugs. The two, regardless of their 
ideological and political differences, united in the formation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
after having realized that their country required some form of law and order. Upon their 
unification, they were immediately targeted by the American CIA and Ethiopian armies. It seems 
that the CIA became suspicious of the ICU’s mission and ideology on terrorism, but the Ethiopian 
armies were already conducting brutal military operations in several towns and rural areas of 
Somalia without seeking any permission or justifying their aims.  
 
 4. 6. 2. 2: Manoeuvres 
 The CIA and its sub-contractors announced that the leaders of the ICU are under target and 
should be eliminated (Scahill, 2013). This led Blackwater, in cooperation with the CIA and FBI, 
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to employ the most powerful warlords in Mogadishu to assassinate the leaders of the ICU (Scahill, 
2015).  Serious attacks and counter-attacks, as well as “tit for tat” political tussles, followed and 
fuelled the conflict (Scahill. 2011). There were harsh attacks against the ICU as carried out by the 
Ethiopian military forces and American air forces, and navies, using helicopters and drones. These 
have been ruthless, continuous land attacks and air bombardments on both Somali civilians and 
belligerents since 2006 (Scahill, 2011). 
  In the Ras Kamboni districts, for instance, there have been chains of air strikes which killed 
hundreds of civilians and their livestock (Shay, 2012). As a result of these attacks, the ICU was 
eventually defeated and divided into rival groups. The defeat has resulted in bitter disagreements 
among the coalition of the religious-political actors. The temporary alliance of Al Ittahad and 
Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’ collapsed and segmented into sub-groups. Consequently, the ICU’s foot-
soldiers divided into Al-Shabab, Hizbul-Islam, Al-I’tisam, Raskamboni brigade, and Ala-Sheikh. 
The Ala-Sheikh finally resorted to negotiate with the CIA and its allies, and as a result, reformed 
their ideology. 
 
4. 6. 3: Ala-Sheikh 
4. 6. 3. 1: Background: Within these divisions, Ala-Sheikh was born and immediately 
obtained power in 2007 (Scahill, 2011). Its leader, Sharif Sh. Ahmed, became the President of the 
country with the help of Western countries such as the US (Scahill, 2011). As the Ala-Sheikh wing 
of the ICU obtained power, it automatically became the ruling party and the first targeted enemy 
of the rest of the ICU’s coalition. The membership of Ala-Sheikh was an informal requirement for 
appointment to the cabinet. At this stage, Ala-Sheikh was not only criticised for compromising 
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with the foreign networks, particularly the US intelligence agencies, but also for exclusively filling 
all the country’s political offices with its members.  
 Ala-Sheikh enjoys the political support of two influential countries: Turkey, which supports the 
government, and the UAE, which supports it in multiple ways. Currently, the former president, 
Mr. Sharif Sh. Ahmed, (the leader of Ala-Sheikh) has two of his four wives reside in Turkey while 
one lives in the UAE. This former president is active in the current political landscape of the 
country. He tirelessly mobilizes his supporters and recruits even more supporters through his 
humanitarian and developmental NGO known as “Gurmad,” meaning “rescue” (Diriye, 2012). He 
is also learning the English language in both the US and UK. The public believes that he has the 
strongest support from each of these four powerful countries, and as such, he is likely to be the 
next president of Somalia (Hiiraan, 2015).  
 
4. 6. 4: Al-Ittahad 
 4. 6. 4. 1: Background: Upon the defeat of the ICU, the Al-Ittahad retreated to reunify and 
rebuild. This retreat resulted in division of the cult into three sub-cults which are now rivals to one 
another. The group renamed itself several times, first to Al-Wahabia, then Al-Wuhda, then to Al-
Ittahad, and finally to Salafia. Upon the latest renaming, however, the organization fragmented 
into two groups, each of which claimed to be the original Salafia. The public renamed both by 
calling one wing “the new Salafia” (Salafia al-Jadida) and the other “the Old Salafia” (Salafia al-
Qadima). The former switched from violent to peaceful tactics by abjuring their political and 
economic ambitions. By contrast, the latter insisted on obtaining power and wealth in order to 
control the country by implementing Sharia Law. The group has begun splitting into various sects, 
including Al-Shabab, Hizbul Islam, the Raskamboni brigade, Salahudin group, and Al-itisam. 
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Only Al-Itisam ceased using violent tactics and adopted a peaceful approach to gaining power, 
while the rest were united by violent missions.  
  
4. 6. 4. 2: Manoeuvres 
 The violent sects have had significant disputes over which name and system should be adopted. 
This has precipitated several internal clashes. Al-Shabab, Hizbul Islam, and Salahudin became 
openly belligerent toward one another, with each group targeting the other. Hizbul Islam and 
Salahudin were militarily, socially, and politically defeated by Al-Shabab, however. Most of their 
foot-soldiers surrendered themselves and agreed to serve under Al-Shabaab’s commanders. In the 
meantime, the Raskamboni brigade agreed to reconcile with the Ethiopian forces and finally 
became the leaders of the Jubbaland state. At this stage, Ali’tisam struggled to remain powerful 
and adopted non-violent ideology (Sii'arag, 2012). This has, however, caused more internal 
disputes and physical conflicts.  
 At least three more sub-sub-sects have appeared: Saruuriyin, Madkhaliyin and Rabi’iyin. The 
disintegration of the latter sub-sub-sect was initially caused by disputes over the material assets 
held by the organization. Some individual leaders believed that the organization was on the verge 
of collapse, and if that happened, all of its properties would be left in the hands of the individuals 
who are in charge of it at the time. Nevertheless, each of the groups and senior individuals 
attempted to demonstrate that the conflict was a result of religious differences in order to mask 
their economic and material motivations (Ali, 2008). 
 4. 6. 4. 3: Consequence 
  Due to the prolonged civil war, social instability, social disintegration, poverty, lack of 
education, lack of proper parenting, and idleness, most of the young people who were born during 
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this period of lawlessness became traumatized and threatened. They find their communities 
claiming to be religious but behaving in the opposite way, yet everyone is still adhering to Islamic 
principles91. Having lived in this chaos and confusion, most of the youth became demoralized and 
started gangs, demonstrating delinquency and other antisocial behaviours that are detrimental to 
the country’s resource and environment.  
The Somali young generation is going through chains of sociopolitical and economic crisis. 
They are jobless in their hometowns for several reasons; lack of security, lack of local capacity, 
lack of local infrastructure, lack of national/provincial institutions that are capable of offering 
employment opportunities. Corruption combines with these factors (Bahdur, 2014). For instance, 
most of the youth cannot get employment even if they are highly qualified and there is a possibility 
of employing them. This is more the case when the young persons are not known to any of the 
provincial or national ministers or managers, not related to the money-lords, and did not originate 
from financially stable families. As they sought employment, they were frequently abused both 
verbally and physically by the wealthy bodies. They are also culturally undermined and 
discriminated against, mainly for one or two reasons; being poor and/or being originated from one 
of the lower-class sub-clans.  
Moreover, each of the provincial, national, regional, and international 
stakeholders/networks target Somalis by age. They assault, arrest, torture, and brutally kill the 
young boys. For instance, warlords prevent any form of local development and prosperity in their 
respective hometowns. They have already assassinated individuals who attempt to do so (Johnson, 
2015). They want their young henchmen to be impoverished and not find any opportunity other 
                                                          
91 Indeed, Somalis are in the opposite position of the islamophobia attitude. Even to be qualified to a parliament membership, a 
candidate must be a religious. The law requires one to be a Muslim and respect Islamic values. The spirit of this law ordains 
religiousness. 
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than being bodyguards for them. The same applies to the money-lords and faith-lords. On top of 
these local destabilizers, every Somali boy is sick and tired of the foreign intelligence and military 
forces who consider them as automatic suspects. In this case, the vast majority of the youth have 
no choice but to seek survival source by any means possible. The most apparent opportunity 
offered to them is to join either Al-Shabab or pirates. They prefer to get food for one or more days 
and die the next day, instead of suffering from long lasting hunger and starvation. This is how they 
commit suicide or take a risk. 
   
4. 6. 4. 4: Typology  
 Al-Itahad is highly socially, politically, and economically ambitious, and is dedicated to 
enforcing Sharia Law based on their rigid interpretation of it. Upon realizing that they cannot force 
the public to accept Sharia Law, they have instead attempted to obtain power in order to impose 
their ideology upon the people. Almost all of their actions and ambitions are leading to instability. 
Even their policy, which is based on changing names and titles from time to time, as well as using 
religious justifications to attain socio-political and economic goals (Ali, 2015), is enough to 
identify it as an actor and network of instability.  
 
4. 6. 5: Al-Shabab 
4. 6. 5. 1: Background  
Al-Shabab means “the youth”. Most of its members are pre-teens, teenagers, adolescents, 
and youth. The sub-sect detached from the ICU, in which they were the leading force. It obtained 
that membership credibility by representing the Al-Ittahad sect. It condemned the commander of 
the ICU, Mr. Sharif, for treason when he agreed to collaborate with the international community. 
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Al-Shabaab and its allies condemned Mr. Sharif for selling out his personal faith, Somalia’s natural 
resources, sovereignty, culture, dignity, and patriotism in return for the presidency (Hassaan, 
2011). This is what led the ICU to become split into groups and sub-groups. One of these groups 
called Ala Sheikh under the leadership of Mr. Sharif became Somalia’s governing body, while 
other factions have become armed rebels or political opponents. 
  
4. 6. 5. 2: Manoeuvres 
Because of Ala Sheikh’s political decision, Al-Shabab and Hizbul-Islam declared holy war 
against all foreign political, economic, and social stakeholders as well as all Somali groups and 
individuals who may have any connection with those foreigners (Dorrie, 2014). They appealed to 
all Somalis and non-Somali Muslims to join and stand by them (Dorrie, 2014). They also ordered 
those who are unable to physically fight alongside them to support them financially. In repeated 
announcements they have stated that any Muslim person, be they Somali or non-Somali, who is 
not in the support of Al-Shabab is considered as an apostate and should be killed on sight. 
4. 6. 5. 3: Economic Base 
Al-Shabab receives revenue from exporting charcoal and livestock, taxation and levies, 
fines and penalties, fundraising, and donations. Besides these sources, Al-Shabab enjoys military 
and political support from certain countries, as spearheaded by Eritrea. Moreover, the group has 
the support of many former supporters of Al-Ittahad, including the Afghani Taliban and several 
other terrorist networks and wealthy individuals. No doubt, each of the foreign donor state and 
non-state actors and networks has either political or economic motives of its own, and attempts to 
achieve their goals by any means possible. 
 
156 
 
 4. 6. 5. 4: Motives 
The Al-Shabab’s overall motive is to take advantage of two circumstances to gain 
sociopolitical power; the country’s status of lack of law and order machinery and the citizen’s 
predisposed interest in Islam. They want to rule the country with a radical-system based on the 
harshest version of Sharia. Al-Shabab, as well as the rest of the Al-Ittahad’s sub-sect, believes and 
practices the extremists’ most dangerous doctrine called “Al-wala wa al-bara” meaning “intimate 
friendship or hatred of the enemy.” This entails a sort of “my way or the highway” mentality and 
approach (Ali, 2015). Closely observing, one can internally distinguish among Al-Shabab factions 
who are united in destabilizing the country. The first are those who fight for the defense and 
dissemination of a fundamentalist religious ideology, while the second are economic-motivate. 
The third group, who are the majority, are those who feel their basic rights to resources, politics, 
freedom, and even survival means were violated by the political stakeholders including the federal 
government.  
4. 6. 5. 5: Strategies 
In reality, Al-Shabab implements the Al-Ittahad’s original concept, which is based on 
spreading propaganda against foreigners and secular Somalis, as well as labeling any Muslim 
person who does not support them as an apostate. In order to easily influence and recruit youth 
and laypersons, the faith-lord warmongers move to excommunicate and isolate the educated and 
wise persons in the society (Ali, 2008). This leads many civilized and educated people to accept 
their harsh interpretation of the religion so that they can survive in the community, instead of being 
politically, socially and economically sanctioned. Others have resorted to piracy, theft, highway 
robbery, or delinquency.  
 
157 
 
 
 4. 6. 5. 6: Typology 
 Al-Ittahad and its sub-sects/cults, as spearheaded by Al-Shabab, are socially, politically, 
environmentally, behaviorally, culturally, and economically destructive (Ali, 2008). These are 
religious radicals who have political and military ties with the global Al-Qa’idah, and now, with 
Salafia al-Jihadia of Sham (Syria and Iraq), Boko Haram and ISIS (Rudincová, nd). They started 
spreading propaganda to recruit youth. Their primary propaganda involves arguing that foreigners 
invade their country for two main purposes, to exploit its resources and to change its people’s faith 
(MediaMonitor, 2011; Aways, 2009; Alidheere, 2012). Therefore, Al-Ittahad is obviously among 
the actors and networks of instability.  
 
4. 6. 7: Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’ 
4. 6. 7. 1: Background 
  Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’ (ASWJ) represents the historical Muslim culture known as “Sufism”. 
They practice Islam in a form of mysticism which is based on lack of interest in this world, but the 
afterlife instead (Luis, 1993). Here is where its conflict with the modern Islamic movements 
begins. The modernists, led by Al-Ittahad, integrate Islamic faith with political, social, and 
economic factors (Luis, 1997). Economically, the sect relies on the support of the local people.  
4. 6. 7. 2: Manoeuvres 
ASWJ had been known as a peacemaking religious sect which interacted peacefully with 
society. It has recently become hostile, however, in order to defend itself from Al-Shabab’s 
aggression. The latter targeted the former’s faith and culture. One aspect of their faith is to visit 
the graveyards of the late spiritual leaders, and chanting and praising both God and the prophet 
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Mohamad there.  Al-Shabab rejects this type of faith and instead enforces the belief that one must 
only praise God and always be active in every part of social life. As a result, Al-Shabab destroyed 
almost all the tombs of the Ahlu-Sunna and removed the bones of the spiritual leaders. That 
triggered the hostility of the ASWJ (International Religious Freedom, 2010). The sect’s main 
stronghold region is the central districts of the South-Central province.   
4. 6. 7. 2: Motives 
The primary motive of the ASWJ is to defeat Al-Shabab, but there are many 
carpetbaggers92 who target their political ambitions to lead the country (Baxter, 2011). Many of 
these carpetbaggers, whose motivation is to reach power through the sect, have already filled 
political and military leadership positions in the sect. This has resulted in the addition of a political 
agenda to its primary missions. It has established its own media channels to fight for the right to 
power. 
The spiritual leaders of the sect attempted to unify the ASWJ, which is made up of Qadiri’a, 
Salihia, Ahmadia, Zayli’iya, and Sufis under one umbrella in order to reinstate its previous position 
in the community. The effort has instead created further divisions. Smaller groups such as Ahlu-
Suffa and Ansaru-Sunna have emerged. Indeed, further divisions will occur within each of the 
religious groups whose ambition is to dominate Somalia socially, economically, and politically 
according to their interpretation of Islam (Daniels, 2012).  
  4. 6. 7. 3: Typology 
 Ahlu-Sunnah wal-Jama’ has committed a series of human rights violations, and has caused 
further environmental destruction, political destabilization, and the prolongation of the war, 
                                                          
92 Carpetbaggers is a terminology used to define political demanders who seek power from anywhere possible. If there is a 
political barrier in their area, they go to somewhere else where they have no local connections and plans. 
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leading to instability. This is most likely due to the fact that the members of the sect have no 
understanding of the moral principles that should guide war either from global or traditional 
perspectives. Yet, I categorize it as an actor and network of potential stability. Obviously, if its 
rival groups, chiefly Al-Shabab, are eliminated, and the carpetbaggers are as well, the sect will 
return to its origins as a mystic religious group encouraging stability and inner tranquility.  
 
4. 6. 8: Al-Islah as the Key Faith-lord Peacemakers 
4. 6. 8. 1: Background 
Peacemaking faith-lord groups are Al-Islah, Tabliq and Takfir. The latter two are passive 
while the former is active. In this section, I focus on the active one, which is Al-Islah. Al-Islah is 
a religious civic organization that is a regional branch of the Global Muslim Brotherhood (Al-
Akhwanu Al-Muslim) headquartered in Cairo, Egypt93 (The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily 
Watch, 2014; Hassaab, 2011; The Telegraph, 2013). Al-Islah has political ambition and has always 
been involved in development and educational projects. It has built and operated several social 
institutions such as universities, schools, hospitals, and media offices. 
 
4. 6. 8. 2: Manoeuvres 
Since 2010, the organization has been suffering from internal conflicts leading to its 
division in three sub-sects: Damu-Jadid, Al-Islah-Tajamu’ and Al-Islahu Tadamun, each of which 
claims to be the original Al-Islah. This has created extensive competition, which is based on the 
pursuit of profit for political gain. To seek money by any means possible is characteristic of any 
growing political body, whether it is legal or illegal, and whether it is rebelling or registered. Hazen 
                                                          
93 This office was recently burned down and closed by the Egypt’s current government lead by president Sisi.    
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writes that “the options available to rebel groups during conflicts are based on the group’s capacity 
to continue fighting, and this capacity is based on the group’s access to resources… such as 
currency, natural resources (Hazen, 2013, p. 22). The author also states that: 
“Although conflicts have often been described as passing through stages, from onset to 
escalation to termination to peace building, such a linear progression is rare. Instead 
conflicts involve numerous attempts at negotiations, cease-fires, and signed peace 
agreements, as well as frequent returns to active fighting” (Hazen, 2013, p. 26).   
 
Damu-Jadid, which seceded from Al-Islah sect, took the power from Ala-Sheikh through 
the parliamentary election in 2012, which was influenced by bribery and political bargaining 
(SaadaalNews.com, 2012). At this stage, Damu-Jadid renounced its membership of Al-Islah and 
declared itself as an independent ruling political party (Badio, 2013). Yet, it has strong ties with 
the mother of Al-Islah, the Global Muslim Brotherhood (GMB). The president of Somalia, Hasan 
Sheikh Mohamud, who is a co-founder of Damu-Jadid, was the first head of state to attend the 
inauguration of the president of Egypt, Mohamad Mursi, who had been the head of the GMB 
(Lansford, 2015). Currently, Damu-Jadid is the ruling party. The head of the state, approximately 
half of the cabinet members, prominent members of the judiciary, and the majority of the 
employees of the Presidential palace are full members of Damu-Jadid, most of whom are of the 
founders of this religious-political party (sub-sect) of Al-Islah (RBC, 2014).  
4. 6. 8. 3: Relationships 
Damu-Jadid enjoyed the full support of Mursi’s administration of Egypt, but when Mursi 
was ousted from power, the group immediately turned to Turkey, Qatar, the UAE (SomaliaReport, 
2012), and many of the Western countries including Norway, Sweden, the UK, and US 
(Garoweonline, 2012). As the most active network of the complex faith-lord groups, the sect 
enjoys direct or indirect financial and political support from many foreign countries and INGOs. 
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4. 6. 8. 4: Motives 
Al-Islah as the most notable figure of the faith-lord peace-makers trained its members with 
high political and leadership ambitions with modern skills and strategies. This has resulted in its 
dissection into three groups. Even though most of these religious-political peacemakers are not 
armed for physical fighting, each of them fights towards gaining access to the country’s economic, 
military, social, and political sectors. Damu-Jadid, the latest winner is endeavouring to maintain 
its power as the Somalia political leader. All the Islah internal factions are typologically actors and 
networks of stability. They are open-minded modernists who can be negotiated with, advised, 
educated, and corrected.  
 
4.7: Warlords 
4.7.1: Background 
For close to a quarter of a century, Somalia has been hijacked by merciless warlords who 
can be defined as clannish in nature. In the last few years, their powers have waned. Recently, a 
smaller network of instability has emerged. In this theme, I address the warlords followed by a 
discussion of such parasitic actors and networks.  
 The warlords consist of clan-based warriors that divide the country into clan-based fiefdoms 
that do not have a good relationship with one another. The most vigorous military and political 
shareholders of these warlords,94 who operate in the South-Central, include: Yalahow, Finnish, 
Qanyare, Hussein Aideed, Furuh, Addi Waal, Indha Adde, and Haran ku Naah of whom each leads 
a faction of the Hawiyes sub-clans. Similarly, there are Barre Hiiraale, Morgan, Ahmed Madobe, 
                                                          
94 Because they lead hundreds of militias armed to the teeth.  
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and Ahmed Jees of whom each leads a faction of the Darod sub-clans. These are actors and 
networks of instability who are significant stakeholders. They often win in preventing, boycotting, 
disturbing, or hijacking attempted political movements by using both physical power and political 
immoral games.  
 Banerjee, et al., (2003; Kahler, 2009; Ellison et al., 2004) define stakeholders as various types 
of non-governmental organizations and other potential lobbyists that have an interest in the 
environment and have the ability to mobilize public opinion. This definition disapproves that of 
Margerum (2011) whose opinion is that stakeholders are limited to those who are officially 
recognized by the government. Indeed, local or national stakeholders can collectively be defined 
as a collection of individuals or groups that can affect or be affected by the achievement of 
environmental goals including: regulators, organizational members, community members, and the 
media (Harrington, 1998; Fischer, et al., 2007). Fischer, et al., (2007) argue that if the competing 
internal stakeholders in Somalia advocate for the use of science in addressing Somalia’s problems, 
they can be described as the principal policy-networks in the country. 
3. 7. 2: Economic Base 
 The warlords’ main revenue sources are: levies taken from the civilians, relatives, clans, and 
sub-clans. Besides taxation and funds raised in special events, these warlords engage in almost all 
forms of illegal activity such as: illegal fishing, illegal logging, drug-production, drug-trafficking, 
weapon trade, booty, and properties confiscated or robbed from others. Many of them also have 
ruthless businesses including selling expired food and medicine (Africa Media, 1999).  
In terms of relationships, each of these warlords plays a significant role in attracting the 
support of numerous foreign networks of instability in the country. They have a close relationship 
with the money-lords who are the most active network. Even though they demonstrate enmity 
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towards each other, there is also an indirect correlation and coordination between them. For 
instance, when Barre Hiiraale and Morgan were fighting over the administration of the Kismayo 
city of Jubbaland, they still exchanged cash money and valuable properties (Gedonet.com. 2005). 
Moreover, the two are brothers-in-law. The same applies to many others who are mostly business 
partners rather than warlord friends.  
Recently, all of these warlords were selected to be members of the federal parliament 
(MPs), and are strong political stakeholders and decision-makers. Inside the HPFP, they endeavour 
to recruit more warlords and complicate parliamentary motions (SaadaalNews, 2005). Each of 
these warlords has the ambition of being a political leader or, at least, one of the wealthiest men in 
the country. They know that political leadership in Somalia can be a route to wealth, and vice 
versa. Recently, as they have realized that their ambitions are far-fetched, they strive to prevent 
the return of law and order to the country.  
Typology: Due to the above discussion, the typological category of the warlords is an actor 
and network of instability.   
 
4. 8: Parasite Networks 
New networks operating under each of the major actor and networks have recently appeared. 
For instance, there are groups of young boys (pre-teens and teenagers) who pretend they are Al-
Shabab police units. They wear uniforms that look like that of Al-Shabab’s division known as “Al-
Amniyat” which is trained as a local police task-force. These freelance youths equip themselves 
with lashes and pistols. They patrol the streets and markets where there is no other authority, with 
the intention to rob people and rape women in the name of Al-Shabab (NISA95, 2015).  
                                                          
95 Somali National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA). 
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Typically, these different groups are unidentified thugs disguised as the federal government’s 
tax-collectors and criminal investigation department (CID). They wear the uniform of the unit 
which they want to impersonate and print receipts of their own. Then, they charge the citizens 
levies, give them false receipts, and intimidate them until they pay some money (NISA, 2015)). 
Since all the faith-lords attempt to control the media, money, resources, women, children, 
youth, and ultimately the country’s sociopolitical and economic systems, they may assassinate 
anyone who challenges them. Under each one of the faith lords is a secret brigand devoted to 
eliminating their dissenters. For instance, Amniyat is the sharpshooter unit of Al-Shabab (Dorries, 
2014), even though it sometimes operates as a police force. Likewise, Gusa is a special branch of 
Al-Shababs secret forces whose duty is to plant bombs in public and private vehicles as well as 
public venues. This is not exclusive to Al-Shabab and the rest of the faith-lords, however. Each of 
the networks of stability and instability are protected by such brigades. For instance, Rohanta is a 
sniper unit for the federal president (Raad Raac, 2015; Caasimada, 2014; Garoweonline, 2014; 
Saadaal, 2012), while Lubanta is a secret unit hired by the leading money-lords to target and 
execute individuals who may become a threat to their businesses (Caasimada, 2014; Raad Raac, 
2015). It is also reported that each of the UN offices and Western forces, including the US and 
France, use special snipers and commando forces trained to target the leaders of their opponents 
(DunidaOnline, 2015; Peterson, 2014).  
These ruthless activities have already changed the morals and behaviour of the Somali 
people of any age. Today, most Somalis are either political or religious extremists. Either type of 
extremism leads to political instability, insecurity, resource unsustainability, and environmental 
degradation. There have been a number of studies conducted regarding socio-political and health 
problems among Somalis inside and outside the country. Ultimately, as a sociological category, a 
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new mental illness called “Somalization,” as a result of chaos, was discovered and named after 
Somalia. Somalization is a destructive and mayhem state of extreme confusion and disorder, which 
mostly affects the male persons suffering from prison or military-led trauma (Gorol and Mulley, 
2001; Sadock et al, 2007). That is why the vast majority of the Somali youth fall into forms of 
destabilization, such as piracy, terrorism, scamming, smuggling, trafficking, and others.   
 
4. 8. 1: Relationships among the Networks of Instability 
Maritime criminals cooperate with one another and commit crimes collectively, because their 
criminalities are interconnected, and they face common threats from security forces. Terrorist 
groups cannot survive without smugglers bringing weapons, money and manpower to them 
(Nasser, 2009). On the other hand, smugglers benefit from terrorists’ actions when they make 
states and navies thwarted and unstable. The most notable cooperation between smugglers and 
other marine criminals is that smugglers help marine terrorists and pirates by bringing them to 
their destinations (Murphy, 2007). Nowadays, there is a growing problem in narcotic trafficking 
through the Somalia basin. These traffickers are networking with others in various ocean routes 
such as Malta and the Panama Canal. Marine criminal networks of instability in Somalia learn the 
means of illegal trades via collaborating with those of Afghanistan and Panama. On the other side, 
it is reported that the pirates in Somalia have offered crash-program trainings and scholarships to 
pirate-students who came from Western Africa (International Human Rights Internships, 2015).   
          In Afghanistan, the drug-traffickers that export narcotic drugs from Afghanistan cooperate 
with the terrorist group called “Taliban.” There are also substantial concerns that NATO troops in 
Afghanistan cooperated with local drug-traffickers (Rotberg, 2009). This strengthens the rumour-
based view that no administrative institution is free from corruption and self-interest. This is 
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buttressed when one observes how drug-trafficking remains a highly lucrative trade despite 
tremendous efforts by the international community, both collectively and individually, to combat 
it. To follow the identification of marine drug-traffickers and their strategies, there is a need to 
understand and untie the networks of marine criminals. Marine criminality and marine trafficking 
are among the most harmful networks of instability, insecurity and unsustainability. Economically, 
all the networks of instability make money from their illegal businesses, but it is difficult to get 
concrete data on their income and how they spend/disperse. 
4. 8. 2: Typology: Indisputably, smugglers are actors and networks of instability. 
 
4. 9. 1: The Key Network Actors of Fishing Companies and Coast-Guards 
 In this heading, I highlight two key networks operating in Somali waters, being fishers, counter-
pirates and resource managers. I examine each of these actors’ backgrounds manoeuvres, motives, 
relations, and typology in a paragraph or more.  
4. 9. 2:  Somali National Fishing Company (SNFCO) is a fishing company which was 
established in 1981 as a part of a bilateral project between Italy and Somalia. SNFCO was created 
to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries. It utilizes the country’s marine 
natural resources to create “jobs and incentives for fishermen and coastal habitants, by increasing 
national economy as whole ... through fishing, processing, packaging, local-selling, exporting 
and recycling the nature with environmentally friendly fishing method” (Ibrahim, 2013, p1). 
   The company generates income and acts a productive private company through fishing. 
Its motivations are based on economic development at the individual, family, local, provincial, 
and national levels. Due to the shortage of qualified professionals, however, the company 
operates in an ad-hoc manner. At a national level, its registration work papers are yet to be 
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completed. It is the federal government’s fault for not requiring it to do so (Raxanreeb, 2014). 
Due to its initiatives, including the use of resources in an environmentally friendly way, I 
categorize SNFCO   as a network of stability, provided it proves to be law-abiding and 
cooperative with the federal government. 
4. 9. 3: Somali Marine Resource Development and Conservation Centre (SMRDCC) is the 
company actively engaged in promoting business opportunities, and attracting foreign investment 
in the absence of an effective central government. The company has suffered due to a lack of 
reliable fish markets, and a lack of permanent, systematic fishing schedules. Furthermore, it 
caused the fisheries to split with their respective local communities. The latter precipitated a lack 
of co-ordination among artisanal fisheries, a lack of communication facilities for artisanal 
fisheries in rural and urban areas, a lack of public awareness, and a lack of appreciation for 
progress. All of these factors contributed to the company’s diminished financial capacity, which 
hindered attempts at management and plans for data collection. 
In fact, the diversity and abundance of marine resources has, over the years, led to the 
development of a range of fishing activities geared to harvest the variety and diversity of fish 
species present on the coast. These have included industrial, subsistence, and artisanal fishers, 
these being the most common types of fishers in the country. Furthermore, the unsustainable 
development and activities related to overconsumption of resources have demonstrated negative 
impacts on the environment. Domestic wastes are dumped directly into the sea so that these waters 
are sometimes used as latrines and garbage dumps. Though the aforementioned types of fishing 
are common in the country, it is not always easy to distinguish between the different fishery sectors 
and the methods they use. This is not only because specific definitions are lacking, but also because 
there is considerable overlap between the sectors, in terms of both the type of species harvested 
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and the method to harvest them. This not only leads to frequent environmental damage, but may 
also make it difficult to assess any future projects in environmental sustainability.   
Obviously, these fishing operations are largely opportunistic. Reef-associated line-fish are 
caught with hand-lines and comprise a wide variety of species that are mostly placed on ice and 
consumed locally, or at least, within one day's drive from the port. Sharks are taken with gillnets 
and lines, predominantly for their fins which are removed at sea (UNEP, 2006). Most of the 
carcasses are then dumped and wasted, although at times the flesh is salted and dried before being 
exported to other countries such as Kenya and the UAE (UNEP, 2006).  
The limited survey data available for demersal fish stocks throughout the continental shelf 
area presents a serious challenge to estimating sustainable levels of exploitation and the extent of 
environmental damage incurred. All the studies unanimously found that there is rapid decline of 
fish and other marine ecosystems, however ((Young, 2012). Obviously it is anticipated that, by 
pollution, the highest densities of both demersal and pelagic fish stocks and poisoned fish will be 
found in the up-welling enriched waters from Kismayo to Puntland. 
Since its establishment, the SMRDCC has been suffering financial deficits. It obtains no 
funding from any source, because it was designed to produce its funding through self-sufficient 
means. However, due to lack of personnel, qualification, technology, and capacity building, the 
company lacks both professionalism and financial stability (Young, 2012). As such, its 
performance is poor. Yet, I categorize it as a network of stability due to its initial intention declared 
in its mission and vision. 
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4.10: Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I evaluated and analysed the actors and networks competing to influence 
Somalia’s politics, economics, and society at a national level. I categorized these networks into 
instability, potential stability and stability. Three key governmental networks of stability seem to 
be overwhelmed by three key networks of instability while three non-governmental networks of 
stability and potential stability are distressed as a result of the tussle. Each of the federal 
government’s institutional branches, the Judiciary, the Executive, and the Legislative is an actor 
and network of stability but have been hindered by warlords, warmonger faith-lords, and self-
oriented capitalistic money-lords.   
 Faith-lords are divided into warmongers and peace-lovers who are, respectively, networks of 
instability and networks of stability. The same applies to money-lords who are divided into import-
exporters and local retailers who are, respectively, networks of instability and networks of stability. 
Warlords and minor networks that are parasites on others are collective actors and networks of 
instability that are an obstacle to security and environmental protection.  
Table 2: National Institutional and Non-Institutional Actors and Networks 
Name 
 
Background Maneuvers Motives Dissection Relationship Legality Typology 
Legislative Somalia Transitional 
to activeness 
Political 3 internal 
Blocks 
Globally 
reciprocal 
but 
nationally 
loose  
Governmental   Potential 
Stability 
Executive96 Somalia Transitional 
to activeness 
Political/Management Various 
Ministries 
Globally 
reciprocal 
but 
nationally 
loose 
Governmental    
Potential 
Stability 
Judiciary Somalia Transitional 
to activeness 
National jurisdiction 3 Courts Globally 
reciprocal 
but 
nationally 
loose 
Governmental   Potential 
Stability  
                                                          
96 Ministries and other governmental Institutions. 
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Money-
Lords97 
Somalia Destructively 
very active 
Economic 3 groups 
based on 
economic 
classes 
Secret 
relations 
with 
foreigner 
Legal/Illegal Instability 
Warlords98 
 
Somalia Destructively 
active 
Political  12 warriors: 
8 of Hawiye 
& 4 of 
Darod    
Gradually 
Diminishing  
Illegal  Instability  
Faith-Lords99 Somalia Destructively 
very active 
groups & 
positive 
groups 
Political 4 
warmongers 
& 3 peace-
lovers   
Influential  Illegal Instability 
& 
stability   
Fishers & 
Coastguards100 
Somalia Passive and 
hidden 
agendas 
Social and 
Environmental 
Development  
Unclear  Fragile  Licensed Potential   
Stability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97 Money-Lords include companies and individuals who endeavor in money-making regardless of the legality and morality of its 
sources and means. They identify themselves as independent business companies and wealthy individuals whose intention is to 
help the society. Most of them run the business of Hawala- money-transfer, charcoal export, wildlife export, fish export, hotels, air 
agencies, telecommunication centers, land-transportation services, drug-trafficking, and importing food and medicines. Their 
objectives are to control the country both politically and economically. 
98 Each of the three main clans of Somalia; Hawiye, Darod and Isaq is protected and ruled by self-styled warrior individuals of 
whom each is well-armed with hundreds of clan-based militias. They identify themselves as “Community-leaders”. Each of them 
is divided into tens of networks and sub-networks. Hawiye’s warlords, for instance, is divided into 15 groups of whom each is 
rival to the rest. In this chapter, I focus on the Hawiye’s warlords because they occupy the capital city and dominate the federal 
government. They are also effective in the South-Central province. 
99 Faith-Lords are religious cults that compete over the influence of the people. Even though they are internally divided into dozens 
of segments, they can be identified as clusters of alliances. They identify themselves as “purely religious schools”, even though 
most of them are radicals and terrorists. Each is trying to indoctrinate the public, bring under its feet, and control them forever. 
Their objectives are personal political and economic gain rather than religious teaching.  
100 Including Somali Maritime Resources Research Center, Somali Marine Products, and several others. 
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Chapter Five 
5. Provincial States and Local Communities: National Vs Provincial, Intra- 
Provincials, Institutions, and Local Communities  
5.0: Introduction 
 The Harmonized Draft Constitution, also known as the CNLP101 orders the HPFP102 to 
nominate a national commission to determine the number and boundaries of the Federal Member 
States (FMS). FMS delineations should be based on the boundaries of the administrative regions 
as they existed before 1991, and the amalgamation of two or more regions may form an FMS 
(Article 49). Prior to the breakdown of the central government, Somalia was comprised of eighteen 
regions (Sacco, nd; Lewis, 1996). These regions are no longer united, however; each is controlled 
by a certain clan-based fiefdom. Although there are a dozen local autonomous administrations in 
Somalia, in this dissertation, I follow the system adopted by the United Nations, which divides the 
country into three Provincial Administrations: Somaliland, Puntland, and South-central plus the 
Federal administration.  
In this chapter, I discuss the relationship and coordination efforts between the federal 
government and each of the three provinces, provincial governmental institutions, inter and intra-
provincial cooperation, provincial stakeholders, trans-provincial networks of instabilities, local 
communities, and occasional institutions. Methodologically, the first part has no sections or sub-
headings. The next three sections, which address the aforementioned three provinces, are 
segmented into backgrounds, maneuvers, motives, dissections, relations, and typology, while the 
last two are addressed generally and collectively to provide general information.  
 
                                                          
101 Constitution on the National Legislative Procedures.  
102 the House of the People of the Federal Parliament. 
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5. 1: Relationship between Provincial Governments with the Federal 
Administration 
The national jurisdiction requires each of the provincial states to respect others, promote unity 
among citizens, be cooperative, and protect the limits of its powers and that of other governments. 
In order to achieve those requirements, each of the provincial states should “inform governments 
of other levels of policies and activities it implements within its boundaries which may have an 
impact on the areas of other levels” (Article 51 (c), CNLP). The federal executives and those of 
the FMSs are required to work on strengthening national unity, security, national socio-economic 
development, and common market policies of the country (Articles 51/52, CNLP). This is how the 
national jurisdiction encourages open dialogue and reconciliation in post-conflict Somalia. It 
anticipates recurrent territorial conflicts over water sources, agriculture, pasture, and forestry. 
Therefore, it encourages the traditional leaders to partake in the peace processes at each of the 
local, provincial, and national levels.  
In the spirit of inter-governmental cooperation, Article 53 of the CNLP orders the federal 
government to consult the FMSs on negotiations relating to foreign aid, trade, treaties, or other 
major issues related to international agreements. Furthermore, Article 54 states that the powers 
and responsibilities concerning the matters of foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship, 
immigration, and monetary policy are exclusively the authority of the federal government.  
It is preferable to divide the country into three provinces of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-
Central. Each one of these provinces has a coastline which is double that of the neighboring 
country, being Kenya. Kenya’s coastline stretches up to 640 km (Sigana, 2009; Nageon, 2007; 
Parkin, et al., 2002), while that of Somaliland is 850 km (Somaliland Territory, 2000), Puntland is 
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1600 km (Puntland State of Somalia, 2007; Bahadur, 2011)103, and South-central is over 1200 km 
(Bahadur, 2011). 
In each of the three provinces, there are both visible and invisible conflicting stakeholders that 
comprise networks of potential stability, although they often act as networks of instability. These 
are the fishing companies, industrial polluters, private security-guards, and organized pirates who 
are active at the provincial level. Provincial governmental and non-governmental institutions are 
networks of stability as long as they are cooperative. The President of the federal administration 
has been striving to control the country’s recognized and non-recognized provinces. The first 
article of his mandate in his term was to apply and expand the federal system, which is new to the 
country, by establishing formal provinces and building strong policies and institutions through a 
bottom-up approach (Federal Republic of Somali, 2012).  
In the beginning, the President was thought to be intentionally spoiling the federal system for 
personal gain. Later on, it became clear that he did not, in fact, want the foundation of any province 
without his instruction and leadership. He wants all the leaders and administrators of each province 
to be members of his party, being DamuJadid, so that he may have power over them (FAO, 2006). 
In the three years he was in the office, the President impeded the formation of Jubbaland in 
Kismayo city, and in the Galmudug State which was intended to form in Dhusamareb city (UN 
Security Council, 2015). Before that, the President politically boycotted Galmudug State which 
was formed in Galk’ayo city in 2004 (Security Council, 2015). He also destabilized Puntland by 
encouraging sub-states within it, such as Khatumo and Makhir (Dhanaanmedia.com, 2015). Within 
                                                          
103 The marine sovereignties claimed by either of Puntland and Somaliland state are in dispute. The latter claims several sq. kms 
that are under the control of the former. As a result of this dispute there is an overlapping. kms in the measurement of the coastal 
zones. It also happens that sometimes Puntland claims shorter than 1600 km. For instance, in one of the drafts of its marine policy, 
Puntland wrote that it governs over 800 km on the Indian Ocean and 500 km on the Gulf of Aden (Peter, 1999) which makes 
1,300sq. kms only. 
174 
 
Somaliland, the President also encouraged the formation of the Adal sub-state 
(Dhanaanmedia.com, 2015). All of these instances indicate that the head of the nation does not 
support the federal system.  
The relationship between the Somali federal government and its provincial states varies from 
state to state104. Since both Somaliland and Puntland were established before the Federal 
government, they undermine it. For instance, Somaliland insists that it is more effective and 
efficient than the Federal administration, and any comparison with it is an offense to the dignity 
of Somaliland. Hence, Somalilanders argue for a right of secession because they cannot join with 
a state that they believe to be fragile and inferior to them. They believe that the federal government 
and the rest of the Somali states are poorer, weaker, and more backward than their own. So far, the 
only discussions initiated between the Federal government and Somaliland are on civil aviation 
and airways (AMISOM, 2015). 
Furthermore, Somaliland has been repeatedly condemned for destabilizing Somalia’s federal 
administration. It supports and sends terrorist militias to South-central Somalia, while, on the other 
hand, members of the federal government continuously spoil the country’s political agenda using 
‘destroy from within’ tactics (Allafrica.com, 2010). “Senior officials in Somaliland's intelligence 
organization were actively involved in aiding Al-Shabab terrorists, reflective of Somaliland's 
secretive support for terror groups who destabilize southern Somalia” (Groweonline.com, 2010). 
Somaliland plays a significant role in combating piracy. It has mobilized an organized coast-
guard force, which routinely carries out marine patrols in Somaliland’s disputed 180-mile coastline 
(Guilfoyle, 2013). Compared with other provinces, most NGOs in Somaliland are licensed, under 
contract or other forms of official agreements with the autonomous administration. The same 
                                                          
104 The three states discussed in this dissertation are Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central. 
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policy applies to the local and foreign fishing companies, albeit with limited authority and 
knowledge. Somaliland faces a major challenge when it comes to its relationship with the rest of 
Somalia. The federal government, the autonomous state of Puntland, and the South-central 
administrations are apprehensive about the recognition of Somaliland by some Western countries. 
Finally, Puntland has mobilized a considerable contingent of coastguard officers, named as 
“Maritime Police Force [PMPF]).” Even though this contingent was mobilized to be a strong local 
counter-piracy force, its functionality and quality is inconsistent (Fowler, 2013). As a part of this 
effort, Puntland issued an Anti-Piracy Law (IPL) in 2010. IPL can be considered the first of its 
kind in Somalia (Farole, 2012). Subsequently, Puntland proposed that the Federal administration 
establish a federal level coastal police force (Omar, 2012) to expedite the enforcement of the 
federal system, which Puntland perceived to be the only way to combat piracy. The federal 
government brushed aside this proposal, however, perhaps because it is suspicious of Puntland’s 
political agenda regarding the federal system.  
There are constant physical conflicts and political disputes between Puntland and the Galmudug 
region of South-central. This is likewise the case between Puntland and Somaliland. Yet, compared 
with South-central regions, Puntland and Somaliland have in common the status of being relatively 
stable. That is why the UNISOM’s operations never reach them. These hostile relationships are, 
however, a direct threat to the implementation of the country's federal system. The political rivalry 
may deepen the country's political crisis.  
Unlike Somaliland and Puntland, South-central Somalia is both politically and socially 
unstable, and as such, is not in a position to focus on marine policy issues. Currently, it is divided 
into four clan-based fiefdoms; Jubbaland, Mogadishu, Galmudug, and Hiran & Shabelle. Each of 
these fiefdoms is seeking some form of recognition as a potential province (PP). The latter seems 
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gradually giving it up, while the other three are near to triumph. The federal government’s 
recognition of these three provinces fluctuates. When it gives recognition to one of them, it revokes 
it the next week. The federal President is struggling to control their progress as provinces, but the 
local residents are struggling to adopt the self-governing system (Hassan, 2015). As I explicate in 
the next three headings, the major challenge to establishing intra-provincial and federal-provincial 
relationships is the mistrust among the adversary clans.  
 
5. 2: South-Central  
  5. 2: A. General Introduction: The term South-Central is used by the UN agencies involved 
in Somalia’s political, policy, aid, and humanitarian activities to describe the third province after 
Somaliland and Puntland. South-Central is the main part of the country where the structures of 
governance are still missing. It is the only region the international community concentrates on for 
stabilization. Within South-Central, there are at least five sub-provinces, each of which is in the 
process of forming its own provincial state comparable to the Somaliland and Puntland provinces. 
The UN organizations prefer to address these sub-provinces under the discussion of South-Central 
for three reasons: 1) they are still in the making and not yet announced, 2) they have the same 
geopolitical characteristics, and 3) their policy and management systems are unpredictable and 
uncertain as long as their political status is fragile (World Bank, 2014).  
Due to the complex socio-political situation in this part of the country, there are no means 
of enforcing rules and regulations pertaining to social, political, ecological and economic activities. 
Instead, there has been ongoing chaos, conflict, and vandalism in the land and sea territories of the 
South-Central and far beyond. This part of the country has been divided into fiefdoms controlled 
by Al-Shabab, clan-based armed militias, and a federal government which is limited to certain 
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zones of the country’s capital city (see Somali map below). In South-Central, secular political 
actors are not effective.  
The geographical boundaries of South-Central are yet to be demarcated. Most likely, any 
demarcation process in this part of the country will create new forms of socio-political conflict. 
The vast majority of its residents are nomads who do not recognize border limitations. They and 
their livestock move from place to place to seek grassland and water. Numerous disputes over 
territorial integrity and other forms of land ownership have occurred as a result.105 Even though 
the federal government has not yet recognized the provincial government of South-Central, the 
local residents are struggling to adopt self-governing systems based on a bottom-up approach. It 
is therefore hard to know if they will establish a unified province called “South-Central.” 
 There are complicated political challenges, where each of the local political forces struggles to 
form an autonomous state, according to their own way of serving their group’s interest. In certain 
territories, there are several groups with similar interests, yet each struggles to form a new 
autonomous state to serve personal or familial interests. The various political clusters often argue 
over the name, leadership, administration, and capital city for any autonomous state to be formed 
(Kydd, 2005). As of today, there are five potential clan-based fiefdoms, each of which is seeking 
some form of recognition.  
Most of South-Central’s districts are still controlled by Al-Shabab, and as such, political 
turmoil, social instability, and economic fluctuation is still prevalent (Human rights Watch, 2014; 
                                                          
105 New disputes have already begun as the federalism was legalized. The national jurisdiction emphasizes, encourages and 
legalizes reciprocal relationship among the Federal Member States (FMSs) and between the FMSs and the federal. It also spreads 
the federal system based on freedom of choice and voluntary choice of FMSs through self-confidence “(a) Every level of 
government shall enjoy the confidence and support of the people; (b) Power is given to the level of government where it is likely 
to be most effectively exercised; (c) The existence and sustainability of a relationship of mutual cooperation and support between 
the governments of the Federal Member States, and between the governments of the Federal Member States and the Federal 
Government, in the spirit of national unity;  (d) Every part of the Federal Republic of Somalia shall enjoy similar levels of services 
and a similar level of support from government; (e) Fair distribution of resources; (f) The responsibility for the raising of revenue 
shall be given to the level of government where it is likely to be most effectively exercised (Article 50). 
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African Development Bank Group, 2015a; 2003b). Even if South-Central is liberated from Al 
Shabaab, its geographical boundaries are likely to create new forms of sociopolitical and economic 
conflicts (African Development Bank Group, 2015). Furthermore, even if the border issue is 
settled, it will be difficult to control them because nomads, shepherds and camel herders who 
comprise the majority of the residents of these regions do not understand borders and their rules. 
  In order to identify the networks of instability in South-Central, I divide South-Central into 
Jubbaland, Mogadishu, Galmudug, South-west, and Hiran potential provinces. The latter two are 
yet to be established and inaugurated, thus, I do not address them in this discussion. Then, I divide 
the province into three territories: 1) Kismayo of Jubbaland extending from Ras Kamboni to 
Marka; 2) Mogadishu territory extending from Marka to Eildher, and 3) Hobyo territory extending 
from Eildher to Eyl – off the border of Puntland (Maritime Code of 1959). I call these territories 
and maritime zonings Potential Provinces (PP). In the discussion, I begin by highlighting the 
political position, the condition of the artisanal fisheries, and the trade fishing companies. Then, I 
highlight the security situation in the maritime zone of the province, followed by the key provincial 
governmental institutions and local NGOs. After that, I will address the networks of instability and 
potential stability. Among these actors and networks are provincial fishing companies, fish 
processing factories, privately organized coast-guards, illegal fishers, and pirates.   
 
5. 2: B. Jubbaland PP 
A. Background: Jubbaland is a potential province (PP) consisting of three regions; Lower Jubba, 
Middle Jubba and Gedo. Its structure results from the 1925 agreement between Great Britain and 
Italy (Kaplan, 1977). It stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian border, and it is lined up 
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alongside the border between Somalia and Kenya. Therefore, Jubbaland shares 424 miles of its 
(700 sq. kms) border with Kenya, which is the same border that Somalia shares with Kenya, and 
approximately 60 sq. kms with Ethiopia. Jubbaland has a total area of 87,000 sq. kms equal to 
(33,000 sq. kms) (Osman, 2016; 1993). In 2005, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
estimated the population of Jubbaland to be 953,045 (UNHCR, 2009; UNSC, 2005).  
B. Economic Base: Foreign donors finance Jubbaland’s administration regularly and 
irregularly. Among the donors are the USAID Somalia, UNDP, FAO, and some other occasional 
INGOS and RNGOs. Domestically, the administration gets revenue from the PP’s seaport, airport, 
agricultural production, charcoal, livestock, and other natural resource sectors. Jubbaland is thus 
the most productive region in Somalia (Rift Valley Institute, 2013). It is rich in agriculture, 
aquaculture, livestock, and wildlife. The lower Jubba River, the third deepest river in Africa, 
(Duka, 2007) runs through it (Rift Valley Institute, 2013). This river feeds many farms and 
development projects. Before 1991, there were tremendously valuable projects running in the 
region. For instance, the Burdhubo project, Bardhere Dam, Markabley Research, Dajuma Crash 
Farming Program, Fanole Rice production project, Mugambe tea production, Marerey Sugar 
Project, and many others were the main economic sources of the revolutionary regime from 1969 
to 1991(Rift Valley Institute, 2013). As a result, this PP has always been the center of land and 
marine disputes.  
C. Administrative Capacity: Jubbaland has selected a President and Vice-President, though 
this is still under dispute, and the government is in the process of establishing a legislative house. 
The major obstacle to the establishment of Jubbaland is that it receives orders from various 
sources: Ethiopia, Kenya, Puntland, the Federal government of Somalia, and numerous local 
politicians- each with their own motives. Locally, there are complex clan relationships, wherein 
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each seeks to conquer as large an area of the coast as possible, and the land of the PP. These factors 
jeopardize the state’s advancement, and create open-ended civil wars within the province, and with 
the adjacent potential province known as South-Western. The two rival potential provinces accuse 
each other of land grabbing (Hersi, 2015).   
 Since the collapse of Somalia’s central government, the denizens of this potential province have 
suffered recurrent attacks, occupations, confiscations, genocides, robberies, tortures, and 
humiliations by warriors coming from other regions of the country. As a result, there have been 
various attempts to establish an autonomous administration for the province.  In the earliest 
attempts, Jubbaland’s capital city was chosen to be Buale city (Garowe Online, 2012), but being 
the largest of the province’s cities, Kismayo became the de facto capital city (Muhumed, 2011; 
O'Kasick, 2007), made more formal after 2013, when the Juba Interim Administration was 
officially established and recognized (Garowe Online, 2015). 
The PP’s current problems date to the origin of Somalia’s civil war, which was practically 
only between two clans, the Hawiye and Darod, but which damaged almost all of the lives and 
livelihoods of Somalia. Jubbaland, particularly Kismayo city, has always been at the center of the 
conflict as the two rival clans were fighting over the region (Rift Valley Institute, 2013). Currently, 
the PP is under the control of Darod, while Hawiye dominates Mogadishu and the federal 
government. Consequently, the Darod administration does not trust that of Hawiye. Additionally, 
internally, in Kismayo, there are two rival Darod sub-clans, the Marehan and Ogaden (Throup, 
2012). Neither one trusts the other. As a result, there have been physical wars and political tussles 
between these two local clans since 2005 (International Crisis Group, 2013).  
D. Maneuvers: The local communities in this PP have endured severe socio-political and 
economic disruption by clan militias originating from the central regions of the country known as 
181 
 
Galmudug. Clan militias from Galmudug have attained such power that they occupy the riverbanks 
and charge fees to anyone who intends to get drinking water from the river. Local residents of both 
fisher and non-fisher communities face these problems. After thorough analysis, in the late 1990s 
researchers concluded that addressing this problem requires a broader perspective on resource 
management, with a focus on the marine environment. In order to overcome these power tussles, 
certain NGOs took tough measures to study the most significant resource conflicts in the region. 
They focused on finding strategies to facilitate coastal land and water resources to fulfill their 
potential for sustainable development (Besteman nd).  
The NGOs’ study was, however, interrupted by civil wars in the area, which forced them 
to leave. Subsequently there was less direct concern on the part of NGOs. As such, the local elders 
decided to defend their resources by taking forceful actions. Besteman (nd) describes how elders 
of the Gosha (the riverbanks of the Jubbaland and Shabelle districts) community did not allow 
subjugation by the Somali pastoralists to their essential identity.  They tried to claim their rights to 
equal status as individuals, not as a ‘minority group’ (Besteman, nd). This kind of conflict first 
happened during the 1970s when the government resettled more than a million internal 
environmental refugees in the Gosha zones (Besteman, nd). The rapid integration between the 
local denizens and the newcomers has significantly changed communities’ cultures and lifestyles. 
The government convinced the local elders that changing the local residents’ social activities in 
the short term would initiate a sustainable form of development in the long term.  
In the Kismayo marine territory, several fish species take seasonal expeditions to its EEZ 
(Jensen, 2012). These species seasonally migrate from the Indian Ocean to the Kismayo zone, 
leaving behind their eggs and juveniles when returning (Raxanreeb, 2014). Therefore, the Kismayo 
zone is full of both domestic and immigrant fish species. There is, however, a series of serious 
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environmental problems which have existed since before the collapse of the Somali central 
government.  Just like in the capital city Mogadishu, in the coastal zone of Kismayo raw sewage 
is directly discharged into the coastal waters. The discharge is a severe hazard to human health and 
marine natural resources (Lehr, et al., 2007). 
In terms of marine security in this province, there is less piracy and marine terror activities 
than in the rest of the country’s seawaters. While hi-jacking of seafarers was increasing from 2000 
to 2006, it has fallen since then (Calvani, 2008). A community-based movement known as Somali 
National Volunteer Coastguards against insecurity began in 2005 in Koyema Island off Kismayo 
city (Lehr, et al., 2007). Although the movement did tremendous work, it seems the reduction of 
piracy can be attributed more to climatic conditions, and a local environment which did not 
welcome them (Murphy, 2014).    
 C. Motives: Due to the fact that in South-Central there is no effective government and the civil 
war still continues, each district has its own motive and plan. In each region, there are several clans 
and sub-clans competing over its resources and administration. Jubbaland’s current administration 
seeks to undermine the federal administration (World Bank, 2014).  
 This effort is spearheaded by the Ogaden106 clan that resides in three regions in Eastern Africa: 
North-Eastern (NFD) of Kenya, Ogaden region of Ethiopia and a part of Jubbaland of Somalia 
(International Crisis Group, 2013). The non-Ogaden residents in Jubbaland are in doubt as to 
whether the Ogaden clan is planning to strengthen its power in all the three Eastern African states, 
in order for it to dominate the rest of Jubbaland’s residents. The Marehan clan wants the Darod 
clan to reconcile with the Hawiye clan while minimizing both Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interference. 
The Marehan clan is loyal to both the federal administration and the South-central province. 
                                                          
106 The current leader of Jubbaland is originated from the Ogaden clan. 
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Therefore, it seems difficult for Jubbaland PP to demonstrate the stability and self-sufficiency 
necessary unless Ethiopia and Kenya stay out of its affairs.   
B. Relationships: Instead of establishing and maintaining a reciprocal relationship with the 
federal government of Somalia, Jubbaland relies on instructions and recommendations issued by 
either Ethiopia or Kenya (International Crisis Group, 2013). Both militarily and administratively, 
the most reliable body in Jubbaland’s capital city, Kismayo, are the Kenyan troops known as 
Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF).  When it comes to sociopolitical, economic, and security issues, 
it has been observed that Jubbaland does not take a step without guidance from Ethiopia’s 
ministries of foreign affairs and defence (Arman, 2015). This indicates Jubbaland does not 
cooperate with either the federal or South-Central provincial administration. Jubbaland does have 
a close relationship with Puntland, however, and this relationship is clan-based.  
C. Typology: The Jubbaland potential province does not cooperate with the federal administration. 
Furthermore, it has a series of internal conflicts resulting in sociopolitical instability. Yet, it can 
be categorized as an actor and network of potential stability. Since it is still in its infancy, it is 
expected to be vulnerable to chaos and confusion.   
    
5. 2: 3. Mogadishu PP 
  A. Background: Mogadishu (also known as Banadir) is Somalia’s capital city. It is the 
largest and most populated city in the country. Since gaining independence, it was recognized as 
the 18th independent region of Somalia’s regions. It had the country’s most sophisticated and 
modern infrastructure including the largest seaport, airport, roads, hotels, and main markets.  
 Since early 1991, there has been no official and effective governmental administration in the 
city. Throughout the 1990s, Mogadishu was in a state of chaos and lawlessness. From 2000 to 
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2012, there have been transitional governments stationed there, but they have never governed 
beyond their compounds. It was only in 2012 that the current non-transitional federal government 
was established. Yet this administration cannot operate beyond the Presidential palace and the road 
to the international airport and seaport. That amounts to four sq. kms. The next two sq. kms are a 
protectorate zone for UNISOM. Several international embassies (except that Ethiopia has one in 
each of the three provinces) are located in these six sq. kms (TesfaNews, 2015). The rest of the 
city and its suburban areas are under the control of different actors and networks of 
instability/instability; both warmongers and peace-lovers may live in the same neighborhoods, but 
pursue their interests separately. Thus, with the exception of these six sq. kms, there is no 
substantial administrative functioning. The local communities have grown accustomed to 
managing their own affairs.    
 In Mogadishu, coastal community107 stakeholders include the organized bodies and individuals 
that carry out regular activities on and around the coast, such as fisheries, the tourism sector, port 
services, sea-shell-sellers, local traders, divers, and/or swimmers. These individuals and bodies are 
basically actors and networks of stability, but they occasionally participate in hostile actors, either 
for economic or political motives. Each actor directly or indirectly approaches and cooperates with 
other actors and networks to form temporary coalitions and alliances for economic-based self-
interest and other means of well-being. Indeed, “the passion in politics comes from conflicting 
senses of fairness, justice, rightness, and goodness” (Stone, 1988, p. 25). In Somalia, most of the 
political associations believe that politics is about cheating and plotting against others (Farah, 
2011). Furthermore, both people’s and networks’ political points of view can be inconsistent 
                                                          
107 The national maritime code of 1959 (Articles 1 & 2) recognizes the demesne of Marka with territorial limits from Eil Gaschere 
to Danane as under the municipal county of Mogadishu. 
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(Luca, 2008). That is why most political analysts are in agreement that the case of Somalia is 
extremely difficult to analyze (Luca, 2008).    
  
Maneuvers: In South-Central, particularly the Mogadishu zone, there is no active 
administration other than NGOs, warlords, money-lords, faith-lords, and the federal government. 
Since the federal government is the country’s national administration, NGOs can be considered 
the only sociopolitical and economic actors and networks of either potential stability or stability, 
as they act as the PP’s official administrators. There are numerous local NGOs that gain contracts 
from some of the INGOs. Their activities, however, are not long lasting; they may exist for a period 
of time, die unexpectedly, and then continue operating under a different or the same name. 
Therefore, when identifying one or more of them in my study (e.g. SARACEN), I look at them as 
examples of actors and networks of instability, because presumably the current ones may disappear 
over time, and others appear. Daugbjerg argues that “network is a relatively ad hoc policy making 
structure in which a large, and to an extent unpredictable, number of conflicting interests 
participate” (Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 24). 
The main factor which causes instability within NGOs is any system that attracts 
sociopolitical and economic actors and networks of instability. They directly and indirectly feed 
and encourage them by giving sub-contracts to warlords, money-lords, and religious leaders 
knowingly and unknowingly (Netabay, 2007). The Mogadishu region became a hub for a myriad 
complex actors and networks of instability, and as such, the zone has not stabilized since the 
collapse of the central government.   
 Economic Base: The international NGOs are directly funded by various states and non-state 
institutions. In order to implement projects in the Mogadishu zone, where they cannot operate 
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themselves, they give sub-contracts to the local NGOs. That is how LNGOs maintain their budgets 
and financial status. 
Before the war, the production capacity in the Mogadishu zone was estimated at 5,000 
tonnes of fish per year (Somali Fish Society, 2010). Currently, due to the lack of infrastructure and 
means to reach export markets, the actual production is about 2,000 tonnes per year (Somali Fish 
Society, 2010). There are several trawlers owned by the Somali Federal Government, operating in 
Somali waters and landing their catch in foreign ports. Their annual catch is not known. Illegal 
fishing with sweeping trawlers has been observed.  
 Motives: In the Mogadishu zone, there are divergent motives in different sociopolitical and 
economic sectors. It is where the majority of the actors and networks of instability operate as a 
safe haven for criminals (International Crisis Group, 2013). Each of these actors and networks has 
its own motive and agenda in the political system of the PP as a stakeholder. Some of these 
networks are deemed to have no clear motive other than to spoil other agendas (International Crisis 
Group, 2013).  
 Relationships: Mogadishu’s networks have random relations with various LNGOs and INGOs. 
It is where most of the INGOs implement both humanitarian and development projects. Unlike the 
rest of the provincial and prospected potential states, Mogadishu’s complex actors and networks 
have never declared a direct relationship with Ethiopia and Kenya. But it seems that each of these 
actors and networks is secretly connected to Ethiopia, as demonstrated by a number of factors. 
First, Ethiopia has an embassy and consulate in Mogadishu. Second, the federal government gives 
special treatment and preference to the Ethiopia’s embassy and ambassador over the rest of the 
embassies and even over the country’s federal administration. Finally, Ethiopia’s embassy and 
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consulate are located inside the Presidential palace and the Ethiopia’s flag is elevated over that of 
Somalia (Arman, 2015).    
 Typology: Even though the Mogadishu territorial zone is where there are the most complicated 
networks of instability, it can still be categorized as an actor and network of potential stability. The 
enforcement of law and order are needed to ensure its stability.     
 
5. 2: D. Galmudug State PP 
A. Background: The process of establishing the Galmudug state is in progress. Its 
stakeholders include: Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’, Al-shabab, DamuJadid, Puntland province, the 
Federal government, Ethiopian army, and several sub-clans fighting over its administration both 
politically and physically. Galmudug consists of Galgadud and Mudug regions, neither of which 
has been stable since 1986, which was four years prior to the civil war. Indeed, the civil war in 
Somalia originated in these two regions (Global Security.com, 2016).  
 B. Economic Base: The federal government is the primary sponsor of the Galmudug 
administration. It is not yet clear that the PP receives funds from any other source. In terms of local 
resources, Galmudug is rich in livestock resources. Every year, thousands of livestock heads are 
exported to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Even though this region has a large coast, local fishing 
activities are very minimal. Only in the Hobyo city of the Mudug region are unorganized artisanal 
fishing activities. These have been growing since piracy emerged in Galmudug and Puntland in 
2010. The local community concentrates on animal husbandry and does not participate in fishing. 
Thus, its main income sources are livestock, trade, and remittance sent from the Western countries 
by relatives (Xuseen, 2015). Therefore, there is no clear data on its economy.   
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C. Maneuvers: Socio-politically, each of the six aforementioned stakeholders and the 
various local conflicting clans endeavour to be the ruler of the Galmudug’s two regions. They have 
not been stable since 1984. Clan-based conflicts can be described as a chronic disease in the area. 
The Ethiopian military and intelligence forces are active, especially in the Galgadud region. 
Perhaps this is what causes much of the Galmudug’s population to suffer from mental illnesses 
(Xuseen, 2015). As a result, most of these regions’ youth go to the neighbouring Puntland for three 
main reasons: to travel abroad as a stowaway, to be recruited as pirates, or to join the Al-Shabab 
for a living.   
Motives: There are several rival warrior clans. These clans’ main motives are grabbing or 
protecting zones of grasslands. Furthermore, the two regions became the primary target of the 
Ethiopian forces that are heavily embroiled in Somalia’s politics, and patrol this region to avoid 
terrorist activities (Bissell, et al, 1984). From time to time, Ethiopian forces ambush the region’s 
residents or create clan-based conflicts among them. For instance, on June 2nd, 2015, a conflict 
erupted after the Liu Police forces of Ethiopia invaded two villages of Galgadud region, which 
resulted in the deaths of more than 90 civilians (Horseedmedia.com, 2015). These incursions are 
a regular part of conflicts since 1992, a year after the collapse of the Somali government.  
Relationship: Galmudug has no mentionable relationship with anybody. The potential 
province’s relationship is limited to individual relations which are neither permanent nor official. 
For instance, each of its stakeholders, such as Al-Shabab and DamuJadid are only delegates from 
the Mogadishu potential province. Since Mogadishu is the country’s capital city, most of the actors 
and network of instability is headquartered and operated there either openly or secretly. When it 
comes to livestock exports and food imports, the PP uses Somaliland’s seaports and sometimes 
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those of Puntland. This is based on a mutual trade interest. There are also volatile relationships 
between Ethiopian forces and the local elders in this potential province (Arman, 2015).  
Typology: The Galmudug potential province is one of the most hostile zones in Somalia, 
but it can become an actor and network of stability upon the establishment of Somalia’s 
governance system.  
 
5.3: Puntland 
A: Background: In August 1998, Puntland declared itself a self-governing state of 
Somalia108 (BBC, August 1998a; 2012b). Geographically, Puntland is in the eastern region of 
Somalia, bordering the west with Somaliland (the north-western regions of Somalia), the Gulf of 
Aden on the northern side, and Ethiopia in the south west, while the Indian Ocean lies on the 
South-eastern part of Puntland (Puntland Profile, 1998). Puntland has a semi-arid climate with 
temperatures between 27°C to 37°C (Fowler, 2013). The rain scarcely falls between April and 
June. The total area of Puntland is, disputably, estimated to be 212,510 sq. km, consisting of seven 
districts which are Nugal, Ayn, Sool, Karkaar, Sanaag, Mudug and Bari (Puntland Profile, 1998; 
Fowler, 2013).  
 
B: Economic Base 
The state is primarily active in the fisheries, agriculture, livestock, and trade sectors109. 
Puntland’s coastal territory is rich in fish and numerous other marine resources, while its land is 
                                                          
108 2nd Section Article 10, “Negotiations and Federalism” of Puntland Autonomous Declaration states that Puntland Regional State 
shall be part of a Somali Federal State, and shall negotiate with any party of the Somali factions who truly believe in the restoration 
and the membership of a Somali Government based on the Federal System. It also declares that Puntland Regional Government 
shall hand over to the Somali Federal State the institutions including immigration affairs, defence, foreign relation and co-operation, 
postal official stamp, currency board and measurement units. 
109 In Puntland, Somali currency is in use with the rate of the US dollar exchange, which fluctuates around 1,615.49 per dollar. 
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full of livestock, wildlife, and agricultural products including a variety of foods, vegetables, and 
wild fruits. The land is also rich in frankincense, myrrh, Arabic gum, and dates (FAO, 2005). In 
terms of coastal infrastructure, there is the Alula seaport and airport, Bander Qasim seaport and 
airport at Bosaso, Eyl seaport, Gara’ad seaport and airport, and the Qandala seaport and airport. 
Puntland receives funding from various foreign donors, mainly the Scandinavian states, 
Australia, the UN: UNDP, FAO, WHO, WFP, and other occasional supports from other states and 
non-state actors (Hawdin, 2014). The annual budget of Puntland, which depends on foreign donors, 
fluctuates between $130 million and $221 million (Hawdin, 2014).  
C. Administrative Capacity 
 Puntland is comparable to Somaliland in terms of good governance and resource management. 
Despite challenges in infrastructure and capacity building, it has all three basic governmental 
branches, being a Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary, actively operating. It also has relatively 
reliable forces to protect its land and marine borders in case either of Somaliland or ‘Galmudug’ 
potential provinces, under the South-Central province, attacks them. In addition to dealing with 
recurrent internal insecurity activities such as criminality and domestic violence, the Puntland 
military and police are in open war with Al-Shabab, Somaliland, Galmudug, Pirates, drug-
traffickers, human traffickers, and stowaways. It is a strategic zone for several armed political 
groups, pirates, seafarers, illegal fishers, and toxic dumpers (Murphy, 2008). It is also a hub for 
youths emigrating from all corners of the region, such as South-Central Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya, whose destination is Yemen, and then either to Saudi Arabia or all 
the way to Europe. Furthermore, Puntland administration faces continuous challenges with a huge 
number of IDPs who have emigrated from South-Central Somalia and Eastern Ethiopia (World 
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Bank, 2014). Through this calculation, the World Bank (2014) argues that Puntland has limited 
control over localized conflicts, militia groups, and piracy. 
 The province covers almost all the modern governmental offices and economic sectors 
including administrations, environmental protection, resource sustainability and sharing, political 
consensus, criminal offences, public relations, federal relations, diplomacy, foreign relations, and 
social reintegration and harmony policies (Article 2, Transitional Constitution of Puntland 
Regional Government [TCPRG], 2009). It is based on a combination of Islamic Law, public 
consensus110, the separation of Government Powers,111 ensuring the existence of private ownership 
and the free market, ensuring the individual fundamental rights of life, security and general 
stability (TCPRG, 2009). Article 96 of the TCPRG concerns environmental policy and law. 
Although it focuses on deforestation, erosion, charcoal exportation, and trading of plants and 
firewood, it also prohibits the pollution of sea, air and land. The article also bans the exportation 
of female livestock, and the hunting of wild animals for game (TCPRG, 2009).  
 Puntland’s draft policies address fishing rights, resource ownership, resource management, 
institutional structures, legal and constitutional matters, and financing marine resources. The draft 
also highlights research on monitoring, environmental protection and conservation, awareness and 
training, integrated coastal zone management, fishery infrastructure, surveillance and compliance 
classification of the fishery sector in the Puntland artisanal fishery (Puntland, 2004).  
 The Ministry of Fisheries has signed an agreement with IUCN/ORI to assist in setting a 
provincial policy for Puntland (UNDP, 2005). This agreement is a renewal of the collaboration 
agreement that IUCN/ORI entered into with the collapsed Somali central government in 1998 
                                                          
110 The system of idea sharing and collective decision making. 
111 Which consists of Legislative, Executive and Judiciary at provincial level. 
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(UNDP, 2005). The Ministry of Fisheries also approached PERSGA, in 2004 for the same purpose 
(PERSGA, 2002). In terms of maritime security policy, laws were defined in Puntland Piracy Law 
No 18, 19 November 2012, Law on Transfer of Convicted Prisoners of the State of Puntland 15 
November 2012, (Presidential Decree Ref: MW/DPS/229/2012 of 17 October 2012), and 
Amendment of Law on Transfer of Convicted Prisoners of the State of Puntland 17 November 
2012.  
D. Puntland Marine Police Forces 
  The international community has frequently asked Puntland and other regional authorities 
to increase their efforts to establish security and the rule of law in the long coast of the Horn of 
Africa and the Gulf of Arabia. Large sums of money have been paid by the international 
community to both Puntland and federal administrations for this cause (Bridger, 2013). To answer 
these calls, Puntland has established the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) (Garowe Online 
reports, 2013). PMPF has been attentive in combating piracy (Mail and Guardian, 2013, Bridger, 
2012; Rider, 2015). 
Puntland has been struggling to construct the first navy base in Somalia since the collapse of 
the central government to maintain its own security, property rights, and taxation authority. Upon 
the emergence of piracy, the province formed SARACEN in May 2001. Through SARACEN, 
Puntland began training and mentoring a significant number of local militias. The trained militias 
became the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF). Over 1,000 strong local counter-piracy militia 
based in Bosaso were then trained (New York Times, 2012; Rider, 2015). The PMPF began 
fighting against both piracy and IUU fishing, and to this end, carries out 24-hour Sea patrolling 
throughout the provincial coast (New York Times, 2012).  
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The PMPF’s mission is to promote “peace and stability in the region by deterring, detecting, 
and eradicating piracy, illegal fishing and other coastal crimes; protecting marine resources; and 
delivering much-needed humanitarian relief supplies to the Somali people” (Rider, 2015, p.1). 
The latter mission, delivering humanitarian relief, is symptomatic of the greediness of the 
Puntland administration, and has caused corruption and criminality among the PMPF. The 
province’s administration is eager for international support. They expected the PMPF’s 
humanitarian assistance work to support its counter-piracy efforts and bring stability to the region 
(Bridger112, 2012).  
“The PMPF’s humanitarian efforts include: the delivery of relief supplies, medical 
supplies, food and water; refurbishment of hospitals and medical clinics, including mobile 
clinics to serve remote areas; and improvements to road, airports and other critical 
infrastructure. The PMPF also uplifts local communities through providing training 
programs that teach valuable skills. Improving stability and security in the region helps to 
ensure the safety of those engaged in urgent humanitarian efforts” (Bridger, 2012). 
 
E. Maneuvers: Politically, the structure of the Puntland province consists of the 
Legislature, Executive Body, and Judiciary. The legislative house of Puntland is made up of 66 
members, of which only two are women. Most of the sub-sub-clans of the Harti sub-clan of the 
Darod clan have representatives in this house (Puntland Profile, 2009a). The Executive Body 
consists of the President, the Vice President, and nine cabinet ministers (Puntland Profile, 2009a; 
2012b). The Judicial body seems to be less active compared to the other two houses. It mostly 
operates in an ad-hoc manner on a case-by-case basis. There are, however, fairly active socio-legal 
rules and regulations. There is also a draft of policy instruments in place. In Puntland, there is no 
political party because the leadership of the autonomous state is de facto shared by three sub-sub-
                                                          
112 Foreign Policy 2013. Bridger, James is a maritime security analyst and piracy specialist based in Washington. Jay Bahadur is 
a freelance journalist and author of The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World M&G. 
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clans of the Majerten, being a sub-clan of Darod. These sub-sub-clans are: Omar Mohamud, Isa 
Mohamud, and Osman Mohamud who are all the descendants of Mohamud Saleban (Johnson, 
2008), and as such, can be identified as one family113.  
Consequently, four out of the seven districts that Puntland administration claims to control, 
which are Sool, Sanag, Nugaal, and Ayn, have formed their own regional administration called 
“Kahtumo” (Somalionline.com, 2012). These 4 districts have never been recognized either 
internally114 or externally115. Each of Somaliland, Puntland and Ethiopia (of the main regional 
stakeholders), rejected the formation of Khatumo state (Somalionline.com, 2012). However, 
Khatumo residents insisted on being an independent entity from Somaliland and Puntland116. 
Somaliland has claimed at least two of Khatumo’s four districts, and has waged constant attacks 
on it, conquering more than half of the territory (BBC, 2012). This has, inadvertently, fuelled the 
long rooted conflict between Somaliland and Puntland, because Khatumo’s denizens and those of 
Puntland share blood lineage.  
F. Motives  
Puntland’s primary goal is to attract financial and technical assistance from UN Agencies and 
the International community. Its secondary goal is to defend the dignity of the autonomous 
administration in the eyes of the international community, while also protecting the lives of its 
youth from being killed in piracy activities. 
                                                          
113 Decentralization of the governmental power and multi-party system are also two other instruments written in the first draft of 
the Puntland constitution, but seem to have been abandoned. 
114 Even though in the beginning the formation of Khatumo was encouraged and supported by the Somali federal government, it 
was later on condemned and politically disbursed. Obviously, the reason is that Khatumo has been technically sandwiched by 
Puntland and Somaliland of which each claims some parts of Khatumo. As a result, the Federal administration has preferred not to 
lose these two powers that Khatumo is in between.  
115 international and regional community 
116 its formation headed by Professor Ali Khalif Galaydh, Professor is an American citizen and prominent Professor of several 
universities in the US. He is also a former Prime Minister of Somalia during 2000-2002. 
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Since the start of the Somali reconciliation conference in Kenya, which took place from 
October 2002 to October 2004117, Puntland’s administration campaigned for a federal system in 
Somalia. The Garowe Principles of 2012 and 2013 continued to push for a federal structure in 
2012 (Puntland State of Somalia. 2013). Being the initiator of the federalism, Puntland endeavours 
to demonstrate it has control over the rest. It even dares to dictate what the federal administration 
should do, and how they should go about it. Other provinces perceive that Puntland intimidates 
the federal administration to obtain its self-interest. Politically, Puntland has already achieved, at 
least, eight of its major goals which are to:  
 Have one of its representatives appointed as the Prime Minister of the federal Republic 
of Somalia  
 Educate and employ a large number of the Puntland’s youth 
 Prevent the secession intended by Somaliland by hindering any international/regional 
recognition that might be given to Somaliland  
 Rebuild the lands of the Majerten sub-sub-clan of Darod  
 Secure an autonomous region which is exclusive for the Harti sub-clan of Darod which 
is headed by the Majerten  
 Secure the establishment of Jubbaland as another autonomous region that is exclusive 
for the Darod clan  
 Assure the superiority of the Majertens over the rest of the clans, and has been assured 
 Obtain its full share from the national revenues of the federal sea and air ports.  
                                                          
117 This conference was continuously going on throughout these two consecutive years. 
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Now, Puntland is struggling to obtain extra representatives in the federal parliament 
(ACCORD, 2009).     
 
G. Relationships: Puntland has an amicable relationship with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian 
ministries of defence, foreign affairs, and education actively operate in Puntland as if it was a 
region of Ethiopia (Life & Peace Institute, 2003; Mehler, et al., 2009). The school curriculum in 
Puntland, with the exception of some Arabic schools, is the same as Ethiopia’s, and many of the 
high school graduates are sent to Addis Ababa to enrol in Ethiopian universities (Mehler, et al., 
2009). Puntland’s office, other than the Presidential palace, is the Ethiopian embassy/consulate. 
Puntland argues that the intertwining of these institutions constitutes a relational agreement, and 
thus, Puntland and Ethiopia have a legal and diplomatic relationship (Mehler, et al., 2009).  
Since Puntland suggested a federal system for Somalia, Ethiopia has diplomatically prioritized 
Puntland over the rest of the Somali provinces by dealing with it amicably (Arman, 2014). On the 
other hand, most residents of the South-Central continuously condemn the alliance between 
Puntland and Ethiopia. They fear that Ethiopia may colonize Somalia through Puntland.  
Puntland has signed several agreements with the Federal government. Among the notable 
agreements, are: The distribution of the international aid to Somalia, the revenue of the country’s 
main seaport and airport in the capital city, and other national resources. Puntland receives a third 
of the revenue from each. The two also agreed to not intervene in each other’s internal affairs, 
while giving special respect to Puntland’s marine and land borders (Michael, 2011). Discussions 
of sharing military forces, security forces, foreign diplomatic missions, taxation, national 
resources, and environmental responsibilities have yet to be finalized (ACCORD, 2009).  
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Analyzing the relationship between the Federal government and Puntland, it seems that the 
latter has the upper hand. For instance, in August 2013, Puntland temporarily broke off its relations 
with the Federal government when the Federal President appointed a Prime Minister who was not 
from Puntland. The same thing happened in August 2012, after the Federal administration 
attempted to annex Puntland’s region called Mudug to the Galmudud Province in order to establish 
a new province named Galmudug.  
H. Typology: Puntland has always been suspicious of Somaliland, South-Central, and the 
federal government. These administrations are predominantly led by Puntland’s rival clan 
members.  Despite moderate corruption, however, Puntland is active in terms of administration, 
good governance, development, and environmental protection. These characteristics make it an 
actor and network of stability.  
 
5. 3. 2: Non-State Actors and Networks in Puntland 
5. 3. 2. A:  The Fisheries Based Networks  
 A: Background: The key non-state actors on marine issues in Puntland are more numerous and 
complex than those in the other two provinces. Among them are artisanal fisheries, local 
communities, trade fishing companies, private security firms working as coast-guards, and 
political destabilisers such as money-lords, religious-lords and several other actors and networks 
as mentioned in chapter four.  
 
B. Puntland’s Coasts, Coastal Communities and Artisanal Fisheries 
In some areas of Puntland like Bosaso city, fishing provides direct employment for 
thousands of people during the eight months of the fishing season. It also provides indirect 
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employment for people working in restaurants and other enterprises run for the benefit of the 
fishing community. Some entrepreneurs take their families with them to the coast, thus creating 
temporary settlements for several purposes: getting temporary employment, training their children 
in fishing, visiting relatives, and more. Lovatelli (1996) has taken a full assessment of the fishery 
sector and its impact on the environment in Somalia. In his study, he mentioned that there are more 
than fifty identifiable artisanal fishing communities located at different points along the Somali 
coast, especially along the Gulf of Aden. These fishing activities range from small village fisheries 
led by community elders to larger groupings associated with a central facility such as a port, ice-
maker, or fish company (Lovatelli, 1996).  
Puntland fisheries seem to have partially recovered from the aftermath of the civil war even 
in spite of the tough challenges they faced. In 1998, one of the most productive canning factories 
called “Las Korey” was fully rehabilitated by the private sector with the help of UNDP. Since then, 
the Las Korey product of canned fish is exported to Eastern Africa, Europe, USA, and Canada. 
Currently, the factory is in severe crisis as illegal foreign fishing companies have sabotaged it in 
terms of both market competition and fish production. Therefore, its existence is very tenuous and 
may be on the verge of collapse (Somaliland Development Fund (SDF). (2015). In terms of unions 
and insurance, there is no officially recognized marine-led trade union or business association 
registered with either domestic or international bodies. Therefore, it seems that the stakeholder 
networks operating in the South-Central Somali basin are neither unionized nor insured.  
 There are a large number of small-sized fishing companies operating in Puntland, of which 
some are registered. Some of these companies were originally established in the form of local 
humanitarian NGOs in order to attract funds from foreign donors and enterprises, while others are 
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pure fisheries. Some are professional while others are not. The most notable of these fisheries 
include:  
1. SANURA: A professional marine fisheries company whose vision is to engage in 
producing professional fishers and who may provide consultation and advice to fishery 
producers and traders. It intends to carry out research and surveys on marine products and 
fish markets. It seems, however, that the company has failed to meet these goals due to a 
lack of funding and moral support.  
2. Ladan: A fishery co-operative which is one of the most active fishing companies in 
Puntland. It is based in Bossaso, the economic city of Puntland. It was formed by a group 
of professional fishermen (UNDP, 2005). 
3. Mobilise Artisan Fisheries: This is a mechanical company dedicated to building and 
repairing fishing boats. It also rehabilitates broken marine engines with the help of INGOs 
and Banks (World Bank, 2014). 
4. Barwaqo: This is a fishing company that buys and sells fish products, establishes fish 
market outlets and supplies fish products alongside the coastal towns of Puntland. 
5. Las-Qoray: This is a for-profit tuna factory that specializes in producing tuna. Its main 
aim is to promote employment by creating job opportunities in the province. 
6. Bile Company: This is a small-sized company that can be identified as one project owned 
by one man. It attempts to trade shark fins and meats of marine animals. The owner of this 
company, Mr. Bile, seems to be lacking basic means and a workforce, due to low 
investment. Consequently, the company fails to establish relations with the society, and 
this has affected its roles in production and marketing.  
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7. Suudi Company: This is a fishing company owned by Mr. Suudi. It manufactures gear 
and marine engine spare parts, but sells a few of its production for two reasons: First, local 
communities prefer to buy and use spare parts made in the Western countries. Secondly, 
the owner has no proper relationship with the local community. These two factors are 
among other factors that make the company less productive.  
8. Shafici: This project often operates as an NGO, and sometimes operates as a sub-contractor 
or a mobile project serving under the “Fisheries and Marine Services.” The latter is a local 
organization receiving contracts from various INGOs that operate in Bosaso, Puntland. It 
is devoted to distributing fishing boats and fishing gears to the local fisheries owned by 
low-income families, groups and individuals. 
 
 C. Maneuvers: The early registered group of these small-sized and non-professional fishing 
companies cooperate with the provincial Ministry of Fisheries and Ports, despite the Ministry’s 
dismal capacity. However, the provincial administrations and these companies are insignificant 
compared to the networks of instability. There have been several attempts to establish a 
comprehensive policy to administer marine resources and fisheries in Puntland over the past few 
years, but so far they have been without success. In the Feasibility Study for the Fishery Sector in 
Puntland 2005, Puntland stated that the vision for its policy, which still is in draft, is that marine 
and coastal resources “belong to the entire people of Puntland, who share equally in a fair and 
transparent manner, a marine environment that is healthy, free of pollution, waste, and 
degradation” (UNDP, 2005, p. 4). The statement also underlined that “the sea of Puntland is rich 
in quality of forms of life, production and accessible to create equitable opportunities for 
sustainable development” (UNDP, 2005, p. 3). 
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 In fact, the diversity and abundance of marine resources have, over the years, led to the 
development of a range of fishing activities geared to harvest the variety and diversity of fish 
species present in the coast. These have included industrial, subsistence, and artisanal sectors118. 
Though the aforementioned types of fishing are commonly practiced in the country, it is not always 
easy to precisely distinguish between the different fishery sectors and the methods they use. This 
is not only because specific definitions are lacking, but also because there is considerable overlap 
between the sectors, in terms of both the types of species harvested, and the methods utilized to 
harvest them. This not only leads to frequent environmental damage, but also makes any future 
project on environmental sustainability and assessments difficult and complex.   
D. Motives: The activities of the local fisheries of any size or capacity in Puntland are 
positive, yet they occasionally undertake unsustainable fishing operations due to greed. Their 
motives are, for the most part, to benefit from the natural resources in their coastal territories. Their 
fishing activities, however, are more primitive and thus moderate, due to a lack of capability. The 
nature of the fishing operations is largely opportunistic. Reef-associated line-fish are caught with 
hand-lines, and comprise a wide variety of species that are mostly placed on ice and consumed 
locally, or at least, within one day's drive from the port. Sharks are taken with gillnets and lines, 
predominantly for their fins which are removed at sea. Most of the carcasses are then dumped and 
wasted, although at times the flesh is salted and dried before being exported to other countries such 
as Kenya and United Arab Emirates (Ploch, et al., 2011).  
The limited survey data available for demersal fish stocks throughout the continental shelf 
area presents a serious difficulty in the estimation of sustainable levels of exploitation and the 
                                                          
118 Like the South-central’s seashore, fishing activity has had negative impacts on the environment, where domestic waste is 
directly discharged to the sea to the extent that sometimes sea water is used as latrines and garbage dumps. 
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extent of environmental damage. The actual problem is overfishing and overexploitation of 
numerous other types of marine resources. All the studies have found, however, that there is rapid 
decline of fish and other marine ecosystems. It is anticipated that the highest densities of both 
demersal and pelagic fish stocks and poisoned fish will be found in the up-welling enriched waters 
of Puntland (UNDP, 2005). Despite these difficulties, a factor contributing to the recovery of the 
Puntland’s fisheries is that the majority of the local communities are involved in fishing and fish-
led activities.  
“In rural areas, almost every one (nomads, farmers, etc.) takes part in the fisheries at some 
level. The arrival of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the central south Somalia 
during the past 15 years has radically changed the scenario of the fishery sector in 
Puntland. Most of southern Somali fishermen are now in Puntland coastal towns and 
villages, where they have the opportunity to work and earn under more peaceful 
circumstances and where they have been able to utilize their skills and techniques on 
fishery and boat maintenance. Due to these movements, the amount of fishing gear and 
boats has almost tripled, even though the infrastructures to support such activities remain 
inadequate in most parts of Puntland” (UNDP, 2005). 
  
 E. Typology: Most of the Local fishing companies in Puntland are registered by the Puntland’s 
Department of Fishing. They follow the instructions and guidance given to them by the 
department. They still face a series of constraints, however, including a lack of technology, 
investment, know-how, and the challenges of the foreign networks of instability. Based on this 
evaluation, Puntland’s various types of local fisheries are collectively actors and networks of 
stability.  
A. SomCan 
 Background: SomCan is a Somali-Canadian company which started its business as a fishing 
company. Later on, the company changed its task from fishing to coast guarding. It endeavored 
to be the only one company to operate in Puntland as a private coast guard and began its 
campaign by: 
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1. Having special meetings with the head of Puntland province, and convincing him to rehabilitate 
the pirate criminals and suspected pirates  
2. Reaching out to pirates and convincing them to meet with religious leaders and community 
leaders (Jonathon, 2012). 
3. Preparing special meetings between pirate leaders and sheikh Abdul-qadir Ga’amey, who gave 
them a series of religious admonitions (Said, 2012). 
4. Establishing relations with other fishing companies and coast guards operating in the Red Sea 
of both Puntland and Somaliland, such as Fisheries and Marine Services, Shifco and Shuraako 
5. Organizing workshops about piracy prevention and proper management on marine resources.   
Economically, SomCan’s revenue is based on royalties given by the Puntland province out 
of the fines charged against the marine criminals trading off the Horn of Africa’s EEZ. These 
criminals include both local groups and individuals, such as pirates, terrorists, and smugglers, as 
well as foreign trespassers such as illegal fishers and seafarers. SomCan renews its contract every 
year but has been inactive in the region since 2012 (Jonathon, 2012).  
Maneuvers: SomCan has been working as Puntland’s Coast-Guard since 2001. It has been 
weakened by several challenges, such as: internal corruption, corruption in the province’s 
administration, and a lack of salary payment. On top of these internal issues, there have been 
frequent indiscriminate attacks led by either the American or European navies against SomCan’s 
naval employees after being mistaken for pirates (Said, 2013). Although SomCan was once 
considered the most powerful coast guard in the Horn of Africa, once hiring over 210 well-trained 
naval forces (Said, 2013), it is currently very weak and ineffective. 
Motives: Puntland’s main motive is to show the world it could be an ally in the fight against 
piracy and marine terrorism. It has mobilized a considerable garrison of coastguard officers, albeit 
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these forces’ functionality and quality fluctuates depending on the circumstances. SomCan, 
although weakened nowadays, has maintained a reciprocal relationship with the provincial 
administration and has been a law-abiding institution.  
Typology: SomCan has positive intentions, but faces critical constraints. According to its 
operations (its missions are not officially documented), it can be categorized as an actor and 
network of stability. 
5. 3. 4: Artisanal and Illegal Fisheries in Puntland 
 From 2012-2014, there has been a considerable reduction in both piracy and illegal fishing 
activities in Puntland. By the end of 2015, however, local fisheries in the towns of Bargel, Gara’ad 
and Eil of Puntland were interviewed by One Earth Future and BorameNews (Sayle, 2015). The 
fisheries and majority of the community elders said that almost all the traditional nets known as 
“Jarriif” were completely destroyed. They also said that the most famous mangroves and seaweeds 
in the area were uprooted.  
 As a result of this, many of the local residents have resorted to marine terrorism and piracy in 
order to defend their territory. They have invited some prominent pirates to return to the 
community with their piracy skills and technologies (Sayle, 2015). Those in the fisheries as well 
as elders have mentioned that they have observed NATO ignoring the illegal trawlers, even though 
they could have prevented them from crossing into Puntland’s sovereign territory (Sayle, 2015). 
This indicates that international observers do not care about Somalia’s sovereignty rights and 
resources, but rather about the transnational security and worldwide terrorism. The U.N. 
monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea’s weapon embargo has reported that almost all the 
revenues from illegal fishing fall into private accounts in various countries (UN Security Council, 
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2011). They have also found that certain individuals based in the UAE issue fake licenses (UN 
Security Council, 2015).  
Dozens of illegal trawlers, mainly from Asia, continue to harvest multiple species of fish 
and other vertebrates, as well other types of marine resources in Puntland’s EEZ. In 2015, One 
Earth Future in the US reported that over 132 tons of fish had been harvested from Puntland in 
2013 (Sayle, 2015; Ploch, et al., 2011). Over 20 countries, including Yemen, Iran, Egypt, Spain, 
and France, were condemned for illegal fishing in Somalia. Iran only harvested 45 to 180 thousand 
tonnes of fish in 2014 (Ploch, et al., 2011). Most of the trawlers caught in Puntland displayed 
licenses issued by some of the leaders of the provincial state. Moreover, some were guarded by 
well-armed Puntland soldiers. When these licenses were sent for verification, however, most of 
them were found not to be registered and unknown to most of the concerned institutions and 
officials.  
The Department of Fishing did not recognize most of the signatories and body-guards, 
while the ones that were recognized were issued outside of the province’s legal procedures (Ploch, 
et al., 2011). As such, it seems that many of Puntland’s officials are self-serving individuals who 
do not hesitate to sell public resources for personal profit. As explained by Fowler “The piracy 
industry revitalized Puntland’s economy. The negotiation of ransoms necessitated the adoption of 
advanced technology and cell phones. Restaurants catered to the needs of pirates and their 
hostages. Housing units were built, and consumer goods were produced to meet the needs of the 
pirates” (Fowler, 2014, p.2). Money circulation started and most stakeholders have begun to sell, 
buy and trade commodities. BBC reported that piracy boosted the economy of Eastern Africa at 
large and Puntland in particular (BBC, January 12, 2012).  
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 Since there was an economic boom as a result of piracy, local actors and networks started to act 
politically, by being courageous enough to rebel against the existing systems that dominate them, 
including the Ethiopian army. This has created an environment in which pirates are a part of the 
local communities. Community traditional policy enforcers, private coast guards and Puntland 
police accept the pirates’ leaders as long as their actions do not constitute serious threats or on the 
ground that such a pirate leader is a wanted by a foreign government. This may end the isolation 
of the pirates and initiate their rehabilitation. It will create an environment in which pirates can 
come back to their communities. If they come back and abstain from piracy and any other illicit 
and illegal activities, their positive actions would be accepted and appreciated while their negative 
actions would be condemned. This could lead to either engagement or disengagement on the part 
of the pirates.  
Motives: This network’s motive is profit, regardless of property right to the resource they 
are profiting. This encourages the network to engage in stealing and looting, which eventually 
encourages violent and aggressive activities. Therefore, this network destabilizes the country’s 
security, environment, economy, politics, and social stability. Moreover, the network never accepts 
participation and negotiation, and does not have any relationship with the local communities, 
except recruiting local individual agents whose motive is limited to earning their daily bread.   
 
5. 3. 5: Key Security-led Actors and Networks in Puntland 
Introduction: In Puntland, there were several initiatives to stabilize and securitize the 
maritime zone during the peak of piracy. SARACEN, Halliday Finch, and SomCan are the key 
privately owned and operated coast-guard companies which have been established, and the top 
ten artisanal fishing companies were registered. At the same time, the Puntland government 
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established the Puntland Marine Police Forces (PMPF) to replace or overwhelm the privately 
owned security companies. 
 
A. SARACEN 
 Background: In response to Puntland’s request, the UK and other European States, 
immediately extended both financial and technical support to Puntland. Following that funding, 
the UK-based security company known as SARACEN International was contracted to operate in 
the coastline of Puntland. It is headquartered at Bandar Siyad, which is 25 km West of Bosaso city. 
SARACEN developed a considerable military facility, provided training programs to the public, 
and in 2013 developing training programs for the provincial forces (The Wild West in East Africa, 
2013). The company encountered a series of critical challenges, however. 
 To build and strengthen the economic base of the SARACEN, the UK, EU, UAE and some 
other European and Arabian states financed its mission. “Flush with about $50-million in start-up 
funds from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), SARACEN came equipped with flatbed trucks, 
marine patrol aircraft, and Alouette IIIs–French light helicopters primarily used for 
reconnaissance” (The Wild West in East Africa, 2013). 
Maneuvers: Most of the international organizations condemned SARACEN for taking a cruel 
approach to anti-piracy missions, arguing that their actions violated human rights. The 
organizations also condemned SARACEN for mistreating and torturing Somali anti-piracy 
trainees and workers. The U.N. monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea inspected it, and found 
it culpable of three major offences. Specifically, SARACEN has: 
1. Beaten to death a considerable number of Somali trainees in the course of grueling training 
sessions (Bridger, 2013). 
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2. Violated the arms embargo that has been in place in Somalia since 1992 (Mazzetti, 2012).  
3. Sustained a deep-rooted relationship with a discredited company called “Sterling Corporate 
Services,” where SARACEN has sponsored and recruited more than hundred foreign mercenaries 
from Somalia after Sterling was dissolved by the international community (Bridger, et al., 2012). 
As a result, the UN Security Council delegated the African Union to integrate the anti-piracy force 
into the sanctioned Somali forces, such as the national army, with the help of Bancroft Global 
Development, a private military security contractor in Washington, D.C. (Young, 2012). The 
African Union delegated the task to its branch in charge of stabilizing Somalia, “AMISOM”. 
The AMISOM administration (operating in South-central) protested against SARACEN, 
and hence, the United Nations Monitoring Group in Somalia put pressure on them 
(Globalresearch.ca). The Somali federal government launched complaints about SARACEN and 
requested the cancellation of its license. All of these complaints had no effect, however, until a 
new conflict arose between SARACEN and its provincial host state, Puntland (Weldemichael, 
2014). As SARACEN was rejected by the non-Somali stakeholders, Somalis rejected it as well. In 
2012, one of the SARACEN’s most prominent trainers was fatally shot by a Somali trainee. This 
resulted in internal chaos, followed by a lack of funding. SARACEN was thus forced to 
temporarily close its office, leaving behind a well-equipped and trained, but unpaid security force 
(New York Times, 2012).  
Motives: SARACEN has an official document describing its goals and objectives as well 
as mission and vision statements. Yet, the way they have conducted their operations indicates that 
they are economic and political opportunists. SARACEN seems to be the best example of how 
stakeholders have many motives, due to their basic interest in self-financing and promotion.  
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Upon the cancellation of SARACEN’s license, the members of its battalion, with a few 
exceptions, formed the best-equipped military force in Somalia, second only to the AMISOM 
battalion based in the capital city. The former members of SARACEN mobilized over 1000 well- 
organized, well-equipped and well-trained soldiers (UN Security Council, 2012). These soldiers 
ended up to serving the interest of the President of Puntland, however. They acted as his personal 
body-guard instead of carrying out their duties as provincial coastguard and security forces. They 
were used as a military infantry by the office of the President against political rivals, such as those 
conquered in the Galgala district under the leadership of Mr. Attom (Hansen, 2012: 263).  
Ultimately, SARACEN did not leave the country for good. It plans to re-establish its navy-
like military with a revamped strategy and policy. It is soliciting both provincial and national 
authorities to issue a new license for the continuation of its operations (Radio Mogadishu, Monday 
evening news, 2012)119.  
Typology: By evaluating SARACEN’s activities, it is apparent that the organisation has a 
hidden agenda which is hard to fathom. The company is obsessed with having an official license 
to operate in Puntland, but not ready to cooperate with either the provincial or the federal 
government. As such, SARACEN is an actor and network of instability. 
B. Halliday Finch  
 Background: Halliday Finch was founded by a former British military officer, Sam Mattock, 
based in Nairobi, Kenya as a security company operating in Somalia. Although the founder has 
gathered a number of forces well-trained in combating pirates, his mission, vision, objective, and 
role has never been clear. Again, even though the company claims that it has a valid contract with 
                                                          
119 This indicates that most of the activities in the country are neither permanent nor stable as long as the country’s political 
instability is continuous. 
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Puntland’s government, the government denies issuing such a license (EU NAVFOR, 2015). 
Somali public opinion is that the mission of Halliday Finch is one which seeks to collect and share 
Somali marine resources outside the country through illegal joint ventures, involving Somalis and 
non-Somalis (EU NAVFOR. 2015).    
 Halliday Finch also engages in oil exploration, trading, and other business matters 
(SomaliReport.com, 2012) despite claiming to be a security company. Puntland citizens deemed 
that it makes a great deal of money on these complex illegal businesses, and it is a broker for other 
illegal companies (Murphy, 2007; 2009). This has damaged its credibility, and has led analysts to 
come to the conclusion that Halliday Finch is an actor and network of instability. 
  
5. 4: Somaliland 
 A: Background: Somaliland is a self-styled state which has never been recognized by any state 
or non-state organization in the world. Since its formation on May 18, 1991, the administration 
has sought recognition from international and regional bodies. But to date its President travels with 
the Somali passport. Its constitution states that the separation is a final decision and non-
negotiable.  
 In early 1998, there were over 866 functional motorised Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) 
vessels120 (Dubad, 1998). In the year 2000, the number of fishermen who were actively engaged 
in the fisheries sector, and making a viable living off of it, were estimated at 4500 (Tako, 1998), 
though numbers vary considerably in the coastal regions of Somalia121. The greater majority of 
                                                          
120 Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) is the mainstay of production boat construction throughout the world.  
121Afterward, there is no concrete data. Observing the number of vessels actively engaged in fishing is not reliable, because 
sometimes, there is no distinction between foreign fishing vessels and local ones, as well as there is no distinction between regular 
and temporary fisheries. Similarly, the largest number of traditional fishing boats, i.e. the canoe-like Huris and the larger wind-
powered Mashuas and Bedens were counted to be effective. 
211 
 
these unaccounted fishermen are not working in the field either, because they lack fishing 
equipment and/or boats or because local or export markets are not available (Dubad, 1998).  
 B. Maneuvers: In 2013, the Turkish government tried to negotiate between Somaliland and the 
rest of Somalia (Somaliland Nation News, 2014). Somaliland demanded the agenda of the 
negotiation to be limited to sharing the control and revenue of the airspace, however. The 
negotiation ended without resolution, and Turkey insisted that if Somaliland needs aid that they 
seek it through its embassy in Mogadishu. In Somaliland, there are three official political parties 
registered which operate under some form of democracy. These political parties are UCID, Wadani 
and Kulmiye. In terms of piracy, it is worth noting that the current President of Somaliland, as a 
former leader of Somali National Movement (SNM) rebels in 1988, is the one who first introduced 
piracy in Somalia (Murphy, 2008). He ordered his rebel militia to hijack two privately owned ships 
full of sugar and rice for ransom (Radio Mogadishu, 1988).   
 
 
B1: Government Structure and Administrative Capacity 
 Somaliland’s government remains a unique institution that has been at the heart of clan-
based power sharing. Each of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches are functional, but 
dominated by the Isaq sub-clan of Dir. The legislative house is made up of 82 members, of which 
only two are women (The Guardian, 2014). In its early establishment, there was not even a single 
woman, but later on, one was added, and one more was recently added, as a result of substantial 
pressures from international donors and feminists122. 
                                                          
122 Some female activists led by Suad Abdi have been bitterly fighting for women’s rights to participate in the country’s political 
activities starting from the Parliament. 
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 The legislative house was initially built on a clan-based quota. Each of the clans in the 
territory was given a number of representatives. Such a representation has never been explicitly 
based on a fair proportional quota. Isaq, the most powerful clan, takes the lion’s share. 
Approximately 75% of the leaders, managers, personnel, and junior employees (in each of the 
three departments) are from the Isaq clan, while the rest (Dhulbahante, Gedo-birsay, Warsangeli, 
Isa, Dami, and others) share the remaining 25% (Abokor, 2006). Somaliland has an elected central 
government and a weak but functioning system of local government (World Bank, 2014). 
 B2: Administrative Capacity: In Somaliland, there is a formal Ministry of Fisheries and 
Coastal Development. In this regard, the Minister has promulgated the Somaliland Fisheries Law 
which fifteen Articles pertaining to jurisdiction, data gathering, licensing, penalties, and the 
promulgation of regulations to manage fisheries. Although this enabling legislation provides a 
good initial basis for fishery control, the capacity to implement it may be insufficient.  
 Several fisheries officers have been appointed, notably at Berbera. These officials generally 
appear to be relatively well trained, but poorly equipped to deal with future monitoring activities. 
If one intends to assess their activities relating to law enforcement, however, one will find that 
they were not concerned with implementation before 2010 (World Bank, 2014). Based on their 
actions, it is clear that the final authority to apply the law rests with the central government. 
Therefore, they are reluctant to work seriously and assiduously. More recently, there has been a 
sign of positive change. There have been many articles written about how the administration of 
Somaliland has failed to bring about any developmental or environmental progress (World Bank, 
2014). These prompted Somalilanders to collectively demand that both land development and 
resource management be conducted to foster environmental sustainability.  
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 In terms of marine security, Somaliland plays a significant role in combating piracy. It has 
mobilized an organized coast-guard force, which routinely carries out marine patrols along 
Somaliland’s coastline (Gilmer, 2014). In contrast with other provinces, most of the NGOs in 
Somaliland are licensed, under contracts or other forms of official agreements with the 
autonomous administration. The same policy applies to the local and foreign fishing companies, 
albeit with limited authority on the part of the government and a lack of know-how on the part of 
the fishing companies.  
 B3: Economic Base: Somaliland’s economy is based on foreign donations given by various 
developed states. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the UAE, UK, USA, and Netherlands, and the UN, 
UNDP, FAO, WHO, and WFP are among the main donors to Somaliland. Its annual budget 
fluctuates between $220 and $300 million (Hawdin, 2014). In 2014, the Somaliland Development 
Fund (SDF) was formed between the Somaliland government and the international donors. SDF 
is in charge of contacting and maintaining a good relationship with the international donors. The 
SDF’s budget is provided by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Britain’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), Norway and the Netherlands (SDF, 2014). 
 At the local level, Somaliland generates a remarkable amount of money from the Berbera and 
Zaila’ seaports as well as Hargeisa and Berbera airports. Given that this is internal revenue, the 
authorities charge levies and taxes on the local businesses for import, export, and retail activities. 
In order to reduce corruption and maladministration, the Revenue Policy and Administration of 
Somaliland has established a special agency known as Somaliland Revenue Authority (SLRA) 
(Mehler, et al., 2008).  
 Some of the fishing boats used in Somaliland were manufactured in the country by aid projects 
funded by FAO, but these projects were in their infancy when the civil war broke out. Gears and 
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spare parts needed are rarely available for sale. While conducting my research, I did not find a 
study indicating the quantity of fish caught in Somaliland, but the most active fishing in Somalia 
(excluding illegal fishing from foreign trawlers) is carried out along coastal waters.   
Local artisanal fishing communities exploit most of the valuable marine organisms found along 
the entire coastline of the country, though the level of exploitation is far below the potential sustainable 
capacity of the territorial waters. Sometimes, the levels of fishing activities decrease due to the lack of 
functional infrastructure. The over-exploitation of demersal and pelagic fishing has reduced stocks for 
the fresh and frozen markets. Smaller quantities are being fished, most of which are gutted, salted, 
sun-dried and then exported to Mombassa, Kenya both by sea and by air (Dubad, 1998).  
Very small volumes of fresh fish are being consumed in the country itself and mainly by a small 
percentage of the inhabitants of some of the larger settlements along the coast, including Berbera and 
Zaila (just like Bosaso of Puntland and Mogadishu and Kismayo of South-Central). Due to the absence 
of infrastructure such as ice plants, and a lack of adequate means of transport and processing facilities, 
the industry is limited to the production and marketing of sun-dried and salted products. Sharks as 
well as a variety of demersal and pelagic fish species are therefore utilised. Although reliable figures 
are not available, the total quantities of dried products produced and exported in the last few years is 
likely to have been very low. In order to increase fisheries production, Aden Gulf Fisheries Company 
and Horn of Africa Fishing Company in Zaila announced their unification on October 18th, 2014 for 
full-scale production (Hadhwanaag, 2014).  
 C. Motives: With the hope that the mass media will publicize their success, the primary motive 
of Somaliland is to demonstrate military stability both on land and sea in order to be acknowledged 
as a legitimate state. Somaliland’s adoption of democracy will make it a legitimate candidate for 
financial assistance and international recognition as a newly stable, functional, and independent 
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state. Somaliland’s alternative motive, if forced to remain as a province of Somalia, is to lead 
Somalia or, at least, to obtain a half share in each of the country’s political and economic activities.   
  D. Relationship: Somaliland has a reciprocal relationship with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the EU 
(which gave development aid, though not recognition), but not with the neighbouring Puntland 
(The Guardian, 2014). It offered Ethiopia the use of its seaports at a discounted rate (The Guardian, 
2014). Ethiopia pays less attention to Somaliland’s seaports, however, due to either its lack of 
facilities, or Ethiopia’s desire to respect international laws pertaining to Somalia’s sovereignty 
(The Guardian, 2014; Waldo, nd). Somaliland has repeatedly approached Djibouti for a state-level 
relationship, but Djibouti stated that it does not want to jeopardise the unity of Somalia (Geelle123, 
2000).  
 At the national level, Somaliland has had a prolonged conflict with Puntland, viewing it as its 
main enemy. The conflict between the two provinces goes back to the primitive age of clan based 
conflicts in the Horn of Africa. At the local level, it seems that the leading clan of Somaliland, 
being Isaq, is being sanctioned and scapegoated by the rest of the Somali clans. The clan has no 
interaction whatsoever with any of its fellow Somalia clans (Kaplan, 2008).   
   
5. 4. 1: Non-State Fisheries and Security Actors and Networks in Somaliland 
A. Artisanal Fisheries and Trade Fishing Companies  
In Somaliland, fishing operations are largely opportunistic. Reef associated line-fish are 
caught with hand-lines and include a wide variety of species that are mostly placed on ice and 
consumed locally, or at least within one day’s drive from the port. Sharks are predominantly taken 
with gillnets and lines for their fins which are removed at sea. Some of the carcasses are then 
                                                          
123 Mr. Geelle, Ismael Omar is the President of the Djibouti state. 
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dumped and wasted. This usually contributes to seashore dumping, and diffuses both liquid and 
solid waste into the sea.  
In Somaliland’s terrestrial coastal zone, seaweeds are used for medication, decoration, 
animal feeding, and human consumption (Hadhwanaag.com, 2009). They also help land farms 
nearby the seashores grow faster. There are numerous complex species of sea-grass, diverse coral 
reefs, algal communities and algal habitats, and thousands of other living plants among the rich 
flora, especially in the lower part of the intertidal zone, and the green areas of the intersection 
between the superatidal and the intertidal zones124.     
In Somaliland, local fisheries lack training with modern technology and strategies to make 
and maintain sustainability or stability. If they had the basic means and know-how concerning 
fishing, resource extraction, and ecosystem management, they could have developed a 
management strategy regardless of ongoing overfishing. In their fishing operations, they should 
have a comprehensively defined policy and a clear plan of what they are doing, how they are doing 
it, when they can do it, where they can operate, the purpose of the policy they are applying, and 
what is in it for them. 
                                                          
124  When seaweeds are spread all over the seashore, they quickly dry causing moisture and humidity. Dried seaweeds are 
exposed to rain, which causes serious bleaching to both the coast and ecosystems. Consequently, dozens of varieties of flowering 
plants are dashed over. The coastal communities have no idea of how to establish seaweeds by cultivating in nurseries. Even if they 
were aware of it, there are several factors to be considered before cultivation can take place such as the level of the sea currents, 
weather, and temperature, in order to avoid strong tides that may destroy or bend the seaweeds. In its current condition, there is a 
need of weeding the seaweeds, reaping the supporting systems, removing epiphytes and ploughing or cultivating grasses, replacing 
lost plants and sediments, maintaining, managing, and sustaining these provisions while using them for these various purposes. 
This management and authorization could be provided by local experts and obtaining help from a capable authority.      
     Among the major factors that affect algal zonation are light (both its intensity and quality), interaction between different 
organisms, and water movement (Oliveira, Eurico C. Et al. (2005). “Benthic algal communities are home to a variety of organisms, 
providing them with food, nursery grounds, shelter when tides are in, and moisture protection when tides are out. P. 16” (Oliveira, 
Eurico C. Et al. (2005), and generally “Benthic marine plants are photosynthesising organisms that live attached to substratum, 
such as rock, sediment or another plant. P. 23”. Foreign trawlers fishing in and around Somaliland turn strong lights on the fish 
populated zones in order to catch the fish. Foreign licensed and unlicensed trawlers often use strong light, sound, vibration, and 
dragging nets to harvest fish species immensely. On the other hand, the sun’s energy is blocked from the terrestrial ecosystems by 
the dead animals and the decomposers. Another major effect is that the minerals contained in the organic matter remain locked up 
and unavailable to plants. 
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Like any other province of Somalia, most fishing boats used in Somaliland are wooden 
outboard motor boats and rowboats. These boats catch most fish with gill nets, lines & hooks, 
trolling lines, short pelagic long lines, and hand lines, drift nets, or purse seine. They are owned 
by individual fishing families and small companies. These boats may be rowed while some have 
outboard motors, and others are small fiberglass boats 6-10 meters long. Although mechanized, 
the motors and other equipment for these boats is old and debilitated, and finding their spare parts 
is not easy. 
Despite the marine wealth along the coastline, there is no highly developed fishing tradition 
in the country, even at the artisanal level. Since the population had been chiefly nomadic 
pastoralists, non-pastoralists were simply viewed as poor in both dignity and wealth. In retrospect, 
in many coastal zones of Somalia, artisanal fishers who periodically and temporarily fished were 
marginalized from the rest of the society, being ashamed of adopting a fishing lifestyle (Harper, 
2013). They had been contemptuously nicknamed as "Jaji," meaning “naturally despised” people. 
Therefore, almost everybody had been hesitant to be labeled and debased for a fishing lifestyle. 
Only a few indigenous communities living along the coasts of Kismayo and Bosaso insisted on 
remaining permanent fishers.  
During the years 1973-75, however, a severe drought hit a large number of pastoral nomads 
in the central and northern regions of the country. These victims of natural disaster, who ended up 
as internally displaced people (IDP), were re-settled at the coastal towns of Adale, Eyl, and Eil-
Ahmad by the government. Although those communities had no fishing background, constant 
training on how to fish, fish processing, and how to consume the fish being caught was provided 
to them. Short term and long term maritime management projects, funded and supervised by the 
Government, were established to teach them about the economic lifestyle of fishing.  
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The new fishermen were provided with boats, fishing gear, and other equipment. Many of 
them went back to their hometowns, however, in order to restart their traditional pastoral life after 
they realised the rainfall season had commenced in their home areas. Several years later, those 
who remained and adopted a fishing lifestyle were found to be wealthy and civilised. The 
government also funded new fishing companies belonging to the young students who completed 
secondary school, but failed to enroll in the sole National University that existed in the country, or 
obtain other employment opportunities. This encouraged many others to be interested in fishing.  
Although the institutional structures associated with fisheries management and 
development were largely disbanded as a result of the war, there are encouraging signs that these 
structures are being partially restored by local NGOs, individuals, community elders, and 
provincial administrations. In most of the regions, especially those near the coast, at the local 
community level, village elders or clan leaders have developed rules and regulations pertaining to 
access and control over some fish resources and land-based marine pollution control. These 
traditional rules and regulations serve towards both environmental sustainability and resource 
management. Most of these local administrators attempted to amalgamate the constitutional 
marine law and environmental law, but due to a shortage of policy guidelines and legal references, 
they could not do so efficiently. Therefore, they temporarily formed their own traditional principles 
for the sake of public interest. In several places, previously employed fisheries officers have 
retained measures of interest, involvement, and control over fisheries. 
  In general, regulations concerning marine pollution released by local leaders have been 
scattered among different areas, mainly those within or adjacent to ports. Laws and regulations to 
prevent or control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources had never been 
compatible with, or comparable to, modern laws. Though the UNEP guidelines on this subject 
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would provide a valuable basis for the development of the regulations, performance standards and 
enforcement procedures, enforcement of UNEP’s legal guidelines has always been weak or 
unavailable. 
 
B. Fishing Companies Operate in the Somaliland’s Maritime Jurisdiction 
There are several local fishing companies which operate in the Somaliland seawaters, 
notably: 
1.    Somali High Seas Fishing Company (SHIFCO): SHIFCO was initially licensed as a fishing 
company based on a bilateral agreement between Somalia and Italy signed in 1983. It is one of the 
fishing companies licensed to fish in the offshore EEZ through the Ministry of Fishery and Marine 
Resources before the civil war. After the collapse of the government, the company continued its 
operation in Somaliland, which has been relatively peaceful since 1992, without having its license 
renewed. It has recently sought a temporary license (Somaliland’s Ministry of Fishery, 2013). 
   SHIFCO continuously engages in illicit fishing activities, however. Moreover, it invited other 
greedy and opportunistic companies and economic mafias (hereafter Eco-mafia) to engage in the 
same activity (Guilfoyle, 2013). Currently, it fishes in the Somali EEZ, sometimes flying the 
Somali flag, and sometimes that of Yemen. It distributes its catch outside of the country. Since 
there is no functional government, the company operates as a freelance profit-making venture, 
without any governmental restriction or requirements in place. Before the war, the industrial 
fishery production allocated for the company was 11,940 tonnes of fish and 462 tonnes of lobster 
per month in 1985 (Ministry of Fisheries, 1986). During the civil war, however, it is estimated by 
FAO that it counts this amount per week and reports to no governmental agency (Guilfoyle, 2013). 
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Therefore, its operation is counted as one of the leading ongoing IIUUF activities (Abubaker, 
2013). 
Somali fishing companies, with the exception of SHIFCO, were either absent or slow to 
engage in fishing during the destructive civil wars between 1991 and 1995. As a result, there were 
no signs of a network in either the fishing sector or any other marine activities. Since then, there 
have been growing networks between local fisheries (both artisanal and industrial fishery sectors) 
and foreign fisheries, which connect local fisheries to the international market. As a result of this 
new occurrence, both illegal foreign fishing vessels and local fisheries have been slowly 
increasing.  
 
2. Somali Fair Fishing (SFF): SFF is a newly formed company privately owned by a Danish-
Somali NGO attempting to build commercial fisheries in Somali waters in partnership with Somali 
authorities, industry, and civil society. It is registered under the Somaliland administration. 
Currently, SFF has an active network with Shuraako, the leading trade company that links Somali 
business individuals and corporations to foreign corporations and investors (Shuraako.org). It is 
headquartered in Berbera, Somaliland, using the offices and premises of “Red Sea Marine 
Production LTD”, an old national company which is currently inactive.  
Typology: Unlike Somaliland’s governmental administration, the fishing companies in 
Somaliland are actors and networks of stability.  
 
5. 4. 2: The Role of Local Actions as a Shared Responsibility 
Throughout the provinces of Somalia, in reaction to illegal fishing, toxic dumping, mining, 
and many other forms of ongoing illicit and illegal activities, Somalis reacted negatively, resulting 
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in the emergence of piracy (Mitchell, 2009). All of these horrific activities and indiscriminate 
human atrocities have occurred over 24 years where there had been no social, political, 
environmental, and economic stability. During this long period of instability, environmental policy 
has never been an issue for discussion, let alone for implementation. The matter would need to be 
first addressed by seeking to create and implement environmental policy in the context of 
instability, with the eventual goal of stability in mind.  
Somalia's coastal communities, which in particular worry about the future of marine 
resources and the marine environment, have frequently appealed to the International Community 
for help for protection from foreign ships that engage in illegal fishing in their country's territorial 
waters (Bennett, 2012; Murphy, 2014). They have repeatedly mentioned that this is a critical time 
for the world at large, and for international organisations in particular, to integrate Somali people 
into their environmental policy and safeguard their natural resources. Because there was no central 
government, these calls for help took place at the provincial, local, organizational, and individual 
levels. This haphazard approach was reflective of the illegal fishing along the Somali coastline 
which was heightened after the disintegration of Somalia into clan-based states. Indeed, the local 
reaction in the aforementioned three provinces has been piracy and marine terrorism. In this 
section, I analyse how each of these local communities reacted to the illicit activities practiced by 
the foreign illegal fishers, toxic dumpers, debris releasers, oil spillers, and oil exploiters.     
The Puntland province, for instance, became a hub for foreign trawlers, and started sending 
complaints to certain foreign countries about the illegal exploitation of its marine resources and 
toxic dumping in their sea territory. Due to a lack of a governmental voice, however, the 
complaints received no response. Later, Puntland’s community leaders began to approach foreign 
companies to help them protect their coastline, again with no response whatsoever. As the world 
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ignored their calls and claims, in February of 2000, the regional administration of Puntland invited 
a British-Somali Company called "Shifo Comp.", which had been protecting the Somali marine 
area prior to the civil war, to proceed with its operation in the area of Puntland (Osman, 2000).  
 The complaints from the local and provincial levels failed because they did not follow the 
international diplomatic and legal procedures. And even if the correct steps were followed, they 
may not have been professionally written or have followed legal procedure. Since the vast majority 
of Somalis do not have expertise in this field, it is only community activists who may write 
successful complaints and express themselves. Yet even these writers and broadcasters have only 
a basic understanding that the activities of the foreign vessels in their territories are a violation of 
international law. As such, they do not know where to address their complaints or how to proceed. 
Indeed, if the on-going campaigns of fisheries exploitation and marine environmental 
degradation continue simultaneously, the future of small pelagic fish is at stake. Despite this high 
risk, there is neither prevention nor intervention to address the problem at either the local, regional, 
national, or international levels. As a matter of fact, at the local level, co-ordination would greatly 
facilitate many aspects of fisheries development, training, analysis, exploration, and management. 
Inter-regional communication would also enhance professionalism and the morale of fisheries 
personnel in general.  
 
5. 4. 3: Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, on the basis of their sociopolitical and economic aspects, each of the three 
provincial administrations, being South-Central, Puntland and Somaliland can be considered 
networks of instability to some extent, even though there is no active relationship among them. 
They can also be viewed as actors and networks of stability when it comes to the protection of the 
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marine environment. This highlights the complexity of understanding the policy actors and 
networks at the provincial level.  Further complicating the situation, there is no permanent status 
to evaluate their activities, motives and capacities, because their operations are not permanent and 
not limited to specific locations.  
In Somalia, each of the conflicting parties employs any strategy available to eliminate their 
opponents, including assassination, face to face fighting, shooting, hijacking, terrorizing, and or 
threatening means. They also employ any means of political and diplomatic warfare, such as 
defamation, destabilization, demoralization, devaluation, and so on. Within each of the African 
run organizational stakeholders, there exist all forms of corruption, mismanagement, financial 
shortage, technical shortage, and political volatility. Each of these networks spends some of its 
scarce income on creating conflicts. For instance, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)125 have been 
secretly cooperating with criminals by making large payments in return for assassinations of TFG, 
Ethiopian forces, and the US informants in the country. 
As a post-conflict study, I build my analysis on the ongoing peace processes, potential 
reintegration, growing public awareness, and administrative initiatives throughout the country’s 
provinces, regions, districts, and towns. As a result, I categorize South-Central as a network of 
potential stability in both socio-economic and environmental terms, while categorizing Puntland 
as a network of stability in both aspects. I do, however, categorize Somaliland as an actor and 
network of instability from a sociopolitical perspective, but as an actor and network of stability 
                                                          
125 During 2006, the main discussion was that many newly born Islamic extremist organizations were given birth by the UIC. 
The reason of this fragmentation was mostly as a result of disagreements over assistances provided by: Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Hezbollah. According to a UN report, UIC receives aid from Iran, Egypt, Djibouti, Libya, 
Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Eritrea. Djibouti has provided uniforms and medicines; Egypt has provided trainings inside 
Somalia; Iran has provided arms and ammunition; Hezbollah has provided military training and arms, and UIC fighters fought 
Israeli soldiers alongside Hezbollah in July 2006; Libya provided training, funds and arms; Eritrea provided arms, ammunition and 
military equipment; Saudi Arabia provided logistical support and ammunition (UN Report, 1992; 1998).  
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from the aspects of environmental protection and resource management. True, the self-declared 
autonomous state is more stable than the other two, but it does not recognize the federal 
government and as such is not ready to cooperate with it. Consequently, there is a strong possibility 
for further civil war between Somaliland and the federal administration. Furthermore, there are 
open ended disputes, which sometimes lead to physical conflicts, between the coastal communities 
in Somaliland and Somaliland’s military and administration (Colletta, 2000). Instead of 
government courts, clan elders and religious leaders act as mediating offices (Colletta, 2000). The 
cause of these conflicts is the political position of Somaliland which is based on ‘secession,’ rather 
than sharing information with the rest of Somalia.  
Coastal guards are actors and networks of potential stability because their motive is to 
combat piracy and marine terrorism in order to protect the country’s prestige, security, and the 
lives of the local youth. Even though they do not report to any office, they enforce general public 
morality and customary laws for which they are potentially accountable. In terms of local fishing 
companies, even though they often practice illegal and illicit activities, I categorize them as 
networks of potential stability. They only need governmental and scientific guidance in order to 
serve as actors and networks of stability. In contrast the foreign trawlers who openly engage in the 
looting of marine and coastal resources, without regard for local communities, as well as the 
provincial administrations and federal government, are categorized as actors and networks of 
instability. 
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 Table 4: Provincial/Local Actors and Networks  
Name Background Maneuvers Motives Modules Relationship Legality Typology 
South-
Central 
Somalia Sociopolitical 
& Economic 
Struggles, 
Corruptions, 
Brutal wars 
Political 3 Potential 
Provinces: 
Jubbaland, 
Mogadishu 
and 
Galmudug 
Regionally 
reciprocal but 
nationally loose  
Governmental    
Stability 
and 
Potential 
Stability 
Puntland  Somalia Political and 
Economic 
Struggles  
Political 3 internal 
weak Blocks: 
Makhir, 
Khatumo, 
SSA    
Globally and 
Regionally 
reciprocal but 
nationally loose 
Governmental    
Stability 
Somaliland Somalia Secessionist 
Political 
Movement  
Political  Awdal, 
Khatumo, & 
Hargaisa 
Globally/regionally 
reciprocal but 
nationally denial  
Governmental  Security 
Stability 
Political 
Instability  
Fishing 
Companies 
Somalia 
and Aliens 
Weak local 
Fishers Vs. 
Strong 
Foreign 
Exploiters 
Economic Numerous 
legal/illegal 
and 
foreign/local 
Fishers 
Secret relations 
with foreigner  
Legal/Illegal Instability 
and/or 
Stability 
Coast-
Guards 
Somalia 
and Abroad 
Deterring 
Piracy for 
economic 
gains  
    Security Several 
uncooperative 
forces  
Gradually 
Diminishing  
legal  Potential 
Stability  
Coastal 
Communities 
Somalia Weak in 
capacity but 
combatting 
Traditional 
survival 
Various clan-
based 
Fisheries  
Influential & 
Contesting 
legal Stability  
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Chapter Six 
Actors and Networks of Instability, Potential Stability and Stability Analyzed 
for Potential Marine Environmental Management Policy Networks 
6.1. Introduction 
 In this dissertation, I endeavoured to identify and characterize the socio-political and economic 
actors and networks of instability, potential stability and stability in Somalia. I sought to 
understand “Who are the socio-political and economic networks of instability and environmental 
unsustainability in Somalia? Can stability be achieved in the absence of sustainability or can 
sustainability be advanced without stability? What strategies could advance both stability and 
sustainability in marine environmental management in mutually reinforcing ways?  
  As a result of these complex actors and networks of instability and the prolonged civil war 
which created new phenomena in each of Somalia’s social, economic and political spheres, the 
mainstream literature on environmental resource management was found inappropriate to the case 
of Somalia. It tends to assume the presence of functional state structures. The most relevant 
literature to the case in Somalia is the post-conflict literature which highlights the potential role of 
bottom-up rather than top-down state-centred approaches. Yet, on certain occasions, a combination 
of both would likely be the best choice. That is why my dissertation used “actor and network 
analysis” approach to understanding the relationship between socio-political and economic 
instability and marine environmental degradation in the Somali basin. In my analysis, I categorize 
the actors and networks into instability, potential stability and stability. The actors and networks 
in these three categories may encompass foreign states, foreign state and non-state organizations, 
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foreign fishing and dumping vessels, national government agencies, provincial institutions, private 
institutions, religious sects/groups, local NGOs, local communities, local pirates, and individuals.    
My overall goal was to identify strategies in relation to these actors and networks that can 
advance both stability and sustainability in marine environmental management in Somalia in 
mutually reinforcing ways. I identified and classified the key actors in these three classes of actors 
and networks at the international/regional, national, and provincial/local levels in Somalia. In order 
to understand how active, influential, practical, powerful, and strategic each of these networks is, 
I researched their membership, their origins and structures, in what areas they operate, what 
relationships do they have among themselves and with others, their activities, their 
interests/motives, administrative/executive capacities, and their strategies?  
My basic approach is to identify ways to strengthen the role of actors and networks of 
stability and potential stability, to transform actors and networks of instability to stability or 
potential stability, and finally to marginalize or eliminate networks of instability for whom this is 
no prospect of being able to play a constructive role in Somalia. 
Throughout chapter 3 to 5, I identified the problems of marine environmental degradation, 
insecurity and unsustainability in resources. The drivers of each of these problems are actors and 
networks of instability pursuing their personal interest; they are thus competitive and not 
cooperative stakeholders. The practices of some of them are extremely destructive while some 
organize themselves for positivity, yet in the end their activities also have negative outcomes. The 
third group, who are a minority, attempt positive collective impacts and perform these to certain 
levels.  
 In this concluding chapter, I consider the most applicable and workable solutions for each of 
the actors and networks of instability, potential stability and stability at the three scales of 
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international/regional, national and provincial/local. The key actors and networks of instability at 
the international/regional level include Ethiopia, Clandestine State Networks, IIUUUO Fishing, 
and oil explorer companies. In contrast, the Turkish government and the United Nations are the 
actors and networks of stability, while AMISOM, Kenya, the US government, the US and the 
UK’s Intelligence forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU Naval Force 
(NAVFOR) are the actors and networks of potential stability. At the national level, Money-Lords, 
Warlords, warmonger Faith-Lords, and Somaliland separatists are the actors and networks of 
instability. Only the moderate religious groups are actors and networks of stability, while the three 
branches of the federal government (legislative, executive and judiciary), national fisheries 
organizations and companies and NGOs are actors and networks of potential stability. At the 
provincial level, Somaliland’s separatists, pirates and marine terrorists are actors and networks of 
instability. However, Puntland, local fishing companies, and coastal communities are actors and 
networks of stability, while Somaliland’s governmental marine environmental management, 
South-Central, and private Coast-Guards in Puntland are networks of potential stability. I briefly 
analyse the position of each of these actors and networks, and then, suggest a potential solution 
 I also analyse the cross-cutting themes competing in the country at an international level, the 
lack of capacity among Somali governments, and the roles of corruption and the clan system as 
provincial/local impediments to stability. Subsequently, I suggest what the international 
community might do to rebuild Somalia in its post-conflict situation so that Somalia will be able 
to protect its environment and security. Domestically, I provide suggestions on how to build 
capacity within the Somali national and provincial/local governments, and to tackle the crises of 
corruption and clannish culture to deal with networks of instability. Finally, I provide general 
recommendations and outline the dissertation’s academic contributions. 
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6. 2. Key Actors and networks of Instability, potential stability and stability 
at 3 levels 
6.2.1. The International/Regional Level  
6. 2. 1.1. Actors and Networks of Instability 
 A. Ethiopia: Due to Ethiopia’s continuous engagements, it seems hard for Somalia to 
become a stable state as long as Ethiopia is involved in its internal affairs. Therefore, the simple 
solution is to request Ethiopia to pull out of Somalia both militarily and politically. On the other 
hand, Somalia should sign in the presence of the UN and AU that it will never claim any of the 
Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s Somali inhabitant regions by applying the OAU’s territorial integrity treaty 
“As you Possess” (see chapter one; footnote 122 of chapter six). The region, at large, should adopt 
a new law denouncing attempts at political and economic domination within the region. A new 
approach and new treatment calling for neighbourly-based diplomatic exchange may be requested 
and initiated by Somalia. As a result of a friendly and neighbourly memorandum of understanding, 
Ethiopia’s objectives and policy visions towards Somalia may change to positivity. Otherwise, 
Somalia should resort to forwarding official claims to the UN and ICJ as a last resort. In response 
to Ethiopia’s actions, AMISOM forces supported by international forces operating under the UN 
Security Council should be deployed alongside the border between Somalia and Ethiopia as well 
that between Somalia and Kenya. 
 B. Clandestine state Actors: The clandestine states can be divided into certain countries of 
Europe (Spain, Italy, France, and Russia); Africa (Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, and 
Seychelles); and Asia (Yemen, Thailand, India, and China). The European state-polluters 
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encourage and provide investment to the Asian and African networks of instability (Waldo, 2013; 
AllAfrica, 2010). Confronting European polluters could mean marginalising those of the Africans 
and Asians.  
 To begin with Spain, should the Somali government approach the government of Spain to 
promote fishing trade, Spain may take it as an opportunity to accelerate its illegal and overfishing 
activities. Spain is more technologically advanced than Somalia and its neighbors, and there is no 
indication that she is ready to use these technologies in a positive way.  The apparent solution is 
to apply the ‘ship out’ policy against Spain by prohibiting its vessels from entering or coming 
closer to Somalia’s EEZ. As for Italy, any agreement entered by Somalia and Italy can be 
jeopardized by the Italian economic-mafia whose motive is purely economic, and involves both 
illegal fishing and illegal dumping. Therefore, the two states should seriously and sincerely discuss 
removing two mafias (Italian eco-mafia and Somali pirates) from the Somalia’s EEZ. As for 
France, it is advisable to attempt a trade agreement between Somalia and France. If such an 
agreement fails to work mutually, then, the next choice is to demand French fishing vessels stay 
away from Somalia’s EEZ.  
C. IIUUUO Fishing: Illegal foreign fishing fleets and their local agents are the most 
unsettled actors and networks of instability. To fight against the foreign illegal fishers, the 
government needs to have modern satellite technologies, appropriate weapons, aircraft, sea-craft, 
well-trained navy arms, and financial and logistical support. Having all or some of these 
armaments can allow Somalia’s provincial and federal governments to control, patrol, supervise, 
and investigate whatever is going in and out of their EEZs. With this capacity, Somalia’s federal 
and provincial governments would be able to defend their territorial seawaters and coasts legally, 
diplomatically and militarily.  
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  D. Oil Exploiters: Oil/mineral exploiting companies are among the actors and networks of 
instability that create environmental degradation, insecurity, unsustainability, and indirectly rule 
the country. The simple solution is to ban any undertaking related to oil, gas, or mineral extraction 
and exploitation in Somalia’s land and seas. It is hard to perfectly cooperate with any of these 
companies, and create an environment in which there is a market where environmental 
sustainability is possible. The reality is that any business which is not based on cooperation, but 
competition results in environmental degradation and resource depletion. 
 
6.2.1.2. Actors and Networks of Stability 
A. Turkey: Turkey’s government provided substantial assistance for the rebuilding of 
Somalia. In November 2012, Turkey signed a multi-training agreement with Somalia’s federal 
government in Djibouti (Özkan, 2014). Subsequently, Turkey commenced development projects 
covering the economic, military, public infrastructure, educational, social, and political sectors in 
Somalia (International Business Publications, 2015). Proving itself to be the most neutral and 
reliable friend, Turkey is the first foreign actors and network of stability in Somalia. At this stage, 
the Somali government and the rest of the world should applaud and encourage Turkey for its 
tremendous efforts and solicit Turkey to increase or maintain these efforts. 
B. United Nations (UNs): The UN hugely supports AMISOM. But the concern arises as to 
whether the use of foreign military forces in Somalia would bring stability or would aggravate 
instability. My argument is that the only foreign military mission that would potentially work in 
Somalia is a border-guardian garrison excluding the troops of the frontline states deployed on the 
Somalia’s borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. This would minimize civilian casualties and would 
target only criminals. In this context, it is also notable that at the end of 1992, the international 
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community decided to stop the ongoing internal conflict causing brutal massacres and hunger in 
Somalia. The US and UN sent humanitarian assistance and a peacekeeping force named the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM), with a mission called “Operation Restore Hope” 
(Lewis, 1993). However, this mission failed within a year. Then, in 1993, another mission was 
deployed by the UN with multi-national troops named the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF), 
which was later reformed and renamed UNOSOM II. It employed over 30,000 personnel, with a 
cost of over $1.5 billion US per year (Harper, 2012). However, the mission was a failure for the 
US and ended with the Blackhawk-down incident, which forced the immediate withdrawal of 
forces from Somalia (Kubiak, 2014).  
 
6. 2.1.3. Actors and Networks of Potential Stability 
A: AMISOM: Even though it is far-fetched, most of the AU members are anxious that a 
strong Somalia may renew its irredentism126 and attempt to annex the Ogaden and NFD regions of 
Ethiopia and Kenya respectively. They believe that a strong Somalia will not respect the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU)’s territorial integrity treaty “As you Possess, so you 
possess” adopted in 1964 (Hasani, nd; Moi, 2004)127, which means to let every state’s border 
remain as it is. As a result, they prefer to protect and control every government established in 
Somalia. Additionally, since 2004, every Somalia government inaugurated has beseeched foreign 
troops to protect it from the people it is planning to lead and rule.  
                                                          
126 “irredentism” is a political term describing any political movement intending to reclaim and reoccupy a lost homeland by a 
government or a group on the basis of historic or ethnic connections. It originates from the Italian term irredento for "unredeemed. 
127 European colonials, mainly the British, demarcated almost every corner of the world’s land and seas territories. One of the 
consequences of the demarcation is the separation of families and kinsmen from one another, and as such, scattered across different 
countries. When the vast majority of the African countries became independent in the 1960s, the predictable border disputes began. 
In order to avoid such conflicts, the OAU adopted “As you possess, so you possess” as a fundamental principle to solve border 
disputes. 
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On the other hand, Somali citizens argue that any government fearing its own citizens to 
the level of using foreign forces against them has automatically lost its legitimacy and authority. 
Instead, it is nothing but a treacherous enemy carrying out a proxy war against its own people and 
country. Possibly, without AMISOM forces, the Islamic terrorists spearheaded by Al-Shabab 
might conquer the region and violate human rights. Due to apprehension at this possibility, the 
international community should help Somalia’s federal government to recruit a cross-clan strong 
police and military force. These Somali forces will be able to destroy terrorists in the country and 
deter them from crossing to the neighbouring countries. Puntland’s quick defeat of Al-Shabab, in 
three days in March 2016, is a remarkable example (Horseed, 2016).  
B. Kenya: Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya’s civilians, intelligence agencies, traders, and 
diplomatic missions could remain in the country, but be encouraged and monitored to be 
reciprocal, impartial and to act based on bilateral agreements. Grievances by either of the two sides 
must be finalized through negotiations and memoranda of understanding between the two states. 
Where these attempts fail to function, the two states need to resort to either a concerned court or 
traditional mediations undertaken in a third-state and facilitated by a third-party.  
When addressing the usage or sharing of natural resources with one or more of its 
stakeholders, Somalia needs to establish its position on the basis of scientific and political 
definitions. To challenge Kenya, whose experts are highly educated and up to date, Somalia needs 
to employ citizens who are experts in the needed field so as to proceed with negotiations or 
consensus- building procedures. Somalia now should benefit from its natural resources as they 
have been out of its control for over a quarter century. To succeed in managing, preserving, 
conserving, and protecting its natural resources and surrounding ecology, Somalia’s experts whose 
loyalty is confirmed must be given the opportunity to exercise their appropriate roles.  
234 
 
C. The US Government: Even though terrorism is the US’s first target, it is not its only 
major interest in Somalia. US policy towards Somalia covers each of the region’s geopolitical and 
economic interests. Being the gate to both Africa and Asia, and the bridge linking West and East, 
Somalia128 is a strategic zone for controlling the world’s transnational movements and economy. 
In every region of Somalia, particularly in the South-Central, there are non-asphalted roads and 
enclosed oil wells owned by the American oil companies such as Conoco, Amoco, and Chevron 
Phillips (Manson, 2013; Global Research, 2007). Most of these companies have been exploring 
and extracting oil or gas or both in Somalia since the 1960s (Global Research, 2007). 
Even though the US has been the sole world superpower since the end of the cold war, it 
has no effective and efficient policy to manage the world. There has been no effective strategy to 
deal with war-torn nations. The US mostly adopts a reactive approach as in the cases of Somalia, 
Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Bowden, 2006; Ludwig, 2005). In 1993, the US engaged in 
Somalia but immediately quit after 19 soldiers were killed (Bowden, 2006). The US has 
disregarded the Somali federal government to which it once gave recognition, followed by 
financial and technical supports. Explicitly, I advise the US to review its policy towards the Horn 
of Africa by taking a proactive policy. To curb and avoid terrorism, the US, assisted by the 
moderate non-state Islamic Scholars,129 may create global religious committee councils. Presently, 
a Muslim Sunni Committee is urgently needed to work on evading the spread of terrorists’ 
ideologies in the name of Islam. The US may approach the Saudi kingdom and ask them to prevent 
radical teachings in the Madina University which produces hardliners who frequently lecture on 
                                                          
128 particularly its marine intersection of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea 
129 These non-state Islamic Scholars could consist of freelance individuals who are selected due to their scholarly works and 
moderate organizations. It seems that nowadays, the vast majority of the Muslim laypersons consider their government political 
leaders as proxy agents of the Western world. As a result, it is advisable to limit the Muslim governments’ involvements in this 
project. 
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jihad. Somali Islamic extremists are primarily the product of the Madina University (Selassie, et 
al., 2004).  
 
C. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU Naval 
Force (NAVFOR): 
The Somalian federal government has little engagement with these networks’ missions 
and understands them ‘maritime monitoring mission’. It seems, however, that NATO and the 
NAVFOR undermine the authority of Somalia’s administration. Instead, they should consider 
empowering Somalia’s authorities by simply making the public aware that they will consult and 
cooperate with national, provincial and local authorities. Announcing such a decision would play 
a significant role in destroying the actors and networks of instability by demoralizing them and 
motivating and supporting governmental authorities130.  
On the other hand, NATO should realize that communicating with incapable citizens and 
associating with non-governmental institutions could delay or damage its achievements. Due to 
NATO’s lack of communication and coordination, Somalia may believe that the Western navies 
are occupying their seas not to deter terror activities, but to exploit marine resources131. To avoid 
such misunderstanding, NATO should sincerely prevent not only piracy and marine terrorism, 
but also police the activities of foreign fishing trawlers. It should also establish and maintain a 
reciprocal relationship with Somalia’s federal and provincial governments. 
                                                          
130. Taking this action against NATO’s improper actions could be a part of the political policy known as “the edge of abyss”, 
which means bringing one to a critical deadlock situation where there is no viable solution. Nasrallah describing this policy states 
“The events in The Edge of the Abyss are told through the voices of three characters whose lives are intertwined: a former minister, 
known for his corrupt practices; his lawyer wife, restricted by her association with him and a professor, whose personal interests 
dictate that he should serve the minister, but who at the same time seeks to fulfil his dreams of love through romantic adventures 
and becomes entangled with the minister's wife” (Nasrallah, 2014). In such a scenario, how do these circumstances resolve 
themselves without any of the parties getting hurt. 
131 Furthermore, the Somali government might have considered that NATO’s actions as a war against the country’s people and 
resources. 
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E. The UK and US Intelligence Agencies: It seems that the US and UK intelligence 
agencies deal with unexpected incidents which lure them to taking military decisions and actions. 
The maneuvers and motives of these intelligence agencies are different from those of their 
countries. Therefore, it is preferable to separate them out in this discussion. These two 
governments’ intelligence agencies seek to deter terrorist activities, but they operate without 
acquiring local approval and coordination with the national government.  
Some of these intelligence agencies argue that regardless of Somalia’s sovereignty and the 
international recognition given to the current government, the fact on the ground is that the 
government is not in a position to administer its territory (Elmi, et al., 2014), and as such is an 
unreliable partner. However, having such outsiders impose rules only exacerbate the lack of state 
capacity. Daugbjerg (1998) argues that policy networks are less efficient when outsiders set the 
agenda in a form of a top-down approach.  
Unlike spontaneous and haphazard reactions to perceived threats, the Western intelligence 
agencies should take three responsibilities, on behalf of the US and the UK, to stabilize Somalia: 
First, to give direct advice to Ethiopia and ask it to withdraw from Somalia politically, militarily 
and economically, while ensuring that its border will be secured by international forces. Second, 
they should give honest advice to Somaliland against its position regarding secession. They should 
publicly announce that they will not recognize it as an independent state. Rather, they should 
encourage Somaliland to respect the unity of Somalia and be a part of the Somalia’s political, 
social, environmental, and economic solutions. Third, the US and UK primarily need to recognize, 
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reconcile, cooperate, and establish reciprocal relationships with Somalia’s provincial and federal 
governments. This could broaden their capacities to succeed in their missions and visions132.  
 
6. 2. 2. The national level 
6.2.2.1. Actors and Networks of Instability 
    A. Money-Lords: Networks of money-lords impair political improvement in the country by 
evading law enforcement. One of the strategies that make them successful is via hosting and 
flattering any new government and then providing loans to it, until they finally hold that 
government as a hostage. At the post-conflict stage, this strategy must be revealed and stopped. 
First, the money-lords’ material offers and financial loans should not be accepted. Second, the 
government should have its own network of logistical supplies rather than contracting money-
lords. Since almost every Somali person can claim to be a trader, there must be a means to evaluate 
anybody and any group. Instead of employing financing from these groups, the government should 
encourage and request the money-lords financially contribute to the rebuilding of the country in 
return for no rewards.  
 On the other side, since the Hawala system is an unregulated economy, each of the networks of 
instability -  including terrorists, pirates, smugglers, money launders, illegal fishers, and political 
spoilers - not only transfer their monies through them, but are also shareholders. Similarly, they 
communicate through the money-lords’ telecommunication companies. The federal government 
needs to classify the Hawala companies as governable and non-governable groups. In front of the 
                                                          
132 It is important to bear in mind that mass distraction weapons, sophisticated technologies, strong finance, and a large number of 
foot soldiers may not bring the success unless there is a human morality. Yet, a human morality can be practiced where there are 
human rights, justice, equity, and other forms of moral armaments. Where these good qualities are not practical, wrong and inhuman 
ideologies are the applicant with the justifications of protecting either religion/culture or natural resource. Al-Shabab uses only 
these two validations to influence supporters and recruit fighters.   
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public media, each of these companies must be required to take an oath of being law-abiding.  
Thereafter, the government should register and license the governable Hawalas who accept to be 
governed, monitored and investigated by the concerned government agencies.  
 The provincial governments, employing all kinds of media and civil societies, should undertake 
a thorough campaign of discouraging small-scale entrepreneurs133 from looking at actors and 
networks of instability as role models. It is in this way that government may weaken the money-
lords’ networks of instability, and replace them with wealthy networks of stability. Besides these 
governmental efforts, religious leaders and clan-elders should adopt a comprehensive campaign to 
promote the values of economic, social, political, and environmental stability. They should also 
publicize the values of tax-paying by the wealthy persons. 
 
B. Warlords: Warlords presenting themselves as self- leaders represent the Hawiye clan, Darod 
clan and Isaq sub-clan of Dir clan. While they are weakening and waning, they remain dangerous. 
They have been previously recognized as community leaders but diminished in their role with the 
re-emergence of the government. The crucial step of eradicating them will require a concerted 
struggle against any clannish concept and employment for the young generation who had found a 
livelihood with their militias. Local civil societies including various experts, professionals, 
intellectuals, women groups, youth organizations, local retailers, innocent elders, and peace-loving 
religious leaders should be organized to enable their unions and clubs to dismantle clan influence. 
Accordingly, social integration programs starting from trading, intermingling, sports races, and the 
traditional system of religious scholarships (isu xeraysi) must be implemented by the NGOs. The 
Warlords’ primary wings are the youth whom they use as militias and bodyguards. Once these 
                                                          
133 who act as networks of stability. 
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youths are employed elsewhere, they warlords will be isolated and more likely to adhere to the 
law.  
 
C. Warmonger Faith-Lords: Warrior faith-lords have produced the Al-Shabab group who should 
be described as neither a politically-motivated insurgent nor an Islamic extremist cult, but rather a 
criminal and barbaric organization. The organization is heavily detrimental to the young generation 
by killing them in the battlefield, in the recruitment process, for disobedience, and in targeted 
assassinations intended to act as a threat and example to others. Additionally, they divert them 
from job opportunities134 and security. None of these faith-lord networks is registered or identifies 
itself, as either a political party or a religious/spiritual sect. They focus on influencing the public 
to promote private political agendas. The best strategy to challenge them is through the creation of 
new moderate socio-religious groups who operate peacefully and demonstrate positive aspects of 
religion, civilization, development, environment, and leadership qualities as an indivisible 
package.  
 
6.2.2.2. Actors and Networks of Stability 
A. Moderate Religious Leaders: Moderate religious leaders mobilizing their teachers, students, 
activists, and supporters should organize themselves and approach all citizens135 for public 
support. One of their first responsibilities is to lobby for constitutionally outlawing the promotion 
of terrorism as an Islamic teaching. Specifically, they should convince the law-makers 
                                                          
134 Somali youth individuals are in sociopolitical and economic crisis. In their hometowns, in which foreigners are exploiting their 
natural resources, the Somali youth have no jobs, security, governmental administration, community capacity, basic infrastructure, 
and functional institutions.  
135 starting from the civil society groups and community elders 
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(parliamentarians) and the judiciary to criminalize teaching, advising, or telling either persons or 
congregations that, in Islamic law, there is a death penalty for apostasy, fornication, 
homosexuality, or for any other case136 as for promoting the principle of “Al-wala Wa-albara”137. 
         To succeed in their mission, moderate religious leaders need to learn the most appropriate 
strategies to deal with, and ultimately reform, each of the religious networks of instability. Directly 
or through mediators, they need to approach and invite them to dialogue assemblies. In the process 
of dialogue, moderate leaders need to demonstrate interest, respect, good hospitality, honest, 
politeness, clean-heartedness, and pure intention of removing negativity. Constructive religious 
groups should be motivated by the defence of their own faith rather than material gains. When the 
warmonger faith-lords are reminded of these good ethics, which are among the chief 
commandments of their faith, they could be pacified and attracted to act and react as part of the 
solution to instability rather than squabbling.  
 
6.2.2.3. Actors and Networks of Potential Stability 
A. The Somali Federal/National Government 
 a. Legislative Branch: The federal parliament’s responsibilities can be improved by the 
Internal/Standing Committee consisting of the Speaker, Deputy Speakers, and Chairpersons of the 
different Committees. This committee is in charge of administering the overall activities of the 
Parliament including the government’s finances and politics in conformity with international and 
regional treaties. Through a parliamentary policy, the Somali government needs to diplomatically 
                                                          
136 The only death penalty that unavoidably Islam accepts is where the victims of a murdered person insist on death sentence against 
the murderer of their beloved person. This means to avoid further reprisal deaths in the community.      
137 Al-wala Wa-albara is a fanatic Wahabism principle which gave birth all the inhuman concepts resulting terrorism. It means to 
divide the people into “friendly and unfriendly” which eventually is practiced as “my way or the highway”. 
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cooperate with foreign intelligence and military forces. Any diplomatic discussion on foreign 
militaries must be approved by Somalia’s military-attaché in that country. In this case, Somalia 
can be assertive in rejecting or negotiating concerning intolerable activities beyond the mandates 
of foreign forces’.138 This would be a milestone for the federal government to set-forth clear and 
applicable policies and plans for the country’s various institutions, while providing advice and 
observation to those of the provincial states.  
 The Standing Committee needs to update its skills in managing the affairs of the house including 
financial auditing and executive’s administrative functionality. Anti-corruption and malfeasance 
services must be continuously and regularly assessed that they maintain and improve the proper 
means of eradicating these scourges. Good governance can be commenced through financial 
control based on weekly discussions, policy reviews, law amendment, and updates. This is the root 
of standardizing self-administration. The current lack of know-how, incompetent leadership, and 
self-promoting behaviours would be addressed through these actions.  
 b. Executive Branch: The executive branch governs, but is not limited to, all the ministries, 
agencies, units, and other institutions that are, either partially or fully, in charge of environmental 
protection and resource management. Like most of the government’s institutions, the 
administrative capacity of the Executive has been jeopardized by a ‘lack of know-how’ combined 
with ‘malfeasance and corruption’.  
 There have been recurrent administrative conflicts among the Ministers/Ministries, due to a 
lack of clearly defined job-descriptions, a lack of experienced and qualified personnel, and a lack 
of skilled junior employees. Incompetent leaders cannot manage the fate of a country that is 
recovering from a prolonged civil war. Certainly, Somalia needs a head of state who can manage 
                                                          
138 Due to the limited capacity of the Somali government, opposing the operations of these forces is a challenging issue. 
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the country’s natural resources in its post-conflict situation by using both qualification and 
experience. Such a leader would employ competent personnel and fulfill international and regional 
conventions, treaties and agreements. Proper management should work via three strategies: to 
educate yourself, to educate your team and to accomplish responsibilities with such collective 
education. 
 c. Judicial Branch: The Judiciary office gazetted enforceable rules and regulations yet these 
are rarely implemented. While in their early weeks, the laws were partially or fully implemented 
after a few months, they vanished and remained on paper only. The country’s courts are either 
dysfunctional or undeveloped to efficiently operate. They either lack legal experts or local 
capacity. I suggest that what is needed at the level of the federal level judiciary system is a state 
capacity-building process which is not limited to material processes, but extended to technical, 
educational and emotional levels.  
 If only the material side is focused on, the actors and networks of instability will create new 
strategies of corruption. Good governance must not only avoid brain-drain but return qualified and 
skilled Somalis, who left the country and adopted other citizenships, to play a significant role in 
the development of efficient administrative skills and prevention of corruption. 139 Even, if 
maladministration and corruption are weakened, there could be other battles in the field of law and 
policy enforcement. What are known as the weapons of the weak, including foot dragging, 
dissimulation (concealment), false compliance, and pilfering (robbery/theft), followed by arsonage 
and sabotage could erupt at any level and any location (Piot, 2010). The judiciary system should 
anticipate such direct and indirect attacks on the country’s law and law enforcement. 
                                                          
139 Mismanagement, misunderstanding and miscalculating local customers create legal and policy complexities in the involved 
organization, and ultimately result in organizational complexity. 
243 
 
 
d. National Fisheries Organizations and Companies 
  In Somalia, the fisher companies registered at a national level are Somali Marine Resource 
Development and Conservation Centre (SMRDCC) and Somali National Fishing Company 
(SNFCO) (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2015). Both are practically inactive.140 The former was 
registered as a national fisher and marine resource company in 2012 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
2015). Nevertheless, the company’s role is very limited, due to a lack of financial capacity and a 
lack of governmental collaboration. Although it is developing economic cooperation between 
Somalia and Italy, it lacks Somalia’s administrative collaboration. Being ignored or neglected by 
the federal government, the company has approached Somaliland to implement a project aiming 
to create job opportunities for Somaliland fisheries. It has been disappointed once again in this 
effort (Ibrahim, 2013)141.  
 After being thwarted by the national and provincial governments, the company engaged in 
unlimited, unrestricted, and uncontrolled fishing activities (Ibrahim, 2013). The federal 
government neglected its duty by failing to register, provide guidelines and control the Somali-
owned and co-owned fisher companies. It should fulfill its responsibilities towards the matter. That 
said, a remarkable positive step was taken in April 2014, when representatives of the Federal 
Government, Somaliland, Puntland, Jubbaland, and Galmudug met and agreed to cooperate on 
fisheries management. The political leaders of these states must understand the importance of this 
                                                          
140 As these are the only two companies registered at the national level, and both end to no avail, apparently, there is no fisher 
company at the national level. Since they are opportunistic and there is a wide lawlessness in the country, the fisher companies 
harvest fish and other marine resources throughout the Somali basin and beyond. Some are registered under the Puntland’s 
Department of Fishing, while others are registered under the office Somaliland’s office of the president. In both cases, there are no 
restrictions in their licenses and no conditions in their registrations.  
141 In its first phase, the project was successful but it could not progress further due to internal unprofessionalism and external 
political interventions. 
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agreement. This could lead them to develop policies and structures to combat IIIUUF, build a 
foundation for sustainable marine resource management142, and initiate territorial use rights for 
fisheries (TURF) among the various Somali provinces.  
 
e. Non-Governmental Organizations Active at the National Level 
The bulk of national governmental management tasks in environmental legislation and 
administration are carried out by some non-governmental organizations whose work is quite weak. 
Thus, operational institutions are primarily concerned with the implementation of policies and 
laws, even though the executive power delegated to them may include setting technical standards, 
as well as monitoring compliance with such standards. In overall terms, it seems that Somalia has 
not sufficiently benefited from the international assistance and co-operation on environmental 
issues.143  
However, by reading the United Nations’ anecdotes and activities, one can argue that the 
UN has given tremendous amounts of financial aid to Somalia. Unfortunately, little of that aid has 
reached its destination or been used for its allocated purpose. Most of the environmental and 
developmental funds were either wasted due to mismanagement or stolen by the entrusted 
managers (Srinivasan, 2012). Most of the current titular national NGOs are not environmental but 
social, developmental, political, and other groups. These NGOs operate only temporarily or 
occasionally. Some may survive a year or less due to funding challenges, and it is rare to find one 
that has survived over a decade unless it is an extended branch of one of the INGOs or Regional 
Non-Governmental Organizations (RNGOs)144. Even INGOs give occasional, or one-time, 
                                                          
142 such as to produce optimum sustainable yield (OSY) and regularize fish-catch policy. 
143 Though various branches of the UN have a close relationship with the developing countries and have environmental joint 
working groups with them, Somalia seems somehow neglected and omitted. 
144 There are plenty of RNGOs and INGOs in the country, but with minimal outcomes and success. 
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subcontracts to implement a particular project. One of the fundamental constraints of the national 
NGOs is that their relationships with the public are weak or non-existent.  
After having consulted with the concerned committee, the federal Parliament needs to set 
standard requirements to be fulfilled by national NGOs. Following those instructions, the ministry 
of internal affairs should register and issue a license for any NGO that has completed the 
requirements. Their visions and missions must be clear to the ministry of internal affairs who 
should monitor and evaluate their activities.    
 
6.2.3. The provincial/Local level 
6. 2. 3.1: Actors and Networks of Instability 
A: Somaliland Separatism   
Somaliland’s political agenda is based on secession. This may lead to a new phase of civil 
war in the country. Such a conflict will directly affect the country’s environment and natural 
resources. At present, Somaliland government has a ‘secret-clause’ collaboration with Al-Shabab 
against Somalia for mutual benefit. Wolfson & Greta145 argue that Somaliland is helping Al-
Shabab in many ways: logistics, plans, strategies, training, recruiting, arms, munitions, supplies, 
and funding through the Dahabshiil Money-transferor Company. These authors argue that even 
some of the Somaliland’s intelligence service are members of the Al-Shabab’s Amniyat division 
(Wolfson et al., 2015).  Ulusow146 (2014) similarly suggests that it seems that Somaliland secretly 
                                                          
145 Swedish Investigative Journalists through many former and current intelligence units and individual officials, security experts, 
and politicians. These bodies include both Somalis, Somaliland citizens, regional experts, and international experts. They also 
analyze numerous cases 
146 An outspoken Somali investigative journalist based in the Netherlands. 
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supports any form of terrorism in Somalia in the belief that the greater Somalia’s instability, the 
better the chances of Somaliland becoming an independent state. 
If a military expedition is deployed in Somaliland by the rest of Somalia under the 
leadership of the federal ministry of defence, there could be more civilian casualties than 
combatants. It is hard to distinguish between the Isaq’s147 military and non-military members. 
Children, women, and non-military men would fight or vacate the zones alongside their military 
kinsmen. To avoid a conflict between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia, there must be strategic 
measures which based on a combination of both negotiation and law enforcement. 
Currently, there is an ongoing UN-backed national government and Somaliland dialogue 
hosted by Turkey which mainly focuses on sharing the rights to control civil aviation. But it had 
dealt less with the political agenda and resource distribution. On this point, the international 
community and the UN should frankly state their points of view towards Somaliland.148 In addition 
international and UN pressures, Somali government should endeavour to attract the Isaq 
community of Somaliland whose politicians are struggling to secede from Somalia. This would be 
helpful at the stage of a referendum if (they) resort to one. In a peace process dialogue, the Somali 
government should be fair to the respective clans of the country, and avoid offering or giving extra 
rights to Somaliland for the sake of the unity.149 
B. Local pirates 
 Pirates operate throughout the Somali basin, largely in Puntland, claiming that they serve as 
coast-guards in their territorial waters (Mazurek, 2015). However, unlike Sierra Leone’s youth 
                                                          
147 Isaq, the separatist group, is in between two sub-clans; Dhulbahante and Gudo-biirsi, who fully or partially support the unity 
of Somalia. 
148 It seems that no state is ready to recognize Somaliland’s independence, yet none of them dares to reject its demand for secession. 
This is ultimately against the interests of Somaliland’s local community, the young generation whose future is particularly bleak.  
149 Giving extra rights to any given community would only exacerbate the problem where such a community would continue 
demanding more and others’ rights will be deprived. The true political and policy strategy is that tells the truth.     
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who fought for the defence of their rainforest in 1999 (Paul, 2015; Smillie, 2009; Dugal, 2009), 
they do not differentiate between illegal fishers and seafarers. They must be seriously fought with 
the help of the international community, excluding three frontline states. This effort must be 
strategically undertaken by avoiding further tensions that could strengthen networks of instability. 
Unlike the approachable networks of instability, the unapproachable networks must be dealt with 
according to the extent of their unlawfulness and illicit activities.  
 To prevent piracy, there is a need to provide life-skill training in various professions, formal 
and informal education, psychological rehabilitation, and social reintegration for former, new and 
suspected pirate members as well as all youth. Finding job opportunities for the young generation 
is the most effective strategy to prevent piracy. To avert pirates’ justification that they are 
defending their territorial sea resources, each of the provincial and federal administrations should 
warn faith-lords against fomenting violence-based religious advice and motivations.150 Another 
option is to support fisherwomen’s activities besides fishermen. This option may not only promote 
women’s rights in the economy, but would also reduce the new phenomenon of indirect 
prostitution which encourages young boys to join pirates.    
 
6.2.3.2. Actors and Networks of Potential Stability 
A: Somaliland Governmental Marine Environmental Management  
 In Somaliland, most of the activities in the marine and coastal zones are acceptable for a 
developing state recovering from civil war. It is not in a deplorable condition in terms of 
environmental protection, resource management, and security. This means most of the 
                                                          
150 As radicalism is being criminalized, any religious evangelization that may lead to resentment, violence, and warmongering 
should be criminalized. 
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networks/stakeholders involved in these areas are actors and networks of stability. The federal 
government can boost these initiatives by using both external diplomatic ties and internal 
connections. All the agreements with the foreign state and non-state stakeholders must be applied 
to Somaliland’s marine and coastal zones. This will limit the ambition of Somaliland’s separatists, 
while increasing the unionists’ hopes and motivating coastal communities. To weaken the 
separatists, it is necessary to support and mobilize local administrations in the towns and rural 
areas of these sub-clans, while still avoiding any form of conflict. Internally, the government 
should ensure that Somaliland’s economic, political, social, environmental, and developmental 
rights are respected. 
 
B: South-Central (Jubbaland, South-West, and Galmudug) Potential Provinces 
For the stability of the South-central region of the country, the federal government should 
limit its role, in accordance with the constitution, to working with the emerging provincial states 
of Jubbaland, South-West, and Galmudug. This would encourage local communities to feel 
ownership of their cities, districts, towns, and rural villages. It would also open opportunities for 
sub-clan chiefs and elders to meet each other and have a dialogue. Local intellectuals could get 
together on occasion to share information and opinions regarding the peace process with their clan 
elders. Consequently, local communities would comfortably work towards autonomous 
administrations based on a bottom-up approach.  
Galmudug’ stakeholders - Ethiopia, the Federal government, and Faith-lord Warmongers 
– should stop meddling in the potential province’s administration and security processes. Instead, 
they should sincerely support them. In order to secure the establishment of Jubbaland, an 
extensively organized and regularized campaign on sustainable fishing and consumption of marine 
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resources should be undertaken. This would divert residents’ minds from political tensions and 
recurrent conflicts toward provincial fishing professions. Similarly, the people of the Southwest 
potential province must be encouraged to undertake self-help programs leading to agricultural 
engagement.  
C: Private Coast-Guards in Puntland: Coast-Guards in Puntland, followed by those of 
Somaliland, are the only permanent and reliable marine forces in Somalia. Yet, their missions and 
visions need to be reviewed and adjusted with both the provincial and national interests as well as 
those of the region and the globe. Policy networks among local communities should have close 
working relations and general agreements over the scope and aims of coast sharing policy with 
local communities151. In many respects the formal and informal relationships between local 
enterprises and external organisations, including coast-guards, must be given consideration in 
order to examine to what extent these public–private partnerships are strong and how they may or 
may not affect the marine natural environment.  
 Some of the coast-guard companies are influential and could be used by either the government 
or the citizens to advance particular projects. They should be carefully approached, and negotiated 
with. One strategy to attract the networks of instability to collaborate with locals would be to 
require them to need the knowledge and skills of the local fishers, for instance for 
knowledge/information. This could be the first step in a roadmap to integration of scientific studies 
and traditional knowledge. Such an approach would endeavor to meet two objectives; “to enhance 
competence in the decision-making process, and … to assign a fair share of responsibility to 
manage risks to those who are or will be affected by the potential consequences” (Stoll-kleemaann, 
et al., 2006, p.4). 
                                                          
151 leading to create policy input from the grass roots, and pass it to general institutional processes leading to policy output. 
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     C: Provincial/Local Fisher Companies 
  Provincial/Local Fisher Companies lack formal contracts for exporting their products. As a 
result, they catch fish without any pre-requisite orders, reliable markets and plans. Only after they 
acquire this unlimited and unregulated catch do they start seeking markets. All the non-consumed 
and non-purchased catches are either returned to the sea or left at the shore (thefishsite.com). Local 
fishers do not possess adequate qualitative instruments for fish-netting and handling measures. 
This leads to overfishing with no regard to endangered species or indiscriminate fishing.152 
Administrative structures were not functional during the civil war. But presently, effective 
measures for fishing management, fish-catch control, fishing regulation, marketing system, and 
other relevant responsibilities may be undertaken. 
 Lack of fishing technology and fishery safety measures, including lack of life-jackets, are 
among the primary obstacles to the fishing industry in Somalia. Currently, provincial/local fishers 
need investment, technical support, financial support, and moral support. These types of supports 
could easily be provided by each and any of the local business persons, provincial authorities, 
federal authorities, Local Non-Governmental Organizations (LNGOs), International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and foreign traders.  
     D: LNGOs: Nowadays, local communities are eager to make money through foreign 
humanitarian aid, investments, loans, development projects, and so on. It has reached the level 
where there are hundreds, if not thousands, of one man show LNGOs which do not exist beyond 
name, logos, and an introductory page in papers held in one man’s handbag. Still, there is a window 
of opportunity for establishing effective and efficient environmental local NGOs.  
                                                          
152 When foreign fishing vessels threaten the livelihood of local small-scale fisheries with limited political power and equipment, 
local fishermen using small boats and traditional techniques inevitably suffer from depleted stocks 
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I highly recommend LNGOS be amalgamated with the Local Communities and Provincial 
Administrations. Local NGOs should be registered by the local elders and community activists. 
They need to approach them with practical wisdom rather than giving orders. There, a union of 
LNGOs operating an environmental umbrella office could be established. There must be tangible 
benefits for each of the LNGOs in union membership. The benefits can create a reciprocal 
relationship and constant collaboration. Each of the federal and provincial governments should 
set-forth and implement constitutional and ministerial policies towards NGOs. The ministry of 
interior, which is the most appropriate office to manage NGOs, must update itself and familiarize 
itself with the latest political and non-political conventions regarding NGOs and democracy. 
 
6. 2. 3. 3: Actors and Networks of Stability 
A: The Puntland Government 
 The federal government should continuously consult with Puntland in order to avoid 
distrust. Puntland often complains of not being consulted by the federal administration on national 
policies. It demanded provisions in each draft of the federal constitution, sharing federal resources, 
demarcating provincial borders, power-sharing, the election process, and representation. On the 
other hand, Puntland has often tried to control or influence the federal government’s decisions for 
its particular interests. It demands special privileges for being autonomous before the re-emergence 
of the national government, and for not embracing separatism like Somaliland. In response to these 
demands, the federal government should be cautious not to be submissive to Puntland, but should 
honestly and diplomatically engage with it. The federal government should immediately start 
distributing federal resources to the provincial states by implementing articles 6A and 7 of the 
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interim constitution. There, Puntland may secure its right share of the country’s resources and 
become satisfied.  
B: Coastal Communities: In large part, coastal communities are among the networks of stability. 
They basically need two things: stability and motivation. In order to solve their internal problems 
and build positive relationships among the various stakeholders, the federal government should 
fully use its capacities and social capital to support them. The roadmap to the peace process must 
be based on fairness. This means all networks/stakeholders of potential stability must access their 
fair share of resources in order to divert them from collaborating and siding with the networks of 
instability for self-remobilization. Hanzen states: “A rebel group is likely to continue to seek to 
rebuild its capacity and therefore expand its options to continue the war throughout the negotiation 
period. This is especially true in situations in which the rebel group does not perceive it is getting 
its fair share out of a peace agreement” (Hanzen, 2013, p. 41). 
 
6. 3. Cross-Cutting Themes from Somali Actor and Network Analysis 
A number of key themes emerge from the analysis of the actors and networks of stability, 
potential stability and instability at the international, national and provincial/local levels in 
Somalia.  
6. 3.1. Competing International Agendas with Respect to Somalia 
The key feature among the international networks that are active in and around the Somali 
basin is the lack of a coherent and consistent common agenda with respect to Somalia. Rather, 
individual state and non-state networks are pursuing their own interests, even when nominally 
working collectively. For instance, AMISOM forces, relying on the UN’s support, act as if they 
are the breadwinners for their respective families, communities and countries, and not as 
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Samaritans came to assist a member state - Somalia. Even the UN seems to endorse this approach. 
Recently, the UN commissioned a Ugandan contingent of over 400 Special Forces simply to guard 
AMISOM’s facilities (Arman, 2014).  
Another large military force is assigned to guard AMISOM’s staff rather than pursuing Al-
Shabab. Similarly, AMISOM employed a large number of professionals, office employees, 
laborers, interpreters, reporters, and logistical deliverers.153 The AMISOM donors must recalculate 
their decisions towards financing AMISOM. The money spent in AMISOM may not only suffice 
to support the deployment of UN forces to patrol Somalia’s seas and land borders but also to recruit 
and train Somali forces154 to control Somalia and its borders. The recruitment of Somali forces 
must ensure that they are not susceptible to terrorism, radicalism, warlordism, and gangsterish 
behavior.  
 Ethiopia is one of the strongest stakeholders in Somalia at the regional level, but basically 
pursues its own agenda. It seems that Ethiopia’s motive is to reverse history by reinstating the 
condition of the region before 1897 when there were no borders separating the two countries 
(Kendie, 2007). At this stage, Ethiopia needs to realize that the world has changed geographically, 
politically, socially, and economically as well as in terms of civilization and lifestyle.  
 Instead, Ethiopia needs to remove suspicion and pessimism from its policy. It should focus on 
achieving its main agenda, which is to trade in the Indian Ocean through Somalia’s ports, in a 
peaceful and friendly manner. To achieve this goal, Ethiopia should respect Somali sovereignty 
politically, militarily, socially, economically, and environmentally. As a part of beginning a new 
era of a friendly neighborhood, Ethiopia should discontinue destroying Somalia’s land resources 
                                                          
153 Each of these staff members does not only receive monthly salaries, but huge amounts of risk allowance, night-out, out of home 
incentive, body-guards, maidservants, war-designated vehicles, bullet-proofs, and other frequently emerging incentive payments 
at the cost of AMISOM. 
154 As is being done in other conflict zones. 
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and environment. First is to end its illegal action of diverting Somalia’s two main rivers (Jubba 
and Shabbelle) (Glaser, 2015). Secondly it should halt its suspicious military coalition with Kenya 
against Somalia (Kendie, 2007), and thirdly, it should cut its military treaties with Puntland and 
Somaliland (Arman, 2014).  
 The UN155 should acknowledge that Somalia needs to move from political and economic 
trusteeship, and recovery stages to a post-conflict rebuilding stage. Recently, “Somalia and its 
littoral regions have asked the international community for assistance in developing necessary 
physical infrastructure and scientific capacity to achieve sustainable fisheries management” 
(Glaser, 2015, p. 65). At this stage, Somalia should promote an international call to action to stop 
illegal and destructive foreign fishing in and near its EEZ. 
 
6.3.2. Failure of Actors with Capacity and Nominal Respect for the Rule of Law to 
Act Constructively 
The NATO/NAVFOR coalition, whose capacity is strong and self-sufficient, is unwilling to act 
against IUUUO; at the same time, the coalition does not pay attention to the local fishers’ concerns 
and complaints. This discourages Somali peace-lovers and coastal communities. Instead, it 
encourages pirates and marine terrorists. NATO’s objectives and mandates are unclear to both 
Somalia’s governments and its citizenry. 
The NATO naval fleets state that their mandate is to monitor transnational movements in 
Somali waters. Nonetheless, the following questions, among others, still remain unanswered: Is 
the navy, particularly the US Navy, the most appropriate body to supervise marine security 
globally? What institution can play an effective and neutral role at the global level? Is NATO the 
                                                          
155 Through its main agencies involved in Somalia such as UNDP, UNPOS, FAO, World Bank, and IMO. 
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most reliable body? Even if NATO is the proper channel, can the strategic unevenness in its role 
be compensated with the socio-political and military-political trade-offs that are intrinsic to the 
negotiating process?  
 
6.3.3. Lack of Capacity Among Somali National, Provincial and Local 
Governments: 
 The incapacity of federal and provincial governments has not only hindered the country’s 
recovery, but has also played a significant role in the continuation of the civil war and 
sociopolitical instability. Among their failures is their lack of interest in providing political and 
material resources to the young generation, in order to liberate them from depending on warlords, 
pirates, Al-Shabab, and other criminal and destabilizing groups. The youth’s dependence on these 
networks of instability is the primary source of internal environmental degradation and insecurity 
in the country.  
Dividing the environmental and security responsibilities within the federal government, 
provincial authorities and local communities, there are four key limitations at the federal level, two 
at the provincial level and one at the local level. At the federal level, these are: 1) Institutional 
incapability due to the lack of financial, technological, infrastructural, and personnel capacities. 2) 
Political chasms where most of the politicians focus on personal interests and engage in corrupt 
practices. 3) Foreign military interference, policy alterations and misleading advice based on 
various economic and political agendas, and 4) Internal corruption which may be reinforced or 
facilitated by external personnel.  
At the provincial level, there are two chief obstacles to stability one of which one is internal 
and the other is external. Internally, each of the provincial administrators seeks to block the 
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political and economic agendas of the other. Externally, provinces have endured constant meddling 
from the Ethiopian ministries of defence and foreign affairs (Arman, 2015). At the local level, civil 
society groups, community elders, local politicians, women’s groups, and individuals may attempt 
to improve their territorial environment and security. Since they are not recognized as authorities, 
they have no voice in the international community, and cannot continue fighting for the protection 
of their resources through diplomatic means. Yet, some academic and community fisheries have 
repeatedly tried to argue against degrading their marine environment and exploiting their marine 
resources.  
To maintain relationships between the federal and provincial governments, there must be 
a focal office/person at the national level who is directly connected to each of the provincial 
ministries to coordinate policies and all forms of environmental activities. Provincial and district 
committees are required to work with the national environmental committee, which is in charge of 
drafting the national environmental act that governs the country’s various environmental sectors 
at both national and provincial levels. 
The primary trigger of conflict and mistrust among Somalia’s respective provinces and 
clans is the political leadership. No clan accepts to be governed by another, and the presidential 
elections that have taken place so far were not fair and free, but laden with corruption and coercion. 
Power hungry politicians do not limit their corrupt practices to bribery. They also intimidate 
innocent citizens in order to compel them to vote for particular candidates. In a form of threatening, 
they spread rumours among the voters on that a particular candidate is being endorsed and funded 
by the US and Ethiopia, therefore, those MPs who did not vote for him could be considered 
terrorists and arrested. The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and relevant state 
and non-state organizations who supervise national elections should be present in every election 
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in Somalia as an extra caution. They may provide training to local electoral committees and guide 
the voters, nominators, nominees, candidates, and vote-workers. They may also assist them 
regarding financial capacity, technical capacity, logistics, and organizational management, while 
facilitating the duties of the Electoral Committee, the voting system, and procedures. This would 
enlighten Somalis on evading corruption, bribery, recklessly flattering individuals, voting for the 
wrong candidates based upon interest of their forefathers’ or kinship, jealousy, or becoming 
vulnerable to a candidate’s intimidation and psychological warfare156.  
 
6.3.4. Role of Corruption within Somali Governmental Institutions 
Any fragile government official, especially in the third world, may engage in personal 
interest-based forms of corruption. Where there is a corruption, government decisions may be 
supportive to those of actors and networks of illegality and instability which create or lead to 
environmental unsustainability. Concurrently, corruption opens doors toward misleading, 
abandoning or hindering public management. Corruption may be engaged because of fear, want, 
greed, anger, envy, ignorance, aggression, or for fun157. In the case of Somalia, fear and greed are 
the major motives. The former is practiced by the weak victims while the latter is practiced by the 
strong oppressors. At individual level, these should be combatted in two ways; public admonition 
acting from religious and dignity perspectives, and legal action. Article 11C of the provisional 
draft constitution submitted to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament on 07 September 
                                                          
156 One of the latest corruption strategies used in the latest election was to give each of the bribed MPs a particular sign that he or 
she should write on the back or the edge of their ballot paper. Then, it is the representative of that candidate who will quickly scan 
and record each of those who gave their vote. There, anyone who took the bribe but did not give the vote can be figured out and 
targeted. The Electoral Committee must double check each ballot’s every corner, and if any mark is found on one, should announce 
that such a vote is a waste. On top of that effort, a high definition camera which can detect every mark on the papers should be 
switched on for surveillance.  
157 Most of these reasons could lead other destructive factors such as slowly destroying all senses of right and wrong in the midst 
of the society; killing human intelligence, norms, and spreading itself into all over the roots of the society’s culture. 
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2012 cites corruption with lapses. This article must be amended to be efficient, effective, instant, 
and uncompromising. Legal actions related to it must be taken publicly for the purposes of both 
punishing and embarrassing the culprits. 
It is not a hidden problem that Somali executive administrators and leaders are lacking 
basic knowledge and experience in office administration and money management (Kay, 2014; 
Arman, 2014). Several state and non-state donors contributes quite a significant amount of money 
to rebuilding Somalia. Yet, the federal government always complains about its lack of financial 
capacity.  Since the inauguration of the federal government, the Western state and non-state donors 
started depositing their donations into a UNDP account in Kenya (CRD, 2013). UNDP transfers 
only monthly expenses to the Somalia’s central bank, yet Somali leaders were repeatedly 
condemned for stealing such monthly expenses (Transparency International, 2015; BBC, 2012).  
Currently, Somalia is economically under the trusteeship of the UNDP Multi-Partner 
Trust Fund Office (UNDP, 2010), while politically falling under the UNPOS (UNPOS, 2013). 
This could be a solution if the UN staff themselves were trustworthy. It appears, however, that 
they take an advantage of the Somali leaders’ incompetency. At this stage, what is needed is to 
employ strategic anti-corruption and malfeasance services by the donors collaborating with Somali 
experts. This should continuously and regularly be evaluated so as to eradicate administrative 
corruption. Good governance begins with financial controls based on weekly discussions, policy 
reviews, and legal updating for standardizing self-administration. Through this, the current lack of 
know-how, incompetent leadership, and self-sustaining behaviours can be addressed.  
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6.3.5. The Role of Clans in Somali Politics and Society 
The main two obstacles to security and sustainability at each of national and provincial levels 
are the clan system and corruption. In this theme, I focus on the role of clans in Somali politics 
and society as it has been a factor in instability. When the state collapsed, people fell back on clan 
relationships for security, but they largely failed to play a role as potential networks of stability. 
They have been politicized. In the aftermath of the civil war and the introduction of the federal 
system, government officials were considered, by the public, to act as representatives of their 
particular clans. They may not only lack self-confidence but a lack of knowledge of the governance 
system. If this is not curbed soon, it may lead to recurrent civil wars or a renewed conflict situation. 
 The Somali elders have managed to resolve most of the neighborhood conflicts and civil cases 
by using a customary law (xeer) based on clan systems. An apparent question is how to deal with 
the clan system in Somalia: Is it a network of instability, potential stability or stability? How can 
one transcend its negative and destructive stage to push it toward a positive and constructive 
position? How can different clans work together? Is it possible to destroy or authorize the clan 
system in the process of working towards stability and sustainability in Somalia’s post-conflict 
situation? 
Throughout the history of Somalia, there were two periods in which the clan system was 
replaced with nationalism. The first period lasted for a span of 15 years, from 1945 to 1960 while 
the second lasted for another 15 years, from 1969 to 1984. The first action resulted in the 
independence of Somalia, while the latter resulted in the only successful and satisfactory 
governmental system in the history of Somalia.  
From 1945 to 1960, Somalis had strong motives, one was to obtain freedom from their colonial 
rulers who oppressed them, and secondly, to become an independent state. In the march to 
260 
 
freedom, slogans and messages in the form of poems and statements were used to encourage unity, 
dignity, brotherhood, and statehood. Likewise, from 1969 to 1984, the holy revolution, mentioned 
in chapter one, mobilized the citizens to adopt a new lifestyle which was based on implementing 
good governance so that citizens could benefit from their human resources. In order to reach 
economic self-sufficiency, eliminate illiteracy, elevate living standards, and introduce the most 
beneficial aspects of modern civilization, the revolution applied a “Self-Help” campaign. The 
revolution used its media and orientation sessions at the neighbourhood level to increase public 
awareness of its message. One of the most significant events which occurred in the early days of 
the revolution was the staging of a monumental ceremony in which clan culture was symbolically 
buried in the public cemetery. From that day onwards, it was forbidden for Somali citizens to claim 
or use clan affiliation in their day-today activities.     
What is needed in Somalia today is a reflection on its history in order to learn lessons from the 
past. When the clan system in Somalia was limited to traditional affairs, it was constructive, 
cooperative, and positive. However, upon politicizing the traditional system of clan collaboration 
and alliances, the people’s behavior and culture changed negatively. Moreover, this worsened 
when religion was also politicized and each clan promoted one cult under the leadership of one 
cleric as a vehicle to power.  
 
6.4. Ways Forward 
6.4.1. The Role of the International Community  
The international state and non-state stakeholders should make a new commitment towards 
rebuilding Somalia with concrete action. This commitment should focus on the three practical 
measures of security, justice and public financial management which are currently barriers to the 
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achievement of marine environmental sustainability and security. The international NGOs should 
closely work with the Somali federal and provincial governments in order to reinforce peace and 
stability. Throughout their activities, they should be looking to broaden collective rather than 
individual interests. For instance, the United Nations Office of Politics (UNPOS) should play a 
significant role in supervising Somalia’s politics and election processes while giving advice to any 
government in power until Somalia fully stands on its feet. Particularly, UNPOS should not only 
observe but physically patrol the presidential election scheduled to take place in August 2016, and 
the subsequent. The office’s main concern should be deterring any form of political corruption and 
compulsion based on bribery to gain power and intimidate innocent citizens.  
1. The money invested in foreign experts by UNDP and various other state and non-state 
agencies must be limited. A large portion of this money should be allocated in resettling 
Somali experts scattered all over the world back to their hometowns. These experts have 
gained and updated their qualifications and experiences in the period in which they have 
lived outside Somalia. Mainly, the Somali citizens who politically endured the last 25 years 
of lack of governance in Somalia may be divided into two groups: Those who were born 
or matured after the collapse of the Somali government, and a very few former officials 
who are in their retirement age. The former group has no idea of what government is about 
as they have never experienced one, while the latter has forgotten about the governmental 
system. The experts from the diaspora would train and become role models for the local 
communities. To avoid renewed conflicts over natural resources, Somalia needs the United 
Nations’ special program to offer targeted training, technical advice, neutral facilitation, 
and impartial analysis so as to identify cooperative solutions and mechanisms for 
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coordinated management (UNDP, 2008, 21). To rebuild a war-ravaged state, this special 
program needs four vital components: 
2. Peacebuilding, consisting of creating and enforcing the means of community integration, 
creating employment opportunities, resource management, and environmental governance.  
3. Peacekeeping which includes providing and facilitating safe service logistics, 
technological capacity building, and equipment to monitor illegal resource exploitation and 
trade, while initiating the re-integration of ex-combatants from natural resources. 
4.  Environmental diplomacy as a strategy for using shared natural resources or common 
environmental threats as a platform for dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation 
between divided communities or countries.  
5. Legal protection which is an enforcement strategy to protect natural resources and the 
environment during armed conflicts through international legal instruments (UNDP, 2008). 
 
6.4.2. Building Capacity within the Somali Federal Government 
The Somali federal government should focus on security issues by rebuilding reliable 
security forces at the national and provincial levels. The government needs to recruit competent 
military and police commanders as well as strong and strategic intelligence units. Concurrently, 
the Somali government needs to rebuild the means of justice. The role of legal experts may not be 
limited to the justice sector. It should cover many parts of the government’s administrative 
functions including security, finance, health, politics, and social relations. The country’s financial 
control unit such as the general auditor must be in contact with these experts. As a result, 
accountable and transparent financial regulations meeting the standards of the global economy 
could be developed.  
263 
 
The federal authority should respect and use local knowledge and culture.158 For instance, 
if the government decides to engage in a policy formulation project, it should endeavour to reveal 
and realize the uncertainties which could be faced. Given that policy-planning for the future will 
unavoidably face unknown information and potential incidents the government should fully 
consider the value of the local information and knowledge so at to consider a range of eventualities.  
 
6.4.3. Building Provincial State Capacity 
Provincial ministries and other related institutions should provide training services on 
safety programs that include the use of modern equipment. When conducting research and surveys 
institutions must promote cooperation among local, provincial, national, regional, and 
international networks of stability as well as potential stability. They need to be strategic when 
using financial-led approaches such as marine product markets, infrastructure facilities and life-
skill training. To make the coastal zones clean and green, provincial offices should establish 
community level mobile or temporary offices in collaboration with local communities and traders.  
The major obstacle to building provincial government capacity is the lack of reciprocal 
relationships between the provincial and national administrations. If there is a clear resource 
management policy formulated in accordance with a local consensus, both the community and the 
national authority can be in agreement on the necessity of resolving conflicts and developing 
clarity with regards to resource consumption and capacity enhancement. To maintain relationships 
between the federal and provincial governments, there must be a focal office/person at the national 
level who is directly connected to each of the provincial focal points to coordinate policies and all 
forms of environmental activities.  
                                                          
158 Especially when engaging in any given project at when, why, what, where, how, and how much money will be invested in it. 
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Provincial and district committees are required to work with the national environmental 
committee which is in charge of drafting a national environment act that governs the country’s 
various environmental sectors. Pomeroy, et al., (2005) suggest reconciling local and national 
policy initiatives, categorizing community-based policy approaches on fisheries into five types: 
instructive, consultative, cooperative, advisory, and informative. In the case of Somalia, each of 
these depends on the local individual’s level of understanding and awareness. The more alerted 
and encouraged they are the more interested they will be in environmental protection and resource 
management. 
Taking advantage of the federal system which has been initiated by Puntland,159 for 
instance, the federal government should encourage and help Puntland to create independent civil 
societies as a democratic initiative. These civil societies would combat the provincial networks of 
instability while deterring the emergence of new ones. On the other hand, they will play a 
significant role in stabilizing the province and avoiding any form of political revolt and insurgency 
at each of the local, provincial, national, and intra-provincial levels. It is a good strategy to establish 
networks of stability to overwhelm those of instability at the local level. Civil networks of social 
movements such as environmentalists, feminists, small-scale traders, sports teams, or any other 
community-based movement need to be established, funded, and politically empowered. Having 
learned lessons from these experiences, Somali federal and provincial governments, with the help 
of the UNDP and UNEP, could conduct scientific studies regarding how to establish and maintain 
durable civil societies.160 
                                                          
159. The new constitution introduced in 2012 legalizes a federal structure to Somalia which recognizes and compliments Somaliland 
and Puntland. The federal government also encourages the two provinces to be a role model for the newly emerging provinces. 
160 In retrospect, several initiatives of social movements have died before their execution, and as such, several civil society 
organizations died before they celebrated their first anniversary. Due to financial, technical, qualification, and manpower 
incapacities, alongside constant criticisms coming to them from the networks of instability, they could not accomplish their 
missions and visions. 
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6.4.4. Local Communities in the Governmental System 
The recently adopted decentralized federal system encourages local communities to 
formulate, implement and evaluate the management of their respective resources. Coastal 
communities in Somalia can formulate and implement marine environmental policy in a dynamic 
bottom-up approach for several reasons. First, in Somalia, national authority is weak, if not 
disabled, because it lacks the basic financial, technical, personnel, institutional, and policy 
enforcement capacities. Secondly, several local NGOs are already operating as a form of a 
community-based governance system. Thirdly, environmental public awareness has been on the 
increase since the beginning of the new millennium at the individual, household, community, 
organizational, provincial, national, and regional scales. Therefore, it is conceivable that Somalia 
will be able to establish and implement a workable environmental policy.  
There is a general mistrust of the central government’s abilities to formulate and implement 
an environmental policy that is in accordance with local needs, especially in the post-conflict era. 
Thus, local citizens do not have confidence in a top-down approach to policy formulation analyses, 
evaluation, decision-making, and implementation. Instead, they would like to initiate policy 
formulation in their local context so as to manage their resources according to their local traditions 
and knowledge. This makes it necessary to approach the problem of marine policy using a bottom-
up system in order to formulate applicable local and provincial environmental policies. However, 
local policy should be consistent with the national policy. Both should maintain constant 
cooperation with the regional and international policies. Local coastal communities need to 
establish neighborhood (derisaynta) policy which was experienced during the country’s 
revolutionary rule in 1969. There must be a locally-administered census in the neighbourhoods, 
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where every ten households’ records are kept. That will also contribute to facilitating any general 
census to be conducted in the future.  
Therefore, what is crucial is to use appropriate strategies to empower individuals such as 
employing means of motivating the individual’s sense of purpose, competence, self-determination, 
assertiveness, and reactiveness. Besides individual empowerment, there must be ongoing 
community -building process as a collective empowerment to foment a sense of belonging, 
involvement in the community and self-mobilization. These concurrent processes, addressing both 
individuals and their communities can create public conscientiousness, leading to interaction, trust, 
consensus, and organization in the community for the purpose of collective interest. In its post-
conflict situation, Somalia needs community-based conservation and traditional security based on 
interactive communications and voluntary instruments applied to mixed-genders in fisheries and 
other economic sectors.  
 Policy network rebuilding in Somalia requires a voluntary work approach, which is based on 
self-remobilization, self-representative, self-administration, and reciprocal participation, without 
waiting for governmental involvement and financial sponsorship. This initiative is the motivation 
for the establishment of social and environmental networks of stability based on collaboration. 
Margerum (2011) reports several post-conflict states that applied an “action collaborative” 
approach to achieving community-based policy systems governing watershed restorations and 
ecosystem enhancement. Therefore, the re-establishment of a self-help voluntary program is 
needed in Somalia. This program can play a significant role in reducing corruption and clannish 
power in community-based policy formulation. 
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6.4.5. Combating Corruption 
Following the above discussion on corruption, corruption arising from fear may come into 
bi-partite form: fear of want or fear of losing. In this theme, I focus on the latter as it is more 
prevalent than the former. The latter could include a fear of imprisonment, fear of torture, fear of 
death, fear of poverty, fear of alienation, fear of failure, fear of losing family members, and fear of 
losing property or means of livelihood. It could also be a fear of being surpassed, humiliated, or 
injured. In Somalia, the victims of all these forms of fear are the minority, poor, unarmed, and 
abandoned youth, who are the vast majority of the terrorists and pirates. Usually, the minorities 
make and practice intentional delays of the majority’s activities. This may provide the impetus for 
ill-will, and it would be difficult to dispel it, unless there is a freedom to pursue the truth unfettered 
by the fear. Within a system that denies the existence of basic human rights, fear, with its various 
forms, tends to be the order of the day. 
To curb the forms of corruption that fall into security matters, police forces should be 
properly trained in human rights, national jurisdiction, faith, police code of conduct, civilization, 
and international humanitarian law. The minds of government members, employees, servants, and 
police officers should be firmly liberated from greediness, nepotism, favoritism, and selfishness. 
This may help hold both the oppressed and oppressor accountable for their actions, and as such, 
both fear and greed can be tackled. As a result, the minds of the public citizens will be free from 
apathy and fear161.  
Having a functional National Domain Server System can reduce the police’s tasks. The 
police or any other concerned security agency can follow the suspect’s activities; what they are 
                                                          
161 The most dangerous form of fear is that which impersonates as common sense or even wisdom, condemning as foolish, reckless, 
insignificant or futile the small, daily acts of courage which help to preserve man’s self-respect and inherent human dignity. 
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doing, what they are talking about, who they are corresponding with, who they are hanging with, 
where they are visiting, and even what they are planning to do. Following the information in their 
registration and data record – login and logout - the whereabouts of criminals and/or any other 
wrongdoers can be located and arrested on the spot (Media Asia, 2002). Certain branches of the 
police detectives will be in charge of these electronic investigations, while also protecting liberal 
privacy law, human rights and democracy. In order to track down criminals with cell phones, the 
suspects’ Mobile Phones can be transformed into a micro spy system (Media Asia, 2002). This 
would help both security bodies and financial controllers to follow the people’s movements and 
pick up offenders. In fact, the functions of Domain Controller (DC) with Geographical Positioning 
System (GPS) and other detective devices can play a significant role in controlling the national 
security without or with minimal physical task forces162. 
As the country is recovering from the aftermath of prolonged civil war, social unrest, 
political instability, and economic and human resource losses, it will be difficult to fully install 
and monitor these devices at the present time. The situation however is not despairing. Wealthy 
Somalis will likely invest in developmental projects in the country’s post-conflict situation. As the 
country is in a post-conflict situation, it is with extreme urgency that these measures must be put 
into effect, based on the country’s financial and technical capabilities. Localities in Asia are 
currently using these security measures to reduce crime and increase security (Media Asia, 2002).  
As a basic responsibility, the Ministry of Information should impose a licensing system on 
the private telecommunication firms including local private radios and telecoms. It should 
designate a certain bandwidth or electronic spectrum. In this regard, all waves and levels of 
                                                          
162 Strictly speaking, spying on the suspect is not limited to listening to what they are saying, but also reading their communication 
based on Short Message Service (SMS) and any other form of text messaging or signaling, Calling Logs, and tracing the history of 
their Uniform Resource Locators (URL).  
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national airspaces such as Ante Meridian (AM), Frequency Modulation (FM), Citizen’s Band 
(CB), and Satellite zones should be strictly governed and licensed where necessary, while 
monitoring and controlling all the activities engaged in. These effective measures of corruption 
control must be taken by each of the federal, provincial, and local administrators. If the government 
does not have sufficient manpower, it can easily control the networks of instability with an 
Electronic-system. Having information means having a plan and power.    
The UN and the World Bank need to initiate a new project on corruption resistance in 
Somalia. This project should not be limited to bribery, but should be extended to using public 
property for personal interest, contracting into a proxy war, seeking power for private gain, and 
giving safe haven opportunities to terrorists. Besides all these efforts against corruption, there 
should be some other significant projects of national reconstruction and reintegration, including 
job creation and income generating projects with the appropriate tools to monitor their outcomes. 
Public services should mark their daily activities on an Electronic System, which can be 
available online on demand163. By installing and maintaining Somalia’s Domain Machinery 
Server, i.e. “.so” in the country could facilitate controlling all forms of business as well as 
insecurity activities in the country. This electronic system can detect illegal operations before the 
implementation, even if the culprits do not use any type of telecommunication164. For instance, it 
was reported that the current president has taken cash from the national treasury both directly and 
indirectly (UN, 2012)165. Every money transaction must be electronically recorded by date, time, 
                                                          
163 For example, all candidates, for any position, should complete application forms and related documents online, and follow the 
updates of their applications online, until they are called for an interview.   
164 Domain Controller (DC4) works easily by the server system responding to the security authentication system, and then, records 
all the activities going on inside the country. This service needs only a few numbers of technical assistants or customer services 
who provide normal service to the clients while recording their information to ease bookkeeping, auditing, and all forms of 
investigations when needed. All that the customer services should do is to give an identified username and password to each client, 
while detecting and interfering any unregistered telecommunication in the territory; private wireless and/or pirate electro-system. 
165 In the case of indirect, it was reported that he used some of his ally ministers to withdrew the monthly salaries of their staff from 
the bank account and hand it to him, leaving the employees unpaid (Jay, 2012; UN’s, 2012; Abrar, 2012). 
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purpose, and the names of the withdrawer and cashier. Due to the country’s fragile and volatile 
situation, it is important to publicize every incoming and outgoing financial transaction with their 
purposes. Each of the concerned Parliamentarian Committee, General Auditor and General 
National Accountant must regularly monitor and follow up every single dollar spent. To implement 
E-recording, the cash donations paid by some of the Gulf Arabian states in the title of ‘hospitality’ 
must be terminated.   
 
6.4.6. The Role of Clans 
 The Somali traditional structure contains complex sources of creating and contributing to 
conflicts and unrests. The same tradition also contains conflict resolution mechanisms based on 
traditional law among the respective clans. Taking an advantage of the latter, an implementation 
of the aforementioned neighborhood program can play a significant role in the disarmament 
mission166. Besides these security operations, local neighborhoods should establish and augment 
the use of their human values by relying on each other for the best amicable community services. 
They can achieve this by mobilizing themselves collectively and training each individual for the 
most appropriate task. Through this cooperation, they can build pan-neighborhood alliances with 
residents holding similar values to increase the responsibility, power, and accountability of local 
government.  
 
 
                                                          
166 Zoned elders and police officers should frequently engage in tough unexpected operations of weapon inspections. This program 
can be named as “gor” locally, which means “Eagle Program.” It is to raid the residential buildings of certainly dangerous 
neighborhoods unexpectedly at 5.00 a.m. for mass inspection. 
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6.4.7. The Diaspora’s Role in the Overall Transformation of the Local NGOs and 
Communities 
The Somali intellectuals in the diaspora should endeavor to succeed where the politicians 
have failed, uniting their country and creating conditions for peace and good regional 
neighbourliness. They should establish a revolutionary movement for the recovery, restoration and 
rebuilding of their country of origin. The Somali diaspora may associate civil societies and 
scientific clubs in which they create a peaceful and environmentally friendly society in the country. 
Local communities can fulfill their responsibilities towards preserving the environment by 
following the guidelines of these scientific clubs/unions. In a good-hearted society, the burden of 
upholding the principles of justice and common decency, falls on the ordinary people, and that is 
what is expected from the Somalis in their post-conflict situation. The quintessential revolution is 
that of the spirit, born of an intellectual conviction in the need for change in the mental attitudes 
and values that shape the course of a nation’s development167. 
Modern management systems in natural resources, environment, marine ecosystems, and 
marine security are relatively new to Somalia. They require a coalition of local and diaspora 
experts. But, both need to be trained, oriented, toured, or, at least, briefed about their respective 
responsibilities so that their work reflects a combination of scientific and indigenous knowledge. 
In order to motivate them, they must be given appropriate responsibilities. Some of the local 
experts may be greedily involved in financial corruption. Thus, any experts’ behaviour and 
political activity must be regulated, limited, observed, and controlled based on one’s assigned tasks 
and responsibilities. 
                                                          
167 A revolution that aims merely at changing official policies and institutions with a view to an improvement in material conditions 
has little chance of genuine success. 
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 The collaboration of the LNGOs must be one connected to each part of civil society such as 
youth, women, community activists, and community elders. Qualification-based educational clubs 
and unions, such as students of science, technology, laws, environment, among others, need to be 
established168. These clubs should be encouraged and entwined with professional unions such as 
medical doctors, lawyers, fishers, politicians, policy analysts, environmentalists, and security 
experts’ associations. This is how local activists and young generations can learn good governance 
at the grassroots level. They will practice and adopt job descriptions, roles and responsibilities, 
between politics and environmental/resource management, how to cooperate and collaborate with 
other stakeholders, political and administrative hierarchies, how to relate management and reports 
between provincial and federal levels, the significance of regional and international cooperation, 
and reasons for cooperating and reconciling in environmental management as a common interest 
against external threats. 
  Ultimately, the diaspora should bridge the link between the LNGOs and local communities until 
they unite them in one voice. That one voice should then approach and build strong reciprocal 
relationships with the provincial executive administrators including ministers, directors, managers, 
experts, researchers, surveyors, and day-to-day data collectors. There, the united local 
communities and provincial administrations must create and maintain reciprocal governmental 
relationships with the federal concerned ministries. As such, information sharing, knowledge 
                                                          
168 Nowadays, local communities are eager of money-making through foreign humanitarian aids, investments, loans, developmental 
projects, and so on. it reached the level of where there are hundreds, if not thousands, of one man show LNGOs which are not 
beyond name, logos, and introductory page in papers which is in one man’s handbag. Still, there is a window of opportunity for 
establishing effective and efficient environmental local NGOs. Most of the current titular NGOs are not environmental but social, 
developmental, political, and other abstract projects. But these NGOs only operate either temporarily or occasionally. Some may 
survive a year or less with funding challenges, and it is rare to find a Provincial Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) or 
LNGO that has survived over a decade unless it is an extended branch of one of the INGOs or Regional Non-Governmental 
Organizations (RNGOs). Even INGOs give occasional, or one-time, subcontracts to implement a particular project. 
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exchange, collective brainstorming, inclusive decision-making, and policy formulation can be 
established. 
 LNGOs should have local economic development committees on their Board Directors (BD). 
These BDs should set key development goals and strategies for their respective NGOs. At this 
stage, educated persons should speak out and find their position in the community without waiting 
for any welcome or invitation from uneducated persons. They also should not be afraid to be 
deemed as individuals advertising themselves, but should think about the public interest. Somalia’s 
educated individuals need to realize that the beautiful culture of respect for knowledgeable people 
has disappeared. Thus, they should neither wait for respect for their good acts nor to be invited or 
delegated a responsibility.  
 
6.4.8. Dealing with Actors and networks of instability 
 To contest external networks of instability, their local agents should be eliminated. A Ministry 
of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) should be established at each of the 
federal and provincial levels. It should closely collaborate with all the ministries concerned 
environmental, marine and security affairs. This ministerial power can marginalize all forms of 
IIUUUO Fishing, pirates and other networks of instability engaged in the country’s politics, 
economy, social, and environmental issues.  
 To tackle the internal and external networks of instability, Somalia needs the ‘6 Cs’ that 
Margrum (2011) recounts: Communication based on sharing information; consultation based on 
formal communication with local community, federal government’s involvement, and local and 
international NGO involved; conflict resolution based on a range of formal and informal processes 
for problems solving between two or more stakeholders; consensus building undertaken in a series 
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of steps through which individuals come together, share information, and reach a mutual 
agreement about problems, goals, and actions; cooperation participants working independently 
toward a common goal; and coordination of participants working jointly toward a common end.  
At the domestic level there are several networks of instability which may neither easily be 
brought into governmental system nor be easily destroyed. The fully-armed warlords, unorganized 
pirates, and warmonger faith-lords such as Al-Shabab and Ahlu-Suffa of the ASW are the most 
significant internal networks of instability. They should first be approached for reconciliation and 
reciprocal relations. Irreconcilable and ungovernable networks must be completely destroyed 
using the political policy called “shape up or ship out”. But before taking such a legal step, the 
government should advance the following steps: to advertise the side effect of this networks’ 
activities and publicize its severe consequences, to criminalize it, to warn the public away from 
having any connection with these networks, to investigate their financial and armament sources 
and block them, to detach them from the local communities, and to boycott any form of their 
advancements and enrichments.  
 To challenge corruption, provincial and federal institutions must improve their capacities in 
financial controls. Specifically, they need to understand how the operation of weekly, monthly, 
quarterly, and annual financial auditing and reporting can attract funds while also sustaining and 
enlarging their institutions. Technically, their understanding needs to be adjusted with the common 
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hierarchical stages of economic and accountant concepts; the first being the ‘consistence 
concept’,’169 then the ‘prudence concept’170  and finally the ‘depreciation concept’.171  
 The acceptance and adoption of these concepts will upgrade institutional reporting, report-
rating, the appreciating of benchmark totals, and a proper system of project development and 
follow-up. Currently, most of the governmental institutions are not fully operational due to a lack 
of understanding and/or application of these concepts. The leaders of these institutions also need 
to consider two significant facets, which are personal integrity and legacy structures. When the 
administrative leaders are not short-sighted, their heads of state will follow suit. This is one of the 
advantages of the bottom up approach. Therefore, there must be an ongoing personal 
administrative and developmental concern among these leaders who desire to rebuild Somalia 
through the implementation of a sustainable marine resource consumption and environmental 
protection policy. 
  
                                                          
169. which means consistently applying a particular accounting methods which has been approved of being relevant to the country’s 
sociopolitical and economic situations (Davidson, 2014). 
170 which result conservatively-stated financial statements by not overestimating the amount of revenues recognized and not 
underestimating the amount of expenses, but conservatively recording the number of assets, and not underestimate liabilities 
(Davidson, 2014). 
171. Depreciation for accounting purposes refers the allocation of the cost of assets to periods in which the assets are used 
(Rajasekaran, V. (2011). 
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6.5. Concluding Remarks 
 There is a strong correlation between sustainability and stability/security. In order for a country 
to have environmental sustainability, there must be sociopolitical and economic stability in a 
country. However, in today’s Somalia, a state that is in its early stage of recovering from 
sociopolitical instability, there are opportunities for the implementation of environmental 
sustainability practices while tactically and gradually obstructing the sources of instability.  
 In this dissertation, I attempted to seek practical and applicable solutions to the marine 
environmental degradation and insecurity in the Somali basin. These subject matters are dependent 
on the country’s sociopolitical and economic activities engaged in by complex actors both in the 
sea and land. Using a multi-dimensional bottom-up approach, I found that each of the local 
communities172, provincial governments173, the federal government, and regional/international 
state and non-state stakeholders who are the actors and networks of stability have vital and 
practical roles to paly in creating efficient marine environmental sustainability and security in the 
Somali basin. 
 At the local community level, traditionally, Somali citizens are flexible and like to act 
consistently with the modern civilization and technology174. Taking advantage of this essential 
capacity, environmental activists, NGOs, and representatives of various social 
organizations/groups should publicize the importance of environmental protection at individual 
and community levels. Secondly, since the vast majority of the Somalis are committed to their 
                                                          
172 individual citizens, local NGOs, social organizations, moderate religious leaders/organizations, and representatives of local 
fisheries 
173 Somaliland, Puntland, Jubbaland, Galmudug, South-Western, and Mogadishu. Others are still in the making.  
174 For instance, since the beginning of the new millennium, even though, there has been no reliable economic and effective 
governmental system in the country, Somalia has been the most successful country in the telecommunication usage compared to 
its regional neighbors (Dudde,2012). 
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faith, moderate religious/spiritual leaders must encourage the protection of environment, resource 
management and public security according to their religious commandments.  
 Local intellectuals, entrepreneurs, spiritual leaders, and elders must actively work on 
community reintegration in order to wane the clan system. Somalia’s local communities have 
relatively reliable traditional knowledge about resource conservation. They are chiefly dependent 
on nature. If the external networks of instability are tackled by NATO, local fisheries will be able 
to pacify their seawaters, manage their coastal resources and protect their environment. All they 
need will be occasional workshops held by the local NGOs175.  
  At the provincial level, in order to make local communities practices more viable according to 
modern environmental research findings, both governmental and non-governmental institutions 
must implement pilot projects in environmental science to increase local awareness concerning 
sustainable resource consumption. The cost of educating laypersons will be limited to a small 
amount of media coverage176.  
  Overall, the provincial governments need to demonstrate good governance practices to the 
international community in order to attract further aid and investment. However, they need to 
realize that since they are not recognized as independent states, their voice will not be heard by the 
international community. Therefore, each of the active and passive provincial governments must 
be motivated by its interests, which they cannot achieve without the approval of the federal 
government.  
                                                          
175 Environmental sustainability must originate from individual behaviors, local communities’ demands, provincial willingness, 
and national efforts. This process can ensure that environmental sustainability strategies originate within the institutional and 
corporate policies which are reflective of local demands. As such, environmental management needs to be based on 
environmentally responsible practices which originate from behavioral change at the individual levels. 
176. Lack of restriction in the Somali trade and social movement in both internal and external locations, is one of the factors 
that can teach individual traders and money-lords about environmental protection and sustainable development as well as the values 
of security and governance. What may help the Somali traders is the hint of environmental significance that they may obtain through 
interacting with foreign traders. Foreign traders apply their respective countries’ rules and regulations pertaining to environmental 
protection and may have some knowledge of it too. 
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 The federal government should improve its political, social, environmental, economic, law 
enforcement, and justice capacity with regards to the provincial governments in order to create an 
environment of trust and collaboration. The upcoming government177 has a better chance than its 
preceding. Since the end of the interim governments and the harsh civil war, Somalis have been 
gradually accepting governing authorities. What is needed is to focus on strengthening the 
relationships between the federal and the provincial governments and that among the neighborly 
provinces so as to build political consensus and trust.  
 By having a single voice, single representative, single policy principle, single objective, and 
single motive, Somalia can establish and maintain a reciprocal relationship with the external world. 
Henceforth, it will be able to comply with the terms of regional and international agreements, 
treaties and conventions. Therefore, Somalia will have working regional and international bilateral 
and multilateral agreements. Then, it will be able to control its marine resources and environment 
by detecting any form of internal and external illegal, illicit and insecurity activities. Physically, 
Somalia will be in a position to investigate the power, strategies, strengths, skills, weakness, and 
geographical activities of the networks of instability which operate in its marine territory. It should 
be able to study, monitor and investigate all of the sociopolitical and economic actors and networks 
which operate in the country. To obtain the comprehensive information, the government should 
seek various information sources both overtly and covertly. The active networks can be dealt with: 
1. To strengthen and assist the actors and networks of potential stability 
2. To approach and classify the actors and networks of instability by attracting those prone to 
change from negativity to either positivity or neutrality so as to promote stability or potential 
stability. The strategic approach to managing the actors and networks of instability must be based 
                                                          
177 which is expected to be elected in September 2016. 
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on dividing them into two groups: a reconcilable group and an irreconcilable group, and then, 
governable and non-governable. The federal government, taking the initiative, needs to recognize, 
approach and invite all the networks to a win-win cooperation.178   
3. To avoid anything that could demoralize the actors and networks of stability, and work on how 
they could either attract or destroy the actors and networks of instability.  
4. To attract the international and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) participate in 
defeating the actors and networks of instability, the government should register and reconcile with 
them using legal governmental authority and/or compromises.  
  
  
                                                          
178 In order to attract all the networks, the government may unexpectedly praise them through the public media; justify and 
forgive their previous illegal activities, send friendly messages to them; send reconciliation and cooperation requests based on a 
win-win situation to them; approach them in a person and negotiate with them face to face; and talk to them through mediatory and 
arbitrary delegations. However, all these steps must be weighed with what is needed from them, the public interest, their power, 
the gravity of their activities, and so on. During all these processes, the government should be working on strategies to 
diplomatically fragment the networks of instability in case they intend to cheat the government, act dishonestly, blot conspiracies, 
and/or intend to hide negative agendas. The different levels of government must build their capacities to defeat the networks of 
instability by using either cold and hot/open wars strategies. They should endeavor to obtain the necessary equipment, legal 
instruments, technology, manpower, and facilities. 
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